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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Palestinian Leaders Jailed in Egypt

44000680 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 13 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] [Editorial Report] The Arabic-language Cairo newspaper AL-AHALI reports on page 1 of its 13 September issue that Egyptian Interior Minister Zaki Badr ordered the detention of some Palestinian leaders who were visiting relatives in Egypt last week. They include 'Awni Jabril al-Najah, Palestine Council member and director of the Palestinian Soccer Union; Ra'fat Shahin Muhammad, member of the Palestine Labor Union; and Husayn Ibrahim Mahdi; they were placed in Abu-Za'bal prison. The newspaper adds that the number of Palestinians being held in detention is 12. A complaint against the detention order was filed.

Egypt, Israel Compete for African Influence

African Stances on Arab-Israeli Conflict

45040457 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 29 Jul 89 p 8

[Report by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi: "Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in African Arena"]

[Text] Throughout the various phases of Afro-Arab cooperation, with its prosperity and its setbacks, one Arab circle, namely the PLO, has tried to maintain extremely warm African relations under all circumstances and to steer these relations away from the problems experienced during the setback periods which saw Israel's infiltration of Africa. The PLO has relied on concerted intrinsic efforts in a serious endeavor to stem the Israeli invasion of the continent. The continent has witnessed Israeli-Palestinian battles that have turned Africa into a new theater for an Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

To begin, we register at the political level a number of African stances supporting the Palestinian cause:

Support for General Assembly resolution No 3151 of 1973 which condemns the racist alliance between South Africa and the Zionist regime.

Support for resolution 3237 of 1974 which accepts the PLO as an observer member of the United Nations.

Support for resolution 3379 of 1975 which considers Zionism a racist movement.

From 1976-78, 73 percent of the African countries voted in support of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

But Afro-Arab relations were influenced by the Camp David accords. Dispersal of the Arab efforts and the Arab states' preoccupation with their own battles encouraged a number of African countries, especially those supported by the United States, such as Liberia,

the Ivory Coast, Zaire, and the Cameroon, in which Israel has had consulates since 1948, to resume their relations with Israel.

Since the PLO settled in Tunisia in 1984, the organization launched a concerted effort in the African continent—an effort which once reached the point when 'Arafat visited 30 African countries in a single tour in March 1987, the same month in which Israel resumed its relations with the Cameroon, the last African country to resume these relations to date.

At the Israeli Level

The volume of trade cooperation between Israel and the four countries has amounted to nearly \$200 million in the form of commodity import and export deals.

Israel has a presence in six countries in the form of businessmen and Jewish institutions which, in most cases, have direct dealings with these countries, namely: Ethiopia, Kenya, the Gabon, Uganda, Nigeria, and Malawi.

Israel has military training, agricultural, construction and health experts in a number of countries, especially in the Ivory Coast, the Cameroon, Ghana and Central Africa.

At the Palestinian Level

All the African countries, excluding Zaire, have officially recognized the Palestinian state. The following eight countries have raised the representation to ambassadorial level: Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea, Senegal, the Congo, Zimbabwe and Gambia.

At present, the PLO has 34 diplomatic missions in Africa. The PLO had its first diplomatic representation in Dakar in 1971 and its latest in the Republic of Cape Verde in 1987.

The representation of Sulayman al-Harfi in the OAU has been raised from the level of liberation movement observer to state observer.

To date, the PLO has nearly 80 bilateral agreements to provide the African countries with experts in the areas of medicine, education, and engineering.

The PLO requests that only means of transportation and housing be provided to these missions. The PLO pays their salaries. The countries with which the PLO has bilateral agreements include Guinea, the Congo, Cape Verde and Mozambique.

U.S., Israel, Egypt in Africa

45040457 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Aug 89 p 8

[Mahmud Bakri Commentary: "Egypt and Israel Face-to-Face in Africa"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The recent period, especially since the election of President Mubarak as OAU

chairman, has witnessed an escalation of the Egyptian-Israeli confrontations in Africa. In this context, important information acquired by AL-SHA'B exposes the dimensions of the Israeli movements in this regard. This information shows that Israel's Mosad recently submitted to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir a report accusing the Egyptian Foreign Ministry of having drafted an action plan for Africa which fundamentally seeks to counter the Israeli policies in the continent.

The Mosad report alleges that the plan calls for reducing the areas of political and economic cooperation between Israel and the African countries.

The information also shows that Shamir immediately instructed Moshe Arens, his foreign minister, to launch a strong movement in the U.S. administration to dissuade Egypt from its plan. The Israeli ambassador in Washington did actually convey to John Kelly, the assistant U.S. secretary of state for Middle East affairs, an urgent message urging Washington to intervene immediately with Egypt in order to contain the situation which, if it escalates, will affect the Egyptian-Israeli relations.

If Israel has its obvious objectives and ambitions in Africa, then the United States fully agrees with the Israeli vision. This was evident in a request recently submitted by the U.S. administration on the occasion of President Mubarak's assumption of the OAU chairmanship, expressing its wish that the Egyptian Government hold discussions with a number of African countries, and urging them to permit the United States to establish military bases in strategic parts of the continent.

Even though Egypt had turned down this U.S. request, the United States resubmitted it in a different form. Prior to heading for Addis Ababa to take part in the 25th session of the OAU, President Mubarak received a message from President George Bush expressing his willingness to start a dialogue on the indebtedness of the African countries. But Bush tied this to what he called reaching a common understanding with the United States on the security and strategic dimensions of the African countries.

Israeli Envoy

As for the Israeli-Egyptian conflict in Africa, the information shows that while President Mubarak was discussing with the African leaders the drafting of a common security policy for the continent's countries—a policy which calls for unified strategic planning depending on the importance and special nature of each region—and while he was discussing with them the Egyptian effort aimed at adopting a common stance toward the Israeli policies in the occupied territories, Israel had actually begun preparing to confront the ideas presented by President Mubarak. In this regard, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir dispatched an Israeli envoy carrying special messages to the African leaders after the 25th session was concluded.

Shamir's messages warned these countries against being swayed by the Egyptian opinions and ideas on the Arab-Israeli conflict and threatened to halt the military cooperation with these countries if they accept these ideas.

Within the same context, Shamir has resumed his contacts with the U.S. administration so that it may play a more effective role in pressuring Egypt.

The fact is that if the interventions in the African continent involve more than one party, the Egyptian-Israeli conflict surpasses the limits of what is customary in this phase. This augurs a more heated phase which will be witnessed by Africa in the coming period. It is a phase which will undoubtedly have various reverberations and ramifications for numerous strategic regions in the African continent.

Egyptian Job Hunters Find Little in Libya

45040493a Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM
in Arabic 5 Aug 89 p 10

[Article by al-Sayyid Salamah: "Returnees From Libya Warn: You Will not Find Employment Opportunities, Only a Place for One To Sleep In the Streets and Parks; Painful Experiences Recounted by Those Who Went and Returned Disappointed a Few Days Later; Tourist Agencies Mislead the Simple-Minded into believing Employment Is Available so That They May Make Millions"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] I traveled more than 800 km from Cairo to al-Sallum, and for more than 72 hours, I lived with the traffic going into and returning from Libya through the al-Sallum checkpoint. Tens of tourist and government buses transported hundreds of university graduates, farmers, and craftsmen, all of whom had packed up their belongings in their towns and villages and headed for Libya. This is what I saw at the passenger hall of al-Sallum checkpoint.

The same buses carried hundreds of Egyptian passengers. But this time, they were returning, and the passengers were in a different state than that in which I had seen them at the passenger [departure] hall.

Upon their return, those present in the arrival hall yelled at every official they met: Don't let these people go so that they will not go through the bitter experience we have undergone.

Here are some examples of the complaints I heard from our national wealth, our manpower.

Mustafa 'Ali 'Awad, a 52-year old tile layer from Imbabah said: When the borders with Libya were reopened and I heard about the resumption of travel without employment contracts, I got my papers ready, managed to get enough money, and was barely able to get a ticket with the intercession of a relative working in a tourist agency. I took the bus from Cairo to al-Sallum checkpoint where I found a number of Egyptian workers

who had returned without being able to get work. They warned me against going, but I did not believe them, and carried on with my trip. I disembarked in Benghazi, and I found myself in a big square crowded with Egyptians. It looked as if it were al-Sayyidah Zaynab Square. It overflowed with peasants and people from Upper Egypt. I asked: Where am I? The answer was: In Umar al-Mukhtar Park. I asked: Why are you sitting here? Why don't you go to work? They laughed and nobody answered. By nightfall, my ears had been filled with hundreds of stories and tales. Suddenly, I saw tens of people moving to look for a piece of cardboard. Then, I saw them spread their empty cardboard boxes on the ground and sleep in them until the morning. Like hundreds of Egyptians, I spent my night there. In the morning, I rushed to a tourist agency representative and gave him all the money I had for a return ticket on 29 July.

Cardboard Hotel

[Passage omitted] Al-Sayyid Zayn al-'Abidin, a 24-year old carpenter from Ismailia, said that the employment system in Libya is different from that in Egypt. When we read the tourist agency advertisements about travel, we were not aware of this difference. The Libyan system is a partnership system. One agrees with the contractor on a certain percentage of the profits, depending on the length of time one works at the construction site or the farm, and then gets a part of the net profit made for wages.

Orphaned Buffalo

[Passage omitted] Mahmud Sa'd Mursi, a 29-year old teacher, said that the problem is not with those who have returned because of the lack of employment opportunities. The tragedy is those who cannot come up with the money for a return ticket. Some of them beg the tourist agencies' representatives, others sell their watches or their leather wallets in order to come up with the money for a ticket. I cannot say more. It is not just a problem of profits made by the tourist agencies at the expense of Egypt's reputation. The officials must make an immediate and well-studied decision.

Egypt's Reputation

'Ali Adham, a 25-year old who has a BA in business, said: Where are the officials in charge of regulating the volume of Egyptian labor going to Libya? Where are the studies on the market needs of every craft or profession? Why isn't there order instead of the chaos I experienced in Libya for 72 hours?

He added: Even though my catastrophe is big, considering the fact that I borrowed money to buy the ticket and that I don't know how to repay it, it diminishes in comparison with what I saw there. New rules must be established to regulate travel. We must not be content with a traveler's employment permit and statement that he has an opportunity for employment. The authorities in charge must require an employment contract, not

imaginary opportunities. Otherwise, their main objective is to get the employment permit fee. They collect the fee with their right hand, and with their left hand, they pay manyfold the fee from Egypt's reputation.

Three Million!

At al-Sallum checkpoint, I met a major tourist company official who told me: When the borders were reopened, company studies affirmed that we could make a profit of 3 million pounds in 6 months if we implemented a certain employment plan based on operating all of the company's buses and leasing buses from other companies. We printed a large number of advertisement posters, and distributed them through our representatives in the major cities and villages.

The early signs of our plan's success have already surfaced. When the borders were first reopened, we operated 14 buses daily, each with a capacity of 54 passengers. The price of a ticket is 200 pounds. A simple calculation says that we have succeeded.

I said: You have succeeded in exploiting the hardship of simple workers and peasants?

He responded: I am a businessman. To me, it is an opportunity that has to be exploited.

Hardship of the Simple-Minded

All the official agencies at al-Sallum checkpoint unanimously agree that it is necessary to carefully regulate the travel of Egyptian workers on the basis of studies that determine the Libyan labor market's needs, and that this travel should not be allowed to remain as haphazard as it is at present.

A statistical report prepared by Colonel Sa'id Salim, director of the al-Sallum passport section, says that 70,000 passengers left for Libya from the 28th of last May, the date when al-Sallum checkpoint was reopened, to the end of last July, and that 67,000 passengers arrived from Libya, including more than 40,000 Libyans. The others are Egyptian workers who returned at short intervals because of the lack of employment opportunities available at the present.

Qasim Jabr, al-Sallum's town chairman, stressed a worker should not be allowed to go unless he has an employment contract, rather than the current system whereby the traveler writes in his travel report that he has an opportunity for employment when in fact all such opportunities are imaginary and unreal. The travel agencies must also take a position.

Finally, I listened to the opinion of Kamal Mansur, the governor of Marsa Matruh, who also stressed that the issue must be regulated, and that it must be viewed from an economic perspective subject to the supply and demand factor, because our manpower is a wealth which we must protect.

The governor added that a decision must be made on the travel agencies that are everywhere and that exploit simple people to make a profit. We must keep sight of the proverb: "A twig in its soil is some sort of wood [as published]." This is the picture that I encountered, and for which I traveled 800 km from Cairo to al-Sallum. I have conveyed what I saw and what I heard from the workers. What is concealed is greater. There is a need for somebody to move quickly.

Tunisian Group Denies Allegations of Libyan Control

Formation of Group Detailed

45040456 Tunis LES ANNONCES
in Arabic 30 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by 'Imad al-Hadri: "Whole Truth About Revolutionary Committees in Tunisia—Their Formation, Principles, Membership"]

[Text] Exclusive by AL-I'LAN—The announcement recently that papers have been submitted applying for a permit for a political movement under the name, "Revolutionary Committees," came as a surprise to everyone. Everyone thought that Libyan-oriented political movements interested in Tunisia had stopped functioning by decree of Colonel al-Qadhafi shortly after 7 November.

It was also a surprise because the desire to form a party is against the principles of the revolutionary committees.

AL-I'LAN has tried to discover the identity and history of those involved in this initiative and the reasons that led to it. Probing more deeply, it has sought to reveal the history of the Tunisian opposition in Libya.

According to the application papers for the permit, and as is well known, the Revolutionary Committees movement in Tunisia is led by Mohamed el-Fatih Kefi, a native of Mateur.

The name, "el-Fatih [Conqueror]," is not a nickname, nor was it added after his activity in Libya. It has been his since his birth. His father, Abdeljelil el-Fatih was an actor. At the time his son was born, he was playing the role of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror in a play that was being produced; he named the boy after the sultan whose role he liked to play.

Mohamed el-Fatih moved to Libya in the mid-seventies and began to be active there in a number of organizations. We shall return to these after we learn something about the Tunisian opposition in Libya.

From Youssefists to Gafsa

The roots of the Tunisian opposition in Libya are Youssefist, because a significant number of Youssefist leaders fled the country to Libya after the clash with Bourguiba. A group of them participated in the unsuccessful attempted coup of 1962.

Just after the Libyan revolution of 1 September 1969, a group of Youssefists and a number of Tunisian nationalist opposition figures met to form the so-called National Progressive Front for the Liberation of Tunisia.

In December 1977, the so-called Association of Arab Workers, or the Libyan branch of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor, was founded. After the events of 26 January and the arrest of the central leadership, it came to consider itself the legitimate representative of the working class in Tunisia.

After the events in Gafsa in January 1980 and the announcement of support for them from a number of quarters, the most important of these being the so-called Tunisian Armed Resistance, an important meeting took place in Paris on 3 February. At the end of it, the formation of the so-called Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Tunisia was announced. It gathered together all the Tunisian opposition in Libya. Mohamed Rahilah Munsaga was appointed chairman of its supervisory body, which also included 'Umarah Daww Ben Nayil, Ammara Manita, Hedi Azzouz, Youssef Abdelfattah, Belkacem Miqashsh, Abdelmajid Chebaane, Khalifah Zorgati, and Mohamed el-Riyahi.

After the movement's first conference in Tripoli in 1980, which chose the Green Book as the movement's constitution, splits began to appear. Belkacem Miqashsh founded the so-called Jerba Declaration Organization, which undertook the operation of blowing up the gas pipeline between Tunisia and Algeria. Mohamed el-Mukhtar el-Riyahi founded the so-called Movement of Free Unionists. Mohamed Rahilah founded the Revolutionary Committees movement, which continued to operate by itself until about the end of 1987, after the rest of the organizations had disappeared.

After the change in the top Tunisian leadership in November 1987 and the restoration of relations between Tripoli and Tunis, al-Qadhafi announced a halt to activity of the Tunisian opposition in Libya. Hundreds of Tunisian opposition figures living in Libya returned home.

Contact

Shortly after the recent Arab summit in Morocco, a group of former opposition figures led by Mohamed el-Fatih Kefi, went to Libya. They stayed in Tripoli's most luxurious hotel and met with a Libyan leader named Milad al-Faqi in the communications office of the Revolutionary Committees. Afterwards, the group returned to Tunisia and presented papers to departments of the Interior Ministry to obtain authorization for the "Revolutionary Committees" party.

Some circles in Libya are propounding the idea that the Revolutionary Committees are a service to Tunisia, since they will halt the advance of the Islamists!

AL-I'LAN has learned that a Libyan official in the communications office (Tunisian area), named Mu'awiyah al-Sawi'i, visited Tunisia recently to make contact with Mohamed el-Fatih and his group for the same purpose.

Conflict With Principles

The Revolutionary Committees movement is known to have been founded about 10 years ago, following Col al-Qadhdhafi's proclamation of the "Jamahiriyah" in his speech in Sabha. The movement is founded on the principle that government belongs to the people through people's conferences. Among the movement's principles derived from the Green Book are: "Whoever forms a political party, betrays," and "Representation is fraud." These principles forbid a people's committee member from assuming a government leadership position.

All this leads one to ask how Mohamed el-Fatih's group allowed itself to betray the principles of the movement by submitting papers for legalization as a political party.

Furthermore, how can it allow itself openly to enter the Tunisian public political arena, which is based on the principle of election to office, when "representation is fraud"?

Not Prominent

As we have mentioned, Mohamed el-Fatih Kefi has been active in a number of organizations. Upon moving to Libya, he joined the 'Urubah [Arabism] Club, where he was active in the acting section. At the time of the events involving the branch of the Federation of Labor, he joined it, but was soon expelled.

In the Gafsa events, Mohamed el-Fatih was invited to work as an announcer in the radio station "Here Is Gafsa." His wife, Mufida Bejaoui, worked in the same organization.

Mohamed el-Fatih then joined the radio station Sawt al-'Arab [Voice of the Arabs], where he became an employee. He was active in the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Tunisia, but was kept away from sensitive activities. When the Revolutionary Committees movement was founded, Mohamed el-Fatih joined it, along with most of those who are now with him in the bureau that supervises the movement in Tunisia—such as Salih el-Dala'i (a native of Nefza), Salem el-Bariqi (a native of Jirjis), Ibrahim el-'Abdawi (a native of Kairouan), Mouldi 'Umarah (a native of Jebiniana), and Hedi Beltaieb (a native of Kasserine). None of them has a long historical background as a militant.

AL-I'LAN has learned that veteran leadership circles of the Revolutionary Committees are very displeased with Kefi's leadership of the movement in Tunisia. They do not consider him to be representing them or representing the principles of the movement.

We have learned that there are intensive contacts between these veteran leaders for the purpose of

announcing some facts about the Revolutionary Committees and its current leaders in Tunisia.

It is not unlikely that this announcement will receive a positive response and approval by the top Libyan leadership, which may have approved the principle of creating Revolutionary Committees in Tunisia, though without confirming any definite names.

The question to be asked is who are the most prominent veteran opposition figures in Libya.

Most Prominent Opposition Figures

Most opposition figures are known to have returned home after the change of 7 November. Some, however, still live in Libya. Among the most prominent of them are:

- Mohamed Ramilah (son of the well-known Youssefist opposition figure Rahhumah Ramilah)—Mohamed was a founder of the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Tunisia, which he supervised for 2 years before the founding of the Revolutionary Committees movement. Ramilah is now a major in the Libyan army.
- 'Umarah Daww Ben Nayil (a native of Medinine)—He was a founder of the National Progressive Front for the Liberation of Tunisia, and then a founder of the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Tunisia. He remained attached to this movement despite all the splits. 'Umarah participated in the Gafsa operation. Sentenced to death, he is now preparing a doctorate in the College of Islamic Mission.
- 'Umarah Daww Manita: He has the same militant career and was sentenced to death after the Gafsa incidents.
- Mohamed el-Mukhtar el-Riyahi (founder of the Movement of Free Unionists): He is under investigation for counterfeiting.
- Abdeljelil el-Khalidi: A former Youssefist, he is now about 70 years old.

Other prominent names who have not yet returned to Tunisia are: Tahir el-Fazi', Mouncef Chtourou, Ali Ben Subayh, Abdallah Ben Subayh, 'Umarah Za'furah, Abdelsalam Thameur, Hussein Belkheir Katibah, Youssef Abdelfattah, Hedi Azzouz, and Said el-Oueshfani.

Among the most prominent veteran opposition figures who have returned are: Belkacem (a founder of the revolutionary movement and the founder of the Jerba Proclamation Organization), Abdelmejid Chaabane, Mbarek el-Saghir el-Telili, and Khalifah Zorgati.

Questions

Many questions remain to be answered:

- Will this organization be recognized, when the Political Parties Law prohibits foreign connection?—

- Will the Libyan leadership agree to support or continue to support Mohamed el-Fatih Kefi and his group, when he does not represent the real Revolutionary Committees?
- How will Libya react if the organization is not recognized?
- What is the truth about the announced halt to activity by the Tunisian opposition in Libya?

Time will tell.

Interview With Group Spokesman

45040456 Tunis LES ANNONCES
in Arabic 7 Jul 89 p 4

[Interview with Mohamed el-Fatih, spokesman of Revolutionary Committees in Tunisia, by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jaridi and Mukhtar al-Kawni; first paragraph is LES ANNONCES introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] After we published an exclusive report last week, there were many remarks, comments, and charges by some journalistic circles. To prove the seriousness of our journalism, which tens of thousands of esteemed readers have never for a moment doubted, we invited the official spokesman of the Revolutionary Committees movement in Tunisia to a lengthy newspaper interview during which we raised the questions that our readers have asked by telephone or in writing. We hope the reader will find that this interview satisfies his thirst, and that it will silence the loose tongues of others.

[AL-I'LAN] Revolutionary Committees in Tunisia—this is a completely unexpected development. How do you explain your initiative?

[El-Fatih] It may be a surprising development, but as a movement it has had its extensions ever since its foundation. Its core was sent out in 1979—not as has been stated in some newspapers—and without knowledge of the Libyans themselves. I emphasize this. Because of conditions that Tunisia was experiencing, the movement continued to work in hiding. The movement has not appeared by accident. It is a product of the Third Universal Theory whose foundation is the Green Book.

[AL-I'LAN] Have Revolutionary Committees been dispatched outside of Libya?

[El-Fatih] Lebanon, the Sudan, and Chad.

[AL-I'LAN] Leaving aside military communities, have Revolutionary Committees been dispatched into civilian communities?

[El-Fatih] The Revolutionary Committees are a revolutionary mass movement. The Revolutionary Committees movement is not necessarily found among military men. Violence is not part of our creed! Perhaps at some times—but the Third Theory is a cultural theory based on civilian human concepts.

[AL-I'LAN] Why did you chose June 1989 to apply for a permit?

[El-Fatih] It was not so much a choice as a necessity imposed by current political conditions. It was natural for us to become visible at this time during a period that has confirmed the trend toward implanting and strengthening democracy.

[AL-I'LAN] Is there a relation between the movement's becoming visible in June 1989 and the results of the Casablanca summit?

[El-Fatih] Really, if timing had a role to play, it can be attributed to accident—the nature of politics! If the region has witnessed a drawing together and a resolve toward what the need for control dictates, the Revolutionary Committees have chosen to emerge at this particular time. This has absolutely no relation with the Fes decisions or with what happened in Fes.

[AL-I'LAN] Have you applied for a permit after advice from Arab parties?

[El-Fatih] Before we applied for a legal permit, broad-based consultation took place. It was decided that the time had come to come forward and apply for a permit, given the circumstances—those of the political scene—pluralism and a firm faith in the democratic process. After 7 November, we had militants in Tunisia—after the amnesty. We studied the conditions, and the idea emerged to apply for a legal permit to work visibly and openly.

Every zealous and militant patriot is returning to use his environment and his natural base as a point of departure, especially after the occurrence of what has generally been called “national reconciliation.”

[AL-I'LAN] Doesn't the slogan, “Whoever forms a political party, betrays,” conflict with your movement's application for a permit as a political party?

[El-Fatih] We see no contradiction or difficulty on this point. Since 1982, the Revolutionary Committees movement has announced that it has its own concepts and customs. All members of the committee thought there was no contradiction. The existing pluralism is an encouraging framework for intellectual and political activity and for spreading the Third Theory in another period. The broad masses have freedom to chose!

[AL-I'LAN] If there is no contradiction with Tunisian pluralism, isn't there a contradiction with al-Qadhdhafi.

[El-Fatih] “Whoever forms a political party, betrays,” is a slogan to be raised in a mass society like Libya. In Tunisia, however, with the emergence of pluralism that will lead to the unconditioned—i.e., the nation—the nation is what evaluates mass government and chooses whomever it wants.

[AL-I'LAN] To be clearer, what is your movement's relation to al-Qadhdhafi?

[El-Fatih] We start from permanent principles. As for the question of al-Qadhdhafi, neither he nor anyone else has

the right to impose this movement or theory arbitrarily. We must not practice the opposite of what we preach! The movement is a tool for indoctrination that leads to this truth: There is no authority over the masses other than the rule of the masses. The sincerest of regimes cannot satisfy the masses completely.

[AL-I'LAN] Then don't you think the establishment of your movement embarrasses al-Qadhdhafi?

[El-Fatih] Personal considerations are nonexistent, especially since the colonel has his own permanent principles on which bases his action and that control his revolutionary activity. Basically, this does not much concern us. Al-Qadhdhafi is a revolutionary. I do not think this embarrasses him.

[AL-I'LAN] Before you, there was Bechir Essid's movement, the Democratic Unity Grouping. The establishment of your movement has raised questions on the political scene.

[El-Fatih] The movement has existed since 1979. As I see the issue, given the reasons that made it incumbent for us to apply for a permit, we decided to legalize our movement, even though we respect Professor Bechir Essid and his view, and notwithstanding our respect for any organization.

We respect Bechir Essid because we are fundamentally nationalists and because we start from an ideological perspective that holds that the basic factor is social—i.e., national—activity.

[AL-I'LAN] Does the establishment of the Revolutionary Committees movement render Bechir Essid's card worthless?

[El-Fatih] There is no relation between the establishment of the movement and Professor Bechir Essid's present situation—outside of Tunisia. We know nothing about that.

[AL-I'LAN] The Tunisian scene is saying that the establishment of the movement has come to make things go from bad to worse among the nationalist groups in Tunisia. Just when the nationalist groups were trying to unite ranks, your movement emerged to complicate matters.

[El-Fatih] We did not come to make things go from bad to worse. It is not merely the right of the nationalist movement to unite; necessity is pushing it to do so. We go beyond the narrow concept. We proclaim the view that nationalism is something self-evident. The struggle for the establishment of Arab unity does not call for the establishment of a nationalistic movement molded in this concept to show forth Arab unity; rather, it is by the existence of the Green Book's ideology, which is the best expression of freedom and unity. Thus, we do not think that our movement will create any confusion in the ranks of the nationalist groups. On the contrary, it lays down and proposes solutions that call for deeper study and comprehensiveness.

[AL-I'LAN] Have you been subjected to harassment following your application for a permit?

[El-Fatih] We have not been subjected to any harassment. We stress this in order to strengthen a pluralistic society.

[AL-I'LAN] Based on the Political Parties Law, one impediment to the granting of a permit is the existence of a relation on the part of any party or movement to foreign parties.

[El-Fatih] We have already affirmed to the relevant departments and in newspaper columns that we are an independent movement in our decisions and action, whether on the material or on the human level. The law is clear. If we have applied for a permit, it is because we have well understood the basic law.

[AL-I'LAN] How many militants does the movement number?

[El-Fatih] The movement exists on the country level and on the mass level. God willing, we are optimistic about obtaining a permit. At that time, the size of this movement will become evident. In particular, the movement is acting on a basic principle in the movement's ethic, namely, that it wishes to work publicly and will become visible when it obtains the permit.

[AL-I'LAN] What are the sources of the movement's funding?

[El-Fatih] The sources of the movement's funding are clear. We rely on affiliates and on practices that the law allows. It also comes from donations and contributions—even from people who are not members in the movement. Bear in mind that our sources will be made public and revealed according to the requirement of the law.

[AL-I'LAN] Do you expect the establishment of a movement similar to yours in Algeria?

[El-Fatih] We welcome the change that Algeria is witnessing. We expect it and predict it.

[AL-I'LAN] And Morocco?

[El-Fatih] As I said, a movement may exist, while we know nothing about it. Wherever the Green Book and mass thought reach, a movement of Revolutionary Committees may arise.

[AL-I'LAN] What is your position on the al-Nahdah movement and the Salafiyah movements in the Arab world?

[El-Fatih] We believe that religion is at once sacred, individual, and personal. The relation of the Muslim individual to religion is immediate; no authority or mediation can interfere in it. We therefore believe that religion should not be employed politically to the extent of bloody violence and the rending of societies.

At the same time, in our Arab Islamic society, the Koran must be a basic source of legislation.

[AL-I'LAN] Does this mean that you are for polygamy?

[El-Fatih] There is no Koranic verse that enjoins polygamy.

[AL-I'LAN] Isn't there polygamy in the [Libyan] Jamahiriya?

[El-Fatih] The Revolutionary Committees have called for abolishing polygamy!

[AL-I'LAN] Well, what about the verse, "Marry such women as seem good to you" [Koran 4:3]?

[El-Fatih] As long as we appeal to the Koran, we use it as a point of departure for giving legislation to the masses, who have the final say. Nevertheless, we have no organizational relationship with Libya.

[AL-I'LAN] If you obtain a permit, will you call for closing bars and ending the sale of alcoholic beverages?

[El-Fatih] We leave it to the masses, who decide what is right. If the masses find that alcohol is not detrimental to the family, the pocket, and morals and does not destroy society, they have the freedom to choose what they want.

[AL-I'LAN] Why didn't you join the Democratic Unity Federation?

[El-Fatih] Clearly, the Unity Federation, despite our support for it even at the beginning of its formation—for we were quick to call for unity... However, what we read in the information media is enough for us. The Federation still works for unity... We give expression to a wider perspective than the one that expresses only the nationalistic concept.

We give expression to things broader than partisanship and packaging. Nevertheless, we do not reject the establishment of a democratic unity organization.

[AL-I'LAN] Your personal relationship with al-Qadhafi?

[El-Fatih] Only a revolutionary relationship.

[AL-I'LAN] Your relationship with Bechir Essid?

[El-Fatih] A good relationship as a militant.

[AL-I'LAN] Your relations with al-Nahdah?

[El-Fatih] We are waiting for it to obtain its permit. Why? So that its real members can emerge. We do not know its members.

[AL-I'LAN] Your relation with the ruling party?

[El-Fatih] Our relation with the movement for change is very good.

[AL-I'LAN] Your relation with Iran?

[El-Fatih] We have none.

[AL-I'LAN] With Algeria and Morocco?

[El-Fatih] The relation of citizens within the North African Union.

[AL-I'LAN] What is the economic program of the movement in Tunisia?

[El-Fatih] A vision of emerging from any economic crisis on the basis of the permanent principles proposed in the second chapter of the Green Book.

[AL-I'LAN] What are these principles?

[El-Fatih] Transformation of society from a service and consumer society to a productive society, etc. Eliminating any form of monopoly.

Mohamed el-Fatih Introduces Himself

Mohamed el-Fatih, son of Abdeljelil Kefi, was born in the town of Mateur in 1952. He is the son of a militant in the ranks of the Tunisian Free Destourian Party since the thirties, until those who were described as "Grenadans" were suppressed.

He imbibed the principles of freedom from the axioms to whose affirmation his father dedicated his life—beginning with Tunisia's liberation from colonialism, and ending with the strengthening of its Arab Islamic identity.

He never stopped at any particular limit of study, for knowledge is not restricted to organized classes in schools.

He was active in many cultural and social fields before moving to the Libyan Jamahiriya, where he worked as a newspaper editor and as a radio and television producer. He participated in most international and Arab conferences and meetings with an intellectual and militant character—for example, the international critique of the Third Universal Theory (the Green Book), the Mediterranean Conference on the Motives, Concepts, and Causes of Terrorism, and other meetings and conferences given by Arab and international mass organizations.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH Discusses Role of Leaflets in Intifadah

44040536 Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 23 Jul 89 pp 26-29

[Article: "Cover Story: the Enemy and the Intifadah; Israeli Study of Political Leaflets, the Other Weapon after Stones; the Intifadah's Written Leadership"]

[Text] A lengthy article appeared in the 23 June 1989 issue of HA'ARETZ by Sha'ul Mish'al, a political science

lecturer at Tel Aviv University and a scholar of Palestinian politics. The article included a review of a book entitled, "Stones Are not Everything: the Intifadah and the Leaflets as a Weapon." The book was published by The Unified Kibbutz (Hakibutz Hame'uhad), and by Ofaqim Publishing House. The book affirms that, as far as the Palestinian intifadah (uprising) is concerned, the intifadah's public announcements are more important and more useful weapons. The author also affirms that statements issued by the intifadah's leaders and by HAMAS [the Islamic Resistance Movement] influence the conduct of local residents and also the conduct of the Israeli authorities. Because this is an important subject and because this is a new Israeli treatment of it, FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH is printing this article in installments.

Leaflets were not invented by the intifadah. They are as old as the Jewish-Arab conflict on "the land of Israel." Leaflets have been used to express positions and to control conduct. They have been a part of Arab-Palestinian politics since the days of the British mandate after 1948. After 1967, leaflets played a bigger part in Arab-Palestinian politics as they continued to appear on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and among the Arabs in Israel. This time matters are different. The variety of leaflets, the frequency of publication, and the obedience and compliance they command indicate that the leaflets succeeded in becoming a central factor in the lives of the population. In the absence of influential and duly authorized local leaders amidst the population, the leaflets became "an alternative leadership."

The fact that the leaflets are a central factor is not a coincidence. The leaflets and their authors rely on the ideological and organizational principles of two political tendencies whose roots lie in the midst of the population and go back to the period which preceded the intifadah. These two political tendencies are the national tendency and the religious tendency. The national tendency is represented by Fatah, the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine], the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], and the Palestinian Communist Party. The religious tendency is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Assembly Organization. While the national tendency's power is better known in the West Bank than it is in Gaza, it seems that the religious tendency's presence and influence are basically greater in the Gaza Strip.

After the 1973 war, the PLO and the leftist organizations which revolve around it basically turned to intense political activity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the years which followed 1973, the PLO succeeded in getting the population to support it, and it succeeded in getting control of the centers of power in municipal organizations, student organizations, trade unions, professional associations, and other civilian institutions. This success with institutions was accompanied by success for the PLO's ideas. In its capacity as an organization talking about Palestinian national hopes and Arab

sovereignty, the PLO became a source of political inspiration to broad segments of the population. To many people, the PLO and the Palestinian question became synonymous. Although the Muslim Brothers worked quietly, their actions were not less effective. Their ultimate objective was to establish an Islamic state in all of Palestine. To accomplish that objective, which was considered far-reaching, they would fight a holy war against Israel. Their goal required activities in advance so that believers may be inspired by the spirit of Islam. The Muslim Brothers devoted most of their activities to education and to broad popular activities, and mosques became the principal scenes for their activities. They taught young people the Koran in mosques, and they conducted their information campaigns and their educational activities from the mosques.

The many-sided activities which were carried out by the national and religious camps served their function during the period of the intifadah. That fact became evident in the activities which were carried out by the four organizations which are responsible for writing the public announcements: the Unified National Command for the Intifadah, the Islamic Resistance Movement or HAMAS, leftist Palestinian organizations, and the Islamic Jihad Organization. Each one of these organizations is either ideologically similar to or organizationally tied to the national or the religious tendency.

The two most influential organizations are the Unified Command and HAMAS.

The Unified Command is a coalition of Fatah supporters: the DFLP, the PFLP, and the Communist Party. The close relationship between the Unified Command and the PLO manifests itself in the preface which appears in the Unified Command's public announcements. Since Public Announcement Number 2, each public announcement has started with the following: "No voice shall be superior to that of the intifadah; no voice shall be superior to that of the people of Palestine, the people of the PLO." Since Public Announcement Number 3, it has become obvious that the public announcements are issued by the PLO and the Unified National Command. Signatures of Unified Command and PLO leaders appear at the end of each public announcement.

The fact that leftist tendencies are affiliated with the Unified Command has not prevented them from publishing their own leaflets. It seems that there are two reasons for this. First, they want to emphasize their presence on the scene, and second, they want to point out the ideological and organizational differences between them and Fatah on central issues, especially with regard to Jordan and the attitude toward a political settlement.

Diversity, Frequency, and Effectiveness

Except for the public announcements issued by the Unified Command, the public announcements which are published by the organizations we listed are produced locally and written by activists in the West Bank and

Gaza Strip. But the public announcements which are published by the Unified Command are drafted locally and then sent abroad to the PLO where they are edited. After all the editing is done, the public announcements are broadcast from the Voice of Palestine in Baghdad and the Jerusalem Radio Station in Damascus! Afterwards, the public announcements are distributed to the population.

In addition to the regional leaflets, the local leaflets which are published are inspired by the Unified Command. Their aim is to interpret the instructions which are mentioned in the public announcements, and to turn them into specific orders in accordance with the needs of the place where the leaflet is published.

Sectors of the population have their own special leaflets. These are published in different places by professional or volunteer organizations. Indications that these leaflets are written by the Unified Command are evident. Sometimes, there is evidence that leftist organizations and the Communist Party were involved in the publication of these leaflets.

The frequency with which these public announcements are made is high. During the first year of the intifadah (from December 1987 till December 1988) the Unified Command published 31 public announcements, and HAMAS published 33. This means public announcements were published at the rate of two or three a month.

Leftist organizations or Islamic Jihad published less frequently. Estimates indicate that leftist organizations published 20 leaflets during the first year of the intifadah. It seems that this is due to the fact that these organizations are involved in publishing the public announcements which are published by the Unified Command.

The Islamic Jihad Organization is the organization which published the smallest number of leaflets. We were able to review three of that organization's leaflets. The Islamic Jihad Organization claims it is not enthusiastic about publishing leaflets because it believes all the Palestinian masses are leaders.

The differences in the frequency of publishing these leaflets is reflected in the level of success these organizations achieve in getting the people's compliance with the leaflets and securing their obedience to them. While the aim of these leaflets is to define the mode of life on earth, the public announcements made by the Unified Command and by HAMAS are treated by the population as though they are authoritative orders. Compliance with these announcements and obedience to them is quite high. Besides encouraging the intifadah and enumerating its accomplishments, the public announcements try to mobilize the people by means of a series of detailed instructions regarding what is prohibited and what is not. They tell people when and how action is to be taken. Compared to leaflets from the left and from Islamic Jihad, which are usually limited to certain subjects, public announcements from the Unified Command and

HAMAS cover many areas of life such as work, health, transportation, education, agriculture, and trade. These leaflets deal with the timing of a general strike and a partial strike. They deal with how education is to be organized, despite the fact that schools are closed, and they deal with who may travel on the streets during strike days and who may work during those days.

The public statements contain appeals for cooperation and for collecting contributions for the needy and for the families of martyrs and detainees. They contain appeals to boycott Israeli goods, appeals to hurt the settlers, and appeals for the resignation of employees of the civilian administration, especially those who work in the police and in the tax department. Public statements also appeal for the resignation of members of municipal and rural councils.

The public statements which are issued in the Gaza Strip by HAMAS contain religious instructions. They ask people to pray, pay alms, go back to principles and proper conduct, and adhere to rules of behavior which are consistent with the spirit of Islamic morals.

Public announcements made by the Unified Command have an effect not only on the conduct of local residents but also on Israeli authorities. These public announcements have become "action papers" which determine the size and the pace of missions and activities which are carried out by the Israeli army and the civilian administration. These public announcements contain evaluations of those who work in the field of security.

In the absence of influential and duly authorized local leaders within the ranks of the population, the public statements turned into the intifadah's "written leadership." If we think that leadership is determined by the ability to formulate values, define objectives, and command the population's obedience, then the Unified Command and HAMAS, authors of these public statements, meet these conditions.

There are two central differences between the written leadership and its predecessor. First, during the period which preceded the intifadah, the leaders were thought to be political figures who were influential among the population. These figures played roles and held official positions, such as heads of municipal and rural councils, heads of chambers of commerce, and presidents of trade unions. They also held influential positions in which they served as journalists and lawyers.

Following the development of the "written leadership" indicates that its members are not politicians, and that its makeup is not invariable. Arrests and deportations reduced the number of individuals in that leadership organization. If the "written leadership" succeeds in demonstrating its ability to take action, that success is due to the charismatic character which its role assumed, and not to the individuals who make up that leadership organization and preside over it. It is understandable that leaders come and leaders go, but it is the institution which stays and decides.

Second, before the intifadah, the leadership maintained its relations with Jordan and with the PLO at the same time. By comparison, the inclination of the "written leadership," as formulated by the intifadah, is blatantly Palestinian. The "written leadership" does not draw its inspiration from the same course. The PLO's national Palestinian philosophy is not like that of the religious camp. And yet, each one identifies itself as a Palestinian movement on the rise. Both of them play a part in defining the intifadah's objectives and outlining its path. A study of the public statements indicates that the organizations which have been effective in the intifadah have two principal goals: to establish a Palestinian state and to undermine Israel's authoritarian agencies in the area by means of civil disobedience, which would lead to the withdrawal of Israelis from those areas.

The essential difference between HAMAS and the Unified National Command appears to be in the nature of the Palestinian state each wants to establish, in the political course each wants to pursue, and in the stance each wants to assume toward Israel. The differences stem from the fact that the sources of inspiration for these two organizations are different. HAMAS, which is fueled by religious ideology, is working for the establishment of a state based on the canonical laws of Islam in all of Palestine. According to the covenant issued by HAMAS in August 1988, the land of Palestine is a religious endowment and HAMAS is a distinguished Palestinian movement working so that the flag of Palestine can be flown over every part of Palestine. HAMAS is but one episode in a series of episodes in the struggle against Israel. It is an organization which says that giving up parts of Palestine would be impossible because doing that would mean giving up part of the religious duties required of Muslims.

HAMAS has other political reasons to justify the need to reject any attempt at a political settlement with Israel. An example of these reasons can be found in Leaflet Number 28 which mentioned that "Israel understands no other language but the language of force. It does not believe in negotiations, and it does not believe in peace. It will always be evasive, and it will always build up its military and take advantage of an opportunity to attack and humiliate the Arabs." The leaflet also says, "The Arab world is neither so weak that it has to pursue peace with such eager enthusiasm, nor are the Jews so strong that they can impose their wishes. For how long can Israel hold out in the face of all these powers?"

HAMAS also attributes imaginary characteristics to Israel and to the Jews to justify not talking with them. "Israel is a cancer spreading over the Islamic land. It is threatening the Islamic world in its entirety." (Leaflet Number 16) "The Jews are the brothers of apes; they are prophet killers; they are blood suckers; and they are warmongers. It is Islam which will break the Jews and destroy their dream." (Leaflet Number 1) (Note from FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH: This information must be taken with a grain of salt, because its source is an Israeli source.)

HAMAS makes frequent use of historic figures and events from Islamic traditions to assert the religious nature of the conflict with Israel. The names of Muslim military leaders who are sometimes mentioned in the leaflets are those of Khalid Ibn-al-Walid, who fought in the battle of Yarmuk in 634 and who was called Sayfallah [the Sword of God] by our Prophet Muhammad; Salah-al-Din al-Ayyubi, who conquered the Christians in the battle of Hittin in 1187; the Mameluke Sultan Baybars, who also fought the Christians in the battle of 'Ayn Jalut in 1260; and Ja'far Ibn-Abu-Talib, the Prophet Muhammad's friend, who fought against the Byzantians in 629. According to Islamic tradition, Ja'far carried the flag in one hand during the battle. When that hand was cut off, he carried the flag in his other hand. What that hand was cut off too, he placed the flag on his chest and held it to his chest with what was left of his arms until he died.

The leaflets of the Unified National Command paint a picture that is different from the one painted by HAMAS's leaflets. They show that those who prepare the Unified Command's leaflets see reality from many secular perspectives. The Unified Command's leaflets, which are used as mouthpieces for the national tendency, provide equal coverage of Christians and Muslims. "Religion is God's domain, but the homeland is for everyone." The Unified Command's leaflets make almost no mention of heroes or incidents from old Islamic history. Instead, these leaflets often mention figures from modern history who became national heroes. Three names are often mentioned in these leaflets. They are the names of Shaykh 'Izz-al-Din al-Qassam, who was killed by the British in 1935 and was in the forefront of the armed struggle in Palestine; the author and poet Ghassan Kanafani, who was killed in an Israeli army operation in Beirut in 1972; and 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni who died in the Battle of al-Qastal in 1948.

The leaflets try to confirm the bond between Muslims and Christians. Leaflet Number 22, for example, calls upon the people to pray for those who lost their lives. It calls upon people to stage marches and demonstrations to protest steps taken by the occupation authorities against sites that are sacred to Muslims and Christians. Leaflet Number 30 touched upon the upcoming Christmas celebrations and said, "The 24th of December is the day church bells will ring and chants of "Allahu Akbar" [God is great] will be heard from the tops of minarets to celebrate the birthday of the messenger of peace, Jesus Christ, peace be with him. We congratulate our fellow Palestinian Christians, and we ask them to celebrate Christ's birthday by doing nothing more than performing religious rituals."

The conflict with Israel is seen by the Unified Command as a national, not a religious conflict. At the same time, leftist leaflets add a class-social dimension to the conflict. Leaflet Number 28 mentioned that because Palestinians will be able to determine their own destiny and establish an independent state whose capital will forever

be Arab Jerusalem, Palestinian society will be reformed. But it will not be the kingdom of Islam that will reform the Palestinian world.

Also, the Unified National Command makes direct or indirect practical demands upon Israel, from which it may be concluded that its view of Israel is pragmatic, realistic, and not mythical. A popular model of the demands which are made of Israel appears in Leaflet Number 26. It calls for the repeal of the 1945 British emergency laws; the departure of the army from Palestinian residential centers; the release of all those who have been detained during the intifadah; and the return of those who were deported. Leaflet Number 26 calls for free elections in all local councils and municipalities under the supervision of the United Nations. It calls for an end to collective punishments, such as the economic siege and the demolition of homes. Leaflet Number 26 also calls for an end to torture, deportation, administrative detention, and the establishment of settlements."

ALGERIA

Wheat Production Increase Attributed to State Programs

45190130a Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*
in French 18 Aug 89 pp 36-37

[Article by Abbes Mouats: "Harvests and Threshing in Stif: Untapped Wheat"]

[Text] In the Stif district, satisfaction reigns among grain producers. The fact is that this year the harvest of all types of grain was not a bad one. Although this year's harvesting and threshing are not yet over—this will happen towards mid-August—the figures thus far are twice as high as those for the last cycle.

Just the yield forecast—1,400,000 quintals—hinted at a modest degree of optimism, even if, given an area under cultivation on the order of more than 170,000 hectares and counting on Mother Nature's goodwill, hopes for a vastly larger harvest can be entertained. The same thing occurred in 1985.

Since that famous harvest, grain production has done nothing but fall, to the great detriment of farmers but also to the detriment of the state, which had to increase the amounts of grain it imported. For the local authorities, this year's harvest is the second-biggest after the 1985 harvest. This is true even if it is around one-fifth as big as the 1985 harvest. Nevertheless, diverse catastrophes that seriously affected the forecasts were not lacking. Let the reader judge for himself: More than 31,000 hectares were lost. The categories that were the most affected included barley (17,420 hectares) and hard wheat (around 12,300 hectares). After all, these are the main agricultural products in this district.

At the start, the agriculture service says, everything went swimmingly, despite a number of weather problems that

usually occur in the southern part of the district, where there is a natural corridor that provides the right conditions for hail and frost in the winter.

But the crowning blow that threw off forecasts and blew away, partially, it should be said, farmers' hopes, occurred in a three-day period at the beginning of last April. Or, to be more precise, during the last three days of the month of Ramadan, when major storms hit hundreds of hectares of ripening wheat and caused an enormous amount of damage.

However, and despite these unfortunate, unpredictable forces of nature, morale among growers remained relatively intact, and the yields from the harvest as of 25 July are far from alarming. The figures tell the story: Hard wheat (more than 41,000 quintals), soft wheat (12,500 quintals), barley (49,600 quintals), and oats (7,410 quintals). While the harvest is over for the last two grains mentioned, only 75 percent of the hard and soft wheat has been harvested.

More precisely, as of the date previously cited, some 110,000 hectares had been harvested, or more than 966,000 quintals. When these data are studied more closely, it must be said that the goals that were initially forecast will not be met. And, in the usual fashion, "these failures" are explained to us in terms of those eternal, unfavorable climatic conditions. And only in those terms.

To be sure, this phenomenon, which is universal anyway, should not be covered up. What is hard to "swallow" is the fact that in certain areas—not far from one another—the yield per hectare merrily approaches 18 quintals, and in others, it is scarcely half that. It has to be admitted that there is something fishy about all this. Yet the explanation is simple: In areas where scientific growing methods have been applied, yields are better. But in areas where farmers still till and sow, then wait for dumb luck to do the rest, the result is never certain.

Having said this, it remains to be noted that the extremely drawn out length of the harvest in this district—an average of two months—is caused, also as usual, by equipment shortages and by "the fresh growth of the grain"—in the wake of the storms—which must completely mature. For this harvest, 545 harvester-threshers are on site. First of all, given the acreage to be harvested, this equipment does not help everyone at the same time. Next, there are more and more breakdowns. There are many pieces of equipment that break down for good while they are in use for lack of spare parts, tires being the part most needed and especially the hardest to obtain.

There is, however, a reassuring note. Despite the fact that produce can be freely marketed in the Stif district—and this has been the case for the past three years—we should take note that many farmers belong to the Dry Grain and Vegetables Cooperative (CCLS). In fact, from year to year, this organization has handled a respectable quantity of the grain harvest. The CCLS has adopted a

two-pronged policy of encouragement vis-a-vis farmers. There are 33 receiving points for farmers' produce in locations throughout the district. "The greater the number of these receiving points and the closer they are to the producer, the more the latter is encouraged to deliver his grain, because the going prices are most appealing," they say at the district's agricultural service.

The second tactic is mutually advantageous cooperation between the state and the producer. The state does so by offering the grain farmer seed that has been selected and is healthy and treated, provided the farmer brings his produce to the CCLS. In other words, a quid pro quo.

"In this way, and even if deliveries could be worth more if they were substantially improved, we have noted that everyone becomes a player," officials report. And, to substantiate this claim, there are these ready figures: "As of 15 July, the CCLS had received 242,000 quintals and the prediction is that, by the end of the harvest, it will have received more than 400,000 quintals," officials emphasize with pleasure.

There is one weak point, oats and barley. These two grains are not brought in generous amounts to the CCLS "because they are in great demand by stock breeders" and thus lead to speculative practices that are particularly rewarding to the farmer. How can this phenomenon be brought under control? "By having systematic recourse to the policy of quid pro quo," officials argue.

Be this as it may, when you say speculation, you say shortage. In fact, the only solution is increasing fodder production by increasing the number of acres under cultivation but also relying on modern techniques in use elsewhere.

Commentary Emphasizes Need for Mosque Status Evaluation

45190130b Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*
in French 25 Aug 89 p 50

[Commentary by Mohamed Chennouf, an administrator and secretary of the local office of the FLN [National Liberation Front] in Wargla: "The Role of the Mosque in the Multiparty Political System Era"]

[Text] Among the fundamental guarantees enshrined in the constitution there is one which, though not new, will undoubtedly have an impact on the future of the country, so greatly does the exercise of true democracy depend on it. We are speaking of the freedom of expression granted to political associations, the electoral process, and [organs of] information, for which the legal implementation measures have been supplied in laws recently approved by the National People's Assembly (APN).

Our institutions should enjoy this democracy exclusive of any veto while they, of course, respect our national values or what some call our "constants." There is, however, one institution that is both semipublic and

semipopular, that is to say, the mosque, which, even before the beginning of the current political transformations, has always attempted not to do without the ability to express itself freely, despite all vicissitudes and constraints—which vary from one region to the next, are at the whim of local officials, the personality of its preachers and the size of the local groups that support it—[this institution] could have to bear the costs of an embryonic multiparty political system unless precautions of the indicated sort are taken.

By ruling out places of worship as places for public meetings, the draft law on demonstrations and public meetings visibly betrays the state's concern that mosques not become the objects of political one-upmanship, something that could divert them from their true mission. If, indeed, it is in the interests of these institutions to escape the grip of political parties, the FLN's included, their autonomy of movement with regard to the structures of the state must be guaranteed as well. Vis-a-vis the state, this implies a major reform both in the way they are organized and administered and the nature of what they oversee. An attempt should, therefore, be made to adopt a statute that will ensure that they can fully carry out all of their mission.

To do so, it would be appropriate to begin by drawing up a good definition of the role of the mosque. To think of a mosque as just a place of worship is to exhibit an illiteracy in religious education while not even differentiating between the mosque and the church. As a place where prayers are said, the mosque is also and especially an institution in which the Koran and the Hadith are taught and in which introductory studies in theology can be pursued. Making known the precepts of Islam, and in particular the duties of a Muslim, what he hears in sermons, what it is desirable for him to do while not being an obligation, and what it is preferable for him not to do while not being forbidden, denouncing social misdeeds by showing their fatal consequences for both the individual and society, these are some of the topics that should be taken up by the imams and moudares, be they public agents or volunteers. Agents of the state responsible for coordinating actions by the mosques at the individual district level ought to be chosen with the consent of preachers of the highest rank, keeping in mind their moral character and their aptitude in Islamic sciences.

Furthermore, since every institution must have its external oversight organ, it should be the task of a commission of wise men versed in the subject to follow, guide, and evaluate at the local ward level to see if such and such a preacher or moudares exceeds his prerogatives or gives evidence of incompetence and to take or suggest the appropriate disciplinary measures. The prospect of appealing to a district commission and a national commission in the case of the most serious sanctions could only act as a comfort to all and as additional proof, if such were needed, that the Algerian state does not fear the advent at some point of a truly Muslim society. Indeed, in Islam, more than in any other area, one must

be able to say freely that which must be said, recommending good and repulsing evil (al-amr bil ma'ruf wa anahi 'an al-munkar) being to society what white blood cells are to the human body.

In conclusion, by myself I cannot pretend I can exhaust a subject as vast and controversial as the role the mosque should play in Algeria in the era of political pluralism. This modest contribution should be seen as an introduction to a debate in the press, to which I invite all men and women interested in this problem and desirous of devoting some of their time to pondering it.

EGYPT

Trade Relations Seen To Weaken Between Egypt, Israel

45040455a London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
8 Aug 89 p 45

[Report from AL-MAJALLAH's Cairo Bureau: "Egyptian-Israeli Trade Relations: Weakening Relations Cause Disappearance of Israeli Bananas from Cairo Stores"]

[Text] The issue of Egyptian commitment to provisions of the Arab boycott of Israel became moot with the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. A few months later, officials of the two governments signed on 8 May 1980 a trade agreement whose first article stipulated that "in order to ensure the free exchange of goods between the two countries," each of the two signatories was to supply the other with laws, rules, and regulations governing its exports and imports.

This bilateral trade agreement goes even farther. Its article III (item B) stipulates that "each of the two parties is to grant the other preferred nation status."

The agreement, presented to the Egyptian parliament for ratification early in 1981, inevitably resulted in a noticeable increase in the volume of trade between the two countries in the early 1980s, and especially in Egyptian crude petroleum exports. A report on trade developments between Egypt and Israel, prepared by the secretariat of the League of Arab States, indicates that Egypt ranked sixth among Israeli suppliers. Egyptian commodity exports to Israel average 12 percent of total Egyptian foreign exports and represent some 5 percent of total Israeli imports from the outside world. Meanwhile, Egyptian commodity imports from Israel did not exceed 1 percent of total Egyptian imports from all parts of the world.

The report values Egyptian commodity exports to Israel during that period at \$2.397 billion of which crude oil accounted for \$2.362 billion. Egyptian imports from Israel during the same period were valued at about \$227 million. This means that the value of Egyptian exports to Israel was more than ten times the value of Egyptian imports from Israel, causing a balance of trade surplus of some \$2.140 billion in favor of Egypt.

The report also revealed that crude oil accounted for 99.8 percent of total Egyptian commodity exports to Israel. [Egyptian crude exports to Israel] represented one fourth of the value of total Egyptian crude oil exports to the outside world. Israeli imports of Egyptian crude accounted for about one fourth of its total crude imports from the outside world in the period 1982-1984, and for about 38 percent of total [Israeli] crude imports in 1985 alone.

Israel is especially eager to assure the importation of Egyptian crude. Early on in Egyptian-Israeli relations, observers of the Camp David negotiations must have noticed that, from the viewpoint of Israeli negotiators, the "petroleum paper" [quotation marks as published] was among the most important items of negotiation—so much so that a special committee of Egyptian, Israeli, and American experts was formed to discuss the issue towards the end of the tripartite Camp David summit. When the committee failed to make progress by March of 1979, and after a Carter visit to the region, the U.S. side proposed on 11 Mar 79 that Israel buy Egyptian petroleum through an American corporation. Israel rejected the proposal on the grounds that the peace treaty negated the economic boycott between Egypt and Israel.

The importance Israel attaches to this matter is understandable in view of the fact that there is great cost differential to Israel between importing Egyptian crude, with a shipping distance of 6 days, and importing Mexican crude with a roundtrip shipping distance of two months. The cost of transporting a ton of crude from Mexico to Israel is \$3.6 per barrel compared to only \$1.6 per barrel of Egyptian crude. In 1984, for instance, Israel bought a million tons of crude oil from Egypt at a cost of \$6 million. In the same year, it bought from Mexico 2.8 million tons of crude at a cost exceeding \$31 million, according to a book by Israeli writer (Michel) Yoram on oil sector normalization between Egypt and Israel.

Notwithstanding those realities imposed by "official" commitments to treaties and agreements with the Israelis, it is a fact that the development of Egyptian-Israeli relations, which showed a noticeable rise in the early 1980s, has severely declined in the second half of [the decade], coincidental with the chilling off of all Egyptian-Israeli relations in the aftermath of the invasion of Lebanon and subsequent developments. It is now rare, if not impossible, to find a street fruit vendor in Cairo who carries those Israeli bananas with the distinctive label that once flooded the market. Official Israeli figures indicate that Israeli exports to Egypt at that time consisted mainly of bananas, apples, eggs and poultry as well as serums and vaccines for poultry and livestock.

The past [few] years witnessed frequent indications of retrogradation and frostiness in Egyptian-Israeli trade relations. Early last year, as a protest by Cairo against certain procedural issues, Israel was barred from the Cairo International Fair even though it is open to any country that requests participation. In November of the same year, the Egyptian Government declined an Israeli

offer to manufacture solar heaters for use in new Egyptian [residential] cities, opting for a Jordanian tender at higher cost. It was also rumored then that Egyptian public sector companies received official directives to stop trading with Israel in respect for Arab boycott regulations. News sources reported that there was thought of creating new companies especially for that purpose. Observers recall an important precedent when "Air Sinai" was created to handle travel to Tel Aviv as a substitute in form to Egypt Air.

New Wage Increase Regulations Detailed

45040408 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 28 Jun 89 p 7

[Article by Muhammad al-Shama']

[Text] AL-AKHBAR has learned that the Central Agency for Administrative Regulation has finished preparing regulations to effect the disbursement of the special social increase. The regulations include the payability of the increase to workers as of 1 July 1989. It will be paid completely in July.

The basic wage of the worker is intended to mean the wage based on which the increase is calculated as a percentage of the wage specified for the grade of a worker's position on the table of grades appended to the law in effect. Included in the basic wage are: The salary due to a worker on the aforementioned date, including all periodic increases payable to such workers before 1 July 1989, within the permitted limits set for periodic and additional increases for those to whom they are due, as well as promotional increases which may have been granted to such worker before the aforementioned date, even if they exceed the final salary step of the grade of the position.

Also included in the basic wage is any increase for a promotion regarding workers promoted before 1 July 1989. The basic wage does not include fees, incentives, wages from additional activities or irregular efforts, promotional rewards or other amounts payable to a worker in addition to the wage fixed according to the grade of his position as per the table of grades and salaries appended to the law in effect.

Increases for Promotions

In addition, the periodic increase payable to a worker on 1 July 1989 does not include as part of the basic salary based on which the special increase is calculated, any promotional increase, increase resulting from a promotion, or addition payable to a worker as of 1 July 1989 or subsequently.

The special increase is 15 percent of the basic wage which is due to a worker as determined on 30 June 1989. This increase is not considered part of the basic salary. Rather, it retains its character as a special increase which is disbursed to a worker in addition to this wage, regardless of its value, such that this increase is not subject to a minimum or maximum level of value.

- The granting of this special increase shall be decided on a specific date, namely 1 July 1989. It is a singular increase decided on this date and does not have a periodic character.
- Provision is made for fees, incentives, additional wages or other amounts ascribed to the basic wage of a worker, which are the basis for calculating fees, incentives and other sums, [to be the basis for determining the special increase].

Domestic Workers

- Provision is made for the intent of granting the special increase to workers inside the Arab Republic of Egypt, in addition to the salaries due to domestic workers on 30 July 1989. Regarding workers outside the Arab Republic of Egypt (on government leave for activity abroad and those on special passports, who do not collect wages from the Arab Republic of Egypt in Egypt), their increases shall be calculated based on their basic wages in Egypt as of the aforementioned date, and it will be paid to them only upon their return and resumption of work.
- Workers abroad who collect wages from the Arab Republic of Egypt and who are paid these wages abroad, shall have their increases calculated on the basis of their basic wages in Egypt as of 30 July 1989; the increase shall not be paid to them during their activity abroad, and shall be paid to them as of the date of their return and resumption of work in Egypt.

The Working Woman

- A female worker on leave to care for a child is paid the special increase based on her basic wage on 30 July 1989. The increase shall be paid only upon her return from her leave of absence and resumption of work. Those who receive leaves with full pay shall be paid the special increase in its entirety.
- Provision is made for the aforementioned special increase to be granted to all permanent and temporary workers in the state and the public sector, appointees with full salaries, those whose affairs are regulated by special laws, those with public positions or those having a fixed allocation. Accordingly, the regulation pertaining to payment of this increase is effective for all workers barring legal impediments to payment excepting a condition prohibiting the combination of this increase with a pension increase.

Judicial Provisions

The law does not include a prohibition against combining the special increase with the social increase obtained by a worker pursuant to Law No. 118 of 1981, the additional social increase decreed by Law No. 113 of 1982, and the special increase decreed by Law No. 101 of 1987, such that the granting of these increases shall continue in addition to the new special increase.

Regarding workers whose basic wages on 30 July 1989 are amended in implementation of a judicial ruling or a formal legal opinion issued after this date, the special

increase shall be recalculated based on the basic wage disclosed by the ruling or the formal legal opinion.

New Appointees

Regarding persons appointed on 1 July 1989 and subsequently, the following principles are taken into account when calculating the special increase:

a. Regarding appointees not addressed in the regulations for calculating previous periods (public service, conscription, practical experience, academic experience), the special increase shall be calculated based on the starting salary step of the grade of the position to which the worker is appointed.

b. Regarding appointees addressed in the regulations pertaining to the calculation of periods of practical and academic experience for which the worker is paid increases requiring the determination of his basic wage, when that wage exceeds the starting salary step of the position to which the appointee is appointed, the special increase shall be calculated on the basis of the aforementioned wage determination.

c. Regarding appointees addressed in the regulations pertaining to the calculation of periods of conscription and public service, whose calculation requires the gradation of the salary from a previous period, when this gradation includes a periodic increase on 1 July 1989, the special increase shall be calculated on the basis of the basic wage before the payment of this increase, so that the newer workers are not favored over workers with greater seniority, since the increase of 1 July 1989 is not included in the basic wage of those with greater seniority when calculating the special increase.

Other Increases

The foregoing is in deference to the fact that a person appointed on 1 July 1989 and subsequently, is entitled, in addition to the payment of this special increase, previously decreed special increases pursuant to Law No. 101 of 1987 and Law 149 of 1988.

- Regarding a worker whose due, within the limits of one fourth, is withheld by the agency for which he works, the special increase shall be included as part of what can be withheld inside this limit, in view of the fact that it is a sum which must be paid to the worker.
- The special increase decreed in this law shall be considered part of the wage which serves as the basis for calculating the death grant and funeral expenditures pursuant to the regulations stipulated for these two outlays.

Private Investment Reaches 8 Billion Pounds in Last 10 Years

45040455b London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 8 Aug 89 p 47

[Article: "Private Investment in Egypt at 8 Billion Pounds"]

[Text] Private capital investment in Egypt during the past 10 years amounted to the equivalent of 8 billion pounds, of which Egyptian funds accounted for 65 percent and Arab funds for 18 percent. Foreign investments accounted for the remainder.

There were 1,371 projects implemented with the approval of the Egyptian Investments Authority, of which 1,200 were productive endeavors and the remainder were in the services and construction sectors.

Islamists Criticize Government Policy in Universities

45040468 Cairo AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI
in Arabic Jul 89 pp 62-65

[Article by Dr Layla Bayyumi: "What Worries Muslims under Dome of University: Historical Positions for Egyptian Universities; Security Men Make Deals To Contain University; Who May Be Shot Inside University? Presence of University Guards Is A Political Matter"]

[Text] This year, there were grave events and developments in the Egyptian universities. These events and developments are considered healthy indicators that an awareness is growing into a reaction to the country's security policy. This awareness, which is developing into a solid position on that policy, has carried university life beyond the stage of silent rejection and outside the iron cage, inside which it had remained during previous administrations.

Coercive methods were practiced in the sixties, and the university was besieged for security, political, and intellectual considerations. Then came the purge when faculty members were moved from their positions into administrative jobs. Islamists were arrested, and the university continued to be submissive. In many cases, the university continued to yield to whomever was leading it. When the Islamic trend within the student movement started becoming active, faculty members, working through legal channels and elected officials of the students' associations and faculty clubs, joined it. The Islamic tendency won a sweeping victory in the by-election, which was held to elect half of the members of the boards of directors of the faculty clubs, and Dr Yusuf 'Abd-al-Rahman was unanimously reelected president of the Cairo University [Faculty] Club.

Credit Goes to the Ministry of Interior

The policy of Zaki Badr, the minister of interior, gets much of the credit for helping university life reach maturity. When the minister's forces seized the Cairo University Faculty Club's land, they created an incident around which university forces rallied and united. These university forces declared their total rejection of the police method and the emergency system which are being used to control the university.

Students joined professors in a show of solidarity at all the universities. At the Suez Canal University, a peaceful demonstration was organized to condemn the minister of interior's methods. Faculty clubs in provincial universities declared their solidarity with the Cairo University Faculty Club, and student unions announced their solidarity with the university professors against the minister of interior's security policy.

Historic Events

To express their rejection of the minister of interior's policy, university professors declared a general strike at Cairo University. The strike was held after police had seized the club's land. This was only 2 days before the scheduled celebration for laying the cornerstone to the new building which cost thousands of pounds of the university's budget. Dr 'Atif Sidqi, the prime minister, was scheduled to attend that celebration.

The historic peaceful strike, which was held on 25 March, was 95 percent successful. Almost no classes were held. The implications of that strike were more far-reaching than the modes of conduct and the motives which had led up to it. It created an intellectual bloc which carried its own weight, and it prepared these sectors for confronting crises in a manner that is suitable to the pressures which universities could be subjected to. The university professors proved that they were a force to contend with, and that they had influence and important things to say about the course of events. A radical change came about in the way issues were discussed and presented. The police method was met with a challenge, and the sturdy and forceful presence of the university was imposed upon public opinion and the government.

Personal Challenges for the Interior Minister

Immediately after the strike, Zaki Badr threatened to turn in his resignation if a political decision was made to return the land that had been usurped. He considered the matter a personal challenge rather than a matter of returning something to its rightful owners. At the same time, he tried to make deals with faculty members to settle the crisis of their club. He wanted the club to issue a statement denouncing the recent hearings held by the opposition in the People's Assembly to look into the fact that the Ministry of Interior had torn down the wall surrounding the club which had cost 30,000 pounds to build.

To settle its crisis, the Ministry of Interior required the club to affirm, in its statement, that it did not want opposition leaders and opposition newspapers to discuss the club's problems. The club was to deny the opposition newspapers' published reports about central security forces occupying the club, seizing construction materials, and tearing down the wall. The Ministry of Interior was to see to it that the statement was published in the government's newspapers and magazines. These demands were made in a special meeting that was held by the Ministry of Interior and chaired by Maj Gen

Mustafa Kamil, the director of public security. The meeting, which was held in Lazughli, was held with the president of the Cairo University Faculty Club and members of the club.

During their meeting at the club, the faculty members unanimously rejected the deals which the Ministry of Interior tried to make with them. The Ministry of Interior had seized the land by force.

When professors at Cairo University were scheduled to hold a conference in the university's hall of ceremonies to discuss the crisis, they were taken by surprise when security forces used vehicles owned by the central security forces to surround the campus. Security was tightened at the gates, and faculty members were prevented from entering the hall. More than 2,000 professors staged a peaceful march. They walked around the campus to protest the arbitrary measures that were being pursued by the Ministry of Interior against faculty members. Professors were also protesting the passive attitude of the university's administration and its complicity with the government against the professors. Over a period of more than 5 months the university has been trying to use all kinds of peaceful methods to confront the security policy and regain rights.

Faculty members affirm that they exercised the highest levels of self control in the face of these security provocations which expose the university community to grave danger.

Gunfire Shots and the Murder of Female Students

I was alarmed by the recent recurring murders which took place in our Egyptian universities. In one incident last year a College of Science coed was killed by a fellow student. And now another painful incident has occurred in al-Azhar University. A coed at al-Azhar University's College of Languages and Translation was shot by a student on campus where male and female students are not supposed to mingle. There should have been more security for al-Azhar's female students.

What happened, however, confirms the fact that university guards are not there to secure and guard the universities at all. Instead, they are there to watch and harass the Islamic tendency. They are there to surround the campus with police who provide cover and protection for those who write secret reports. Al-Azhar University's coeds affirm that although the colleges are for females only, it is very easy for a young man who is not a student to enter the campus. Many of the colleges' windows are unguarded, and the university guards do not check the identity of those entering the campus from the main gates. Besides, female students are molested by young men who hang around the university, and this happens in front of the security men.

The presence of university guards in all Egyptian universities has political implications. They are not there for protection at all. This is confirmed by Dr Muhammad Sa'd, professor of chemistry at the College of Agriculture,

Cairo University. Dr Sa'd says, "If we are talking about the role of the university guards—are the guards supposed to do something about the presence of male and female students on campus after the end of the school day under circumstances that are blatantly immoral?"

"Are the guards supposed to do something about recurrent accidents in which students are struck by cars in front of the colleges? Are the guards supposed to do something about the fact that the pedestrian bridges are not suitable?"

And what about the deliberate destruction which occurred in the Chemistry Building at the College of Agriculture? What about the department's installations which were destroyed to serve the interests of those who benefit from such destruction? Such destruction is carried out to prepare budgets which serve the personal interests of individuals. And what about the fires which occur in warehouses? Aren't the university guards, who are lurking in Egyptian universities and suffocating them, supposed to do something about them?

ISRAEL

General Discusses Frustrations and Lack of Support From IDF

44230173 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 7 Jul 89 pp 11-13

[Article by Judy Nir-Moses: "They Threw Me to the Dogs, and in the End They Will Do the Same to You"]

[Text] Chief of Staff Dan Shomron decided that Amos Yaron no longer has anything to contribute to the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. Yaron—whose strong point is the battlefield or the chief of staff position, not the Knesset corridors or the small coffee houses where generals have recently been meeting for various discussions with journalists—no longer belongs. He will not approach any public figure to intercede on his behalf with Dan Shomron.

Yaron, 49, has made peace with his separation from the army. He swears he is happy and not bitter against anyone. There are those within the defense network who link his departure with the fact that he was not in Dan Shomron's clique; rather, he was close to former Chief of Staff Moshe Levi. Internal politics and sociology. And it is possible that Sabara and Shatillah came back to haunt him one more time, 6 years after the fact.

In addition to the internal politics in the army, there is one dry fact: Two weeks ago, Yaron completed his tour as military attache in Washington. It is a role that usually marks the end of a general's career. Uri Simhoni, Yaron's predecessor, was moved out upon his return from Washington. Such was also the case with Mandi Meron and Avraham Eden. Only Moti Gur, following the Yom Kippur War, returned to be general of the northern command and later chief of staff. The attaches,

upon completing their service in the American capital, separate from the army. That is to say, the story about Shomron's clique may be nice, but it is not the only reason, with the emphasis on the definitive article.

Of course, he carries with him the conclusions of the Kohen Commission (see box) that investigated the Sabara and Shatillah incident. The conclusion concerning Yaron was that he would not be allowed to hold a command position for 3 years. Seven years have passed.

Outside the Yaron family home are tall piles of cartons. It is in Ramat Gan, the paratroopers' neighborhood, green and populated with career army officers. Tall trees cast their shadows on the green, refreshing grass. Eternal green. Green for hope. Perhaps camouflage green.

Amos Yaron apologizes for the scattered cartons. Yesterday, the cartons arrived from Washington. The house is only now being organized. Wearing shorts and a black shirt with Cape Cod written on it, with a strong face, lined with manly wrinkles, he is 100 percent a man. "We bought the house 15 years ago. We did not have a penny for decorating. Now, I have paid off all my debts and we are decorating to boot."

He was born in Hulon, a labor district. Nothing heroic. Hulon is Hulon. A workers' district. His parents had immigrated there in the 1920's, from Poland. Yaron was a member of the working youth organization. Menahem Begin was a red flag for the family. His father started as a construction worker and became a small contractor. His mother was a housewife who took jobs on the side to help out with the finances. They bought a piano for Amos. "I had a talent for the piano."

Yaron—who is about to become a grandfather by his eldest daughter, Deganit, 26 years old—began his military career in the pioneer cadet corps and was grabbed up for command positions. He completed an officers course and went to command a watch settlement which no longer exists. There, he encountered mortar fire and skirmishes for the first time. There he met his future wife, Ilana, who was sent there with a friend from Kfar Gil'adi to decorate the settlement clubhouse. An Israeli meeting, an Israeli couple. That is what we were.

Yaron went through a string of combat positions, climbing the ladder of ranks. His last combat position, as brigadier general, was the one that catapulted him to the top. Yaron commanded the group that conquered and settled in Beirut. He was there when the massacre occurred in Sabara and Shatillah.

He is among those who thinks the war was a success. "In my opinion, our situation today in the north is better than it was. From the time the IDF settled in the defense zone and until now, no citizen has been killed along the northern border as a result of terrorist activities. It is true that soldiers have been wounded and killed, but compare this situation with the one that existed before the war in Lebanon.

"I am not among those who claim that military operations are measured by the number of casualties. Losses and casualties are very difficult. As a commander I always did the maximum in every plan and operation to ensure minimum casualties. One of the two most difficult moments I had in my life occurred in that war. When General Yequiel Adam (Quti) and Hayim Sel'a were killed in my unit. Hayim Sel'a actually died in my arms. And Quti, I picked him out personally...I loved and admired that man, even though he was a Golani and I was a paratrooper. I did not cry, but if someone had squeezed the corner of my eye, well, you know.

"I think that when it was decided to go to war, we had to deal the terrorists a stronger blow than what they had absorbed in past actions. I supported a move into Beirut, even at the initial stage. The government did not allow it, and we did not advance.

"That war could have turned out differently. It did not unfold the right way, in this sense: The whole process should have been shorter, the goals should have been established in advance. And according to those goals, the method of operation should have been established.

"I know that the army was against a gradual withdrawal and against the long stay in Lebanon. And people in the military hierarchy were pushing to evacuate the area. There were arguments over the security strip. In principle, the concept that was accepted in the IDF was to reach the security zone as quickly as possible and not to remain at intermediary lines. I was against a long stay in Lebanon. My opposition was absolute. The decision-makers thought differently."

As one might expect, Yaron is not willing to blame anyone directly or to name names. I remind him that the minister of defense at the time was Arens. He does not respond.

"I am leaving the army because they did not offer me another position. I did not think I should have to knock on any doors, saying: Here I am. I have done this and that during my career. I was a group commander, one of the best. If they did not make me an offer, apparently I should make room for the younger generation of officers.

"Yes, I am convinced that this is related to Sabara and Shatillah. Over all, the decisionmaking powers interpreted the commission's findings more seriously than the commission intended.

"Two years ago, with the change of the chief of staff, I asked for a position as command general. I was told explicitly that my background, given the findings of the Kohen Commission, was very disturbing. The findings indicated that consideration should be given to not awarding me a command position for 3 years, from the date the findings were published. Three years ended 3 years ago.

"It does not follow me. I live with it. I have down sometimes. I am not bitter, but I think that the civil and

military systems should have ensured that I be given a command position before leaving the army.

"Always, when paving a path for advancement in the army, you look two steps ahead. There are those who, when they are young, already declare that they will be chief of staff. I am not one of those. I will not tell you that at a certain stage, as I was climbing the ranks, the thought of being chief of staff did not cross my mind.

"If they were to offer me a command general's position today, I would certainly accept it. But I am not among those who go out and lobby. If they were to make an offer, my reply would be affirmative.

"The generals found a new way to advance: go to the media, rub elbows in the Knesset. I do not support those methods. Any issues concerning the relationship between the IDF and the media must be checked very thoroughly. I know and admire the media in democratic regimes. It is very important to have a free press. Not that I have not been harmed by the media. There is a tendency to delve too far into personal aspects, at the expense of the issues.

"I think the conclusions drawn against me by the Kohen Commission were completely unjustified. One way to give an officer the feeling that the army is behind him would be to fulfill the commissions findings but also to follow through down the ranks.

"What does this mean? An officer, caught in certain situations, must have the feeling that the system is behind him, supporting him, backing him up; the feeling that he has not been thrown to the dogs. I performed missions that I was ordered to perform. My point of view on the subject of support is very radical. There may be here, in the army and in Israeli society in general, a blemish of sorts, a certain basic disability, on the issue of support. This problem, this disability crops up relentlessly, every time in a different form. I felt it personally. It is no coincidence that no one below me, no one in the command below me, stood before the Kohen Commission. The rank that stood before the commission was group commander. It did not effect the ranks below."

Amos Yaron recites this text smoothly, directly, and without sidetracking. In his opinion, he can write a book on the absence of support in the Israeli military and political systems. And he is not talking about one-time occurrences, or about purely personal incidents. He is talking about a system, a tradition.

"One is left with the impression that the support system in the Israeli army and government is nonexistent. It is easier to throw people to the dogs, after they have performed missions for the nation's defense. They throw you out and they do not stand behind you or back you up. There is no end of examples. Some have been publicized: the Ron Paqar story, Avi'am Sel'a, the Iran-gate incident, the Shevakh scandal.

"Throwing people to the dogs is an Israeli norm. In the long term, this norm will harm the motivation of those in charge of defense."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What "dogs" are you specifically referring to? How is this reconciled with the fact that you were in the manpower division and in Washington, two respected positions. It is difficult to define those positions as being thrown to the dogs.

[Yaron] "Very respected, but not command positions. Very respected, but that does not resolve the fact of the commission and the investigation from my point of view. The throwing of people to the dogs occurred during the investigation of Sabara and Shatillah. That is to what I am referring. The throwing of people to the dogs at the time of truth, at the time of the event, preceding and during the commission.

"The Kohen Commission period was very difficult. I understand what the commission said, but I cannot agree with the conclusions. In my opinion, the commission was the result of a political struggle. Someone wanted to investigate the entire war in Lebanon, and did not find a vehicle to do so. The only thing available to him was the Sabara and Shatillah incident. Via Sabara and Shatillah, they tried to punish all those who participated in the war in Lebanon.

"I agree with Ariq Sharon when he said that the issue of Sabara and Shatillah will be with us for many years to come. We accepted recommendations from the commission that should not have been accepted."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You represent yourself as politically naive. During the period of the commission's deliberations, the army and the political system were almost one "package." The politicians and the politics did not get to you? You did not get to them?

[Yaron] "During that period, I received letters from politicians. Some of them met with me. I am an independent type, a loner. To this day, I have managed not to be anyone's 'boy.' I do not owe anything to any journalist or politician. Anyone who knows me knows that I do not get involved in conspiracies."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What political accounts were, in your opinion, settled by the commission?

[Yaron] "I think the Kohen Commission did not wipe out the right accounts. The result was androgynous. There were far worse things in the war than Sabara and Shatillah, which should have been investigated."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You cannot and should not ignore the fact that the Israeli government found the Sabara and Shatillah incident worthy of investigation. Are you claiming that you were investigated and judged on a marginal issue? Was the Sabara and Shatillah incident a marginal issue?

[Yaron] "Yes, a marginal issue. Everything, of course, is relative. Marginal relative to the entire war. The missions imposed on my group were more difficult. In my humble opinion and that of others, I performed those missions in the best possible way. And in the end, I am being judged on a marginal issue. And I find myself in a sort of perplexing situation, trying to explain to the commission that in my opinion what happened was cut off from reality.

"Suddenly, I had the feeling that I was defending myself alone. Of course, I was given legal counsel. Then, there was constant gossip behind my back regarding the entire incident. I am after all a pretty refined person. Suddenly, all kinds of people are talking about me in terms that disturbed me a great deal."

Following the commission, Amos Yaron was appointed, for the first time in his life, to a staff position: head of the manpower branch. He was among the best heads the division had. He dealt with the issue of prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action. His appointment as attache to Washington was accompanied by concerns. He is by nature not a diplomatic type. He speaks too directly, has a caustic style. He filled the part well, however. He managed to advance issues for Israel's defense.

"I came to the attache's position after understanding that I would not be given a command position. In effect, I had served for 10 years in very difficult positions, physically and emotionally speaking. Because I had not received the position I wanted as command general of the central command, for reasons we all know, I thought the position of attache would suit me. I asked the chief of staff to consider it. At the same time, I spoke with people at the U.S. embassy. I told them I was going to be attache and I asked them if they remembered that 3 years previously I had stood before an investigating committee. I was sensitive enough to check on this. Not one of them thought it would present a problem."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Did you really believe it would not be a problem?! You did not think about the reaction of the media? Public opinion? You were satisfied with what "people from the embassy" told you?

[Yaron] "Yes, I did not think there would be a problem. When the military spokesman announced the appointment, articles appeared in the Israeli press. It was as if other than Sabara and Shatillah, I had done nothing else in my life. And following these publications in Israel, the American journalists took the articles and sent them to their editors. I was already there. Did they think I would be thrown out? That I would pack it up and leave?!

"There were demonstrations. They called me a murderer and a pig. The Arab lobby jumped on the issue, even with the help of Jewish left-wing organizations. They began to harass me. They demanded that I be tried in court. They passed out pamphlets.

"It was the most difficult period of my life. I said to myself: They will not beat me. Heavy pressures were brought to bear on the Americans, at high levels, to expel me. They tried asking Israel to shorten my stay. We rejected those requests immediately. We did have help from other factions in the administration. A high-ranking American official told me that hundreds of letters had been received by the defense secretary asking him to have me thrown out of the United States.

"This was 6 months after I arrived. The Americans knew me by that time and they gave me support that I will never forget in my life. Much more than the support I received from Israel, other than the constant support from the minister of defense. For that I really thank him, and will never forget what he did for me.

"In effect, apart from Yitzhaq Rabin, no other official stood behind me. I fought my war alone, with a few good friends from Israel: Generals Taliq (Israel Tal), Amnon Shahaq, Ehud Barak, Itzik Mordekhay, Moshe Levi and advocate Uri Salonim."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] In effect you were sent to Washington in the wake of the Kohen Commission that determined you should not be given a command position. You were also sent in order to distance you a bit from the Israeli public eye. But Sabara and Shatillah and the Kohen Commission caught up with you in Washington. Will Sabara and Shatillah accompany you forever? Do you see some kind of symbolism in this?

[Yaron] "The most difficult period in my life was those first few months in the United States. Emotionally, it was very difficult. I do not know how I withstood it. I told myself that in the end it was not my personal problem. But in reality, it was all on my shoulders. I knew I would need to overcome the problem alone, because I was not guilty of anything. There was some sort of commission that came to some sort of conclusion. And that for me was not authorization for anything. Yes, I was sent to Washington in the wake of the Kohen Commission. I knew I was capable of doing the job, not well, but exceptionally well."

Now he is back in Israel. Washington is behind him. The army is behind him. It is possible that the Kohen Commission will follow him for years. What is he going to do with himself? Usually, officers released from the army do what they know best: defense consulting, weapons-related enterprises, and security. That is their natural element. Some of them come away from their consulting careers frustrated and disappointed. Some of them find out that the civilian market is too cut-throat for them, too competitive. Gorodish tried manufacturing revolvers. Ron Paqar never became a big businessman in the area of military spare parts. Natcha Nir is a soldier.

Yaron has offers from several firms. He wants to go into the private sector. If he does not find his niche there he will go back to the public sector. "The problem is not whether I will make a little money or not. I am looking

for satisfaction. I am also willing to volunteer for various activities. We are used to talking 90 percent of the time about the Arabs and 10 percent of the time about the Jews. The time has come to reverse that.

"The job offers I have received are in a variety of areas. For example, construction companies. All kinds of people have said that they want to talk to me about business. Once I finish organizing the house, I will be freed up a bit. I am convinced that wherever I choose to work, they will be satisfied with me and I will be satisfied with myself.

"I have been asked to run for several mayoral positions, by the two major parties. That was contingent on a whole string of things. I did not want to take any steps before I conferred with the chief of staff on my continued path.

"As for my political leanings, I do not have a definite preference for one party or another. There are things that appeal to me in both, a great deal from each one. Public activity is not yet in the plan. I want to taste what it is like to be a civilian, to live without worries."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You are on the outside. The army closed its ranks behind you. You will not be chief of staff. An era has ended for you. All in all, in your opinion, you were done an injustice?

[Yaron] "I have broad experience and knowledge. If the system has someone else, so be it. I swear to you that I am not bitter. My job is done. They gave me a great deal of respect, complimentary words, the highly respected role of general."

[Box, p 13] Then Begin Spoke With Arens

"Begin was minister of defense when I was head of the operations branch. I was brigadier general. I presented operations to him for his approval. I remember that after my first meeting with him, I called my father and told him that I was very impressed with Begin. My father said, keep away, keep away. I was very impressed with Begin during the discussions leading to the attack on the reactor in Iraq. There was in him a mixture of the theatrical and real leadership. The way he discussed the issue with us, explaining his reasoning, made a lasting impression on me.

"After the Galilee Peace War, he was the man I went to when I wanted to know why the minister of defense would not allow me to take on the position as head of the manpower branch. It was difficult for me to convince Moshe Arens that the commission recommended that I not be given a command position for 3 years, and that the head of the manpower division was not such a position.

"I went to Begin. He was a fallen man. He had actually lost all his ability; he was bent and lifeless, a different man entirely. Our conversation began quietly and politely. I saw that nothing would come out of it. I understood from his reactions that he would do nothing.

I raised the tone of the conversation. I used words that were less delicate, and that helped. All this in the same conversation. And in fact, he did speak with Arens. When I first took on the position, they 'punished' me for a few months by not giving me the rank of general. It was only several months later that I received the rank."

[Box, p 13] The Kohen Commission Report—Sabara and Shatillah

Personal Conclusions Regarding Amos Yaron, Then Brigadier General, Group Commander

What follows are excerpts from the report: ...We have determined by reviewing the facts that Brig Gen Yaron received reports of murders in the evening and during the night of 16 September 1982. The first report he received was from Lieutenant Alul and from that it should have been clear to him that people from the Phalangists were killing women and children in the camps. That same evening, Brig Gen Yaron heard another report on the fate of a group of 45 people who were in the hands of the phalangists.

A third report came from the communications officer of the Third Phalangist Group concerning 300 deaths, a number that was reduced to 120. Even if we were to assume that the first and second reports were seen in the eyes of Brig Gen Yaron as reports on one and the same incident, from all these reports Brig Gen Yaron knew that the Phalangists were performing murderous acts that were not required as part of military operations and that women and children were being killed.

That evening, he merely repeated warnings to the communications officer of the Phalangists and to Eli Habayqa not to kill women and children. Beyond that he did nothing to stop the killing....

Brig Gen Yaron indicated that he was informed that the behavioral norms of the Phalangists in time of war differed from those of the IDF and that there was no point in arguing with them to change their combat morality, but since in previous actions with the Phalangists, conducted in cooperation with the IDF, they had not performed deviant acts, he was convinced that his repeated warnings and admonitions not to harm women and children would suffice, that the promises from the Phalangist commanders would be kept, and that the steps he had taken to receive information on the activities of the Phalangists would allow him to follow their actions.

We are not willing to accept this explanation. We have already determined, above, that the methods used for supervising the activity of the Phalangists in the camps could not have ensured a stream of real and immediate information on their activities. It is difficult to understand how Brig Gen Yaron relied on warnings and promises, when he knew about the combat morality of the phalangists....

It is possible that an explanation can be found for Brig Gen Yaron's avoidance of any real response to the terrible reports that reached him in the evening on Thursday, inasmuch as he wanted the Phalangists to continue their service in the camps so the IDF soldiers would not have to deal with combat in that area. Brig Gen Yaron had no reservations about allowing the Phalangists into the camps. He testified that he was happy with the decision and justified it by saying: "We have already been under pressure here for 4 months, and now this is an area where they can take part in the war. The war serves their purposes as well. Thus, they should be allowed to participate, then the IDF will not have to do everything (p 695)." One might understand this feeling, but it does not justify the absence of any action on the part of Brig Gen Yaron given the reports that he received....

Brig Gen Yaron approached the Phalangist officers who were in his command area on several occasions, among them Eli Habayqa, and repeated his warnings that women and children were not to be harmed, but apart from this, no initiative was taken. He only suggested instructing the Phalangists not to go any further. The order was given by Gen Drori. This instruction may be seen as sufficient coming from Gen Drori who had not heard about the killing, but Brig Gen Yaron must have known that stopping any further advancement would not ensure an end to the killing.

When the chief of staff arrived in Beirut, Brig Gen Yaron did not reveal to him all that he had heard, nor did he give the chief of staff any recommendation concerning the continued activity of the Phalangists in the camps. From the time he saw the chief of staff, after the latter arrived in Beirut, Brig Gen Yaron did not utter a warning nor any comment of importance on the danger of a massacre. This danger had not escaped the eyes of the Brig Gen....

Brig Gen Yaron's lack of attention to the confirmed activities of the Phalangists in the camps was also manifested in the fact that he gave no instructions to prevent them from bringing in relief forces on Friday, nor did he impose any supervision on the movement of the Phalangist forces to and from the camps, this despite the fact that the order to cease activities had not been rescinded.

We quoted above the words of Brig Gen Yaron at a session during which he admitted, with a candor that deserves recognition, that in this incident there was a lack of sensitivity on his part and on the part of others in the system. As we have already stated, it was Brig Gen Yaron's desire to spare the IDF soldiers from performing activities in the camps and it appears that therein can be found the principle reason for this lack of sensitivity on his part regarding the danger of a massacre in the camps.

His concern was that of a commander for the well being of his soldiers and might under other circumstances be worthy of praise. However, given the situation as it was

in this case, this was an example of misguided considerations on the part of Brig Gen Yaron and a serious error in judgement by him as a senior commander of IDF forces in this sector.

We find that Brig Gen Yaron's responsibility was determined above. Taking into account all the circumstances, we recommend that Brig Gen Yaron should not fill a command position in the IDF and that the removal of this limitation not be considered for 3 years.

Navy Commander on Dolphin Submarine Project

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[Interview with Navy Commander Mikha Ram by Yitzhaq Tuniq; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The following interview can be prefaced by the story of how, about 6 months ago, the chief of staff summoned Mikha Ram and told him: I have news for you, some good, some bad; the good news is that you will be the next Navy commander; the bad news is that you will have no submarines. General Mikha Ram, Navy commander for the past 6 months, liked that story, but he observed that it was only almost the truth: the whole truth was that there was a 1 week interval between the two announcements. True or not, the past 2 months have not been easy for him, and not only because of the heavy responsibility of our maritime border. The decision to continue the project brought to an end a long period of talks and struggles, especially about money. The following interview took place twice: the first time was 1 day before the decision was made, so that the main question was, of course, what will happen without submarines. The second time the interview took place in a different atmosphere, marked by a feeling that now we had something to talk about.

[BAMAHAHE] So you received submarines as a birthday present on Navy Day?

[Ram] "This is undoubtedly the best present we could have had on the Navy's 41st anniversary. But it is important to recall that this is not merely a gift. The decision was important because it enables us to maintain a balance within the Navy and to continue to carry out our missions at the same level of success to which we have become accustomed and which is required. The new submarines will ensure continuity, because if the present submarines had come to the end of their life span without replacement, an entire generation of submarines would have disappeared together with the experience amassed over a period of 30 years."

[BAMAHAHE] Was the timing really meant to give you an anniversary present?

[Ram] "The timing was not coincidental, but neither was it linked to the Navy anniversary. The real reason for the timing stems from the terms of the contract signed with the German shipyards. Had we not recently signed the

contract the agreement deadline would have lapsed and we would have had to negotiate all over again, not to mention that the price would have gone up. That threat was always in the background and that is why we had to hurry and decide."

[BAMAHAHE] Not every new IDF [Israel Defense Forces] commander has to fight for the future of the corps from the very first days on the job. Did you have a feeling that Navy officers were testing you and your reactions to the subject?

[Ram] "I don't doubt that when the project delay was first announced it threw Navy officers into shock. But they, too, like myself, understood that the decision was due to the IDF's financial difficulties and that ways and means of implementing the project had to be studied. They were studied and, much to my and everyone's happiness, the final decision was positive."

[BAMAHAHE] Are you certain that there will be submarines, or can unexpected new angles still jeopardize the project?

[Ram] "I am 100 percent certain that we will have the submarines. In a few days we will travel to the German shipyards and the United States for meetings, and we will ascertain that there are no changes. Then we can submit the project for the endorsement of the U.S. administration, after which the practical work can begin as early as December."

[BAMAHAHE] The press has already carried items by various sources claiming that the final cost will be higher than what was authorized. Are those still the opponents talking?

[Ram] "First of all, I want to state that no one was against the submarines; some were perhaps not in favor, and I think that is an important distinction. Each person who attended the discussions presented his real problems, and an order of priorities had to be established in view of the financial difficulties. As far as the cost of the project, one must understand that when you build a vessel, the price is fixed and may change only in the wake of inflation or of design changes, and even then the project budget is covered. We don't deal with development almost at all. This is mainly a matter of engineering plans and mostly off-the-shelf systems, the price of which is known from the start. Consequently, I believe that we will stay within our budget, and may even do better than that."

[BAMAHAHE] Have you already decided who will command the submarines?

[Ram] "It's a bit early for that. First we had to have an oar to put in the water; now that we have that we will start rowing, and there is time enough to think, to see, and to decide. The first submarine will arrive in 1995 and the second in 1996, and by then we will have trained the next generation of submarine commanders."

[BAMAHANE] Did people call to congratulate you after the decision was made?

[Ram] "The telephone did not stop ringing. Without exaggeration, I think I received more than 100 phone calls with congratulations. Which is quite natural, because anyone who is close to the Navy knows how important this issue was for us."

[BAMAHANE] Have you already talked to your predecessor, Gen Ben-Shoshan?

[Ram] "He was the first person I called immediately after the decision was made. After all, he was the man who for the past 4 years fought for it. He was delighted to hear about the decision."

[BAMAHANE] And after 4 years of struggle, does he also think that the decision is final and we will have the submarines?

[Ram] "He certainly does. He knows that we have passed all the hurdles and that it's smooth sailing from now on."

[BAMAHANE] Now that a decision has been made and the work will begin in December, can you explain to us why the submarines are so important?

[Ram] "The submarines are a very important and basic element for our balance of power. There are two expensive courses required to build up our force: surface vessels and submarines. There is also a more minor one, namely the sea commando. Without submarines we would be severely limited in any future war. We could, for example, operate in areas that are within missile range, but we could not remain there many hours. We could go into the area, do battle, and leave. But we could not stay and search, as we did in the past. We need the submarines because they can stay in an area, pass data on to surface forces, and can do a lot themselves."

"Also, the very existence of submarines constitutes a deterrent. Submarines can blockade ports. In the Yom Kippur war the Syrian defense minister said in this connection that if the Israeli Navy had closed the ports the war would have ended differently. We did not do that at the time for various reasons, but we did have that option. If we do not have that option in the future, the deterrent capability of the Navy and of the IDF in general will suffer."

"I also think that a replacement can be found for all the alternatives to submarines that were considered; in other words, if you don't have this helicopter, you'll have another, or if you don't have this ammunition, you'll have something else. But for submarines there is no replacement. They are an important, main element of naval operational capability—that was never in question. In all the years that we fought for naval projects there were always debates about missile boats, but about submarines there was never any dispute because everyone knew that they were important."

[BAMAHANE] Did no one in the General Staff try to present a different thesis on naval force build up?

[Ram] "No. All these years the General Staff argued that we need more submarines, while having reservations about Navy requests for missile boats. There is no way to have submarines without missile boats. After a prolonged struggle, the Americans authorized us to spend aid money in Germany, and that allowed us to build the submarines. Otherwise we could not have managed. One thing is connected to another."

"But no one presented any other thesis. In the end the Navy view was accepted, that we need both surface vessels and submarines."

[BAMAHANE] Were you ever asked to present a hypothetical plan of how the Navy would manage without submarines?

[Ram] "No."

[BAMAHANE] Is there any way of extending the lifespan of submarines?

[Ram] "We have been reiterating—and meaning it seriously—that our existing submarines are now breathing their last. The Navy has had a traumatic experience in this connection in the past."

[BAMAHANE] When talk began about missile boats, it was said that inside the Navy a certain group of officers thought that other means could be found. Is there any internal opposition to submarines, too?

[Ram] "There has never been any dispute about submarines, not within the Navy and not outside it. Even opposition to Sa'ar-5 was rather external, although it came from former Navy officers, but there was some minor opposition within the Navy, too. At the time there was also opposition to the Zivoniot in the Navy. Whenever there is a choice of weapons, especially major ones, there are different views, and each has its own merit. I personally think that people talked about Sa'ar-5 while we were still building gunboats in Cherbourg. So that personally I fully identify with the Sa'ar-5 choice. That is, in my opinion, the right trend. Anyone trying to promote smaller vessels is simply trying to fight the next war with the lessons of the previous one, and that is a mistake."

[BAMAHANE] Perhaps the problem is the relative quiet sea we've had in recent times; had there been some dramatic occurrence from that direction would you have had an easier fight on your hands?

[Ram] "I don't think so. I believe that this was a legitimate competition for resources and that it was not linked to specific events. That's not how the General Staff operates. Both the General Staff and bodies above it are aware of the fact that the Navy has always honorably fulfilled its missions. I don't think that anyone views the Navy as less important just because of that."

They know how hard we work and they have seen something of another navy trying to accomplish similar things, and failing."

[BAMAHANE] Are you referring to the current situation of the Syrians in Lebanon?

[Ram] "Yes. In other words, it is clear all around that the Navy is a professional corps that does its job well and fulfills its missions."

[BAMAHANE] Are terrorists now making fewer attempts from the direction of the sea?

[Ram] "I don't think so. I think that there is some kind of maritime activity practically in each organization; sometimes we encounter it or we know about it, so that we cannot sit back and relax. Every so often they will try again, just as they do on land."

[BAMAHANE] Isn't there a danger that the quiet in the naval arena will lull the crews into complacency?

[Ram] "First of all we must make it clear that missile boats do not deal with current security duty. Their job is to train for war, that is their primary mission. Missile boats are used for current security work only in special cases. The ones who deal with daily defense are the Daburs. One fact that must be recalled is that in all the incidents we had in recent years the navy was fully alert and successful. So it's true that the job becomes routine, that it is tiring and often boring, because they have to patrol the same stretch back and forth for hours. The same goes for the radar stations with their patient operators. Each person is quite aware that we have to be always on the alert and, despite the repetitiveness of the work, we have successfully managed to avoid the pitfalls of routine."

[BAMAHANE] You mentioned the Syrians in Lebanon. What were they trying to do and failing?

[Ram] "They tried to stop ammunition vessels from entering Lebanon and in some cases they failed."

[BAMAHANE] What vessels did they use?

[Ram] "They used frigates or mine layers, and in case of need they also resorted to missile boats. On some days they dispatched eight or nine missile boats to this small area to stop vessels from entering, but some still managed to get through."

[BAMAHANE] Where there any encounters between their vessels and ours?

[Ram] "No. We did not clash with the Syrians, nor did we escort ships, despite what some newspapers wrote."

[BAMAHANE] How do you think the Syrians would react if a terrorist vessel were trying to cross to the south?

[Ram] "They wouldn't do anything about it."

[BAMAHANE] Has anything changed, or is anything likely to change in the near future concerning the naval threat in general?

[Ram] "Almost every Arab navy did their great leap forward toward the end of the 1970's and early 1980's. I think that stemmed mainly from the outcomes of the Yom Kippur war. What they had in the Yom Kippur war was more or less mobile launchers and they realized that at sea it doesn't work like on land, where you drive your carrier and park it here or there."

"At sea you have to have a combat system; so they began to equip themselves. All Arab navies went to the west and purchased top of the line vessels, and they continue to do so. The Saudis are still buying and so are the Emirates, and there is still more development. It must be remembered that even more distant Arab navies are a threat to us. At sea obstacles are far smaller than on land or in the air. Algerians or Libyans can get here, and I cannot imagine that Egypt would not allow passage to any Saudi war ship, even if Egypt itself were not at war with Israel."

[BAMAHANE] Did the end of the Gulf war change anything as far as the naval threat to us is concerned?

[Ram] "No, except for the fact that terrorists tried to lay mines in the border area. For the time being I don't see any other change."

[BAMAHANE] Are terrorist attempts based on what they learned from the methods used in the Gulf?

[Ram] "They got it directly from the Iranians, no doubt about that."

[BAMAHANE] Did we learn anything from the Gulf war?

[Ram] "There wasn't much to learn, outside of the fact that if you run around in a missile-infected area you must be prepared to deal with them, otherwise you get hurt. There were no real sea battles in the Gulf. What there was, was sea PEHA [expansion unknown], or airplanes attempting to operate over water in a relatively narrow space and encountering relatively slight identification problems."

[BAMAHANE] I would like to bring up another subject. You recently decided to extend the seamen's course. Is this one aspect of more extensive changes in the area of training naval fighters?

[Ram] "It may not sound like it, but it is mainly an endeavor to become more proficient. What happened over time was that sailors or mates would arrive on vessels without having qualified as duty officers, and training them was a lengthy process. That is why we decided to provide this type of training, as well as systematic qualifications within the seamen's course, and that is why we extended it somewhat. Now they are

already qualified when they arrive on board ship and can begin to work immediately without wasting time on the vessels themselves."

[BAMAHANE] What is the current situation in the Navy concerning volunteers and reenlistment?

[Ram] "We have no problems where volunteers are concerned, whether it is for submarines, sailors, or sea commandos. Neither does reenlistment present a problem. One must remember that in the Navy the first tour of duty is already much longer. Right away people sign up for 3 years and 20 percent—as opposed to 8 percent in the past—sign up for a second tour."

[BAMAHANE] Is the commercial fleet capable of absorbing Navy graduates?

[Ram] "Almost none at all. There is almost no transfer from the Navy to the commercial fleet. In the past, around the 1960's, there was, but now there is almost none."

[BAMAHANE] In other words, a Navy officer who embarks on this profession in fact makes a lifetime choice.

[Ram] "That's true, and generally speaking those are fine young men who, if they stay in the army, must be permitted to study, otherwise they will quit to go study outside the army. That is why almost none of them go to the commercial navy. This applies mainly to officers, although I personally don't know of many sailors who joined the commercial fleet."

[BAMAHANE] The Air Force now has one more general in blue with the General Staff. You sit close to the Air Force commander. Do you feel as if the Air Force were being pampered more than other corps in the army?

[Ram] "I wouldn't put it quite that way. I would say that the Navy has difficulties getting its men into high-ranking positions and in my opinion, there are two reasons for that: first, there are few of us. Although we feel big and strong, we are in fact a small corps. Secondly, people don't know us. In the army there are closer links between ground and air forces; they meet more frequently and they conduct many joint operations, certainly more than the Navy and the ground forces do. So when it comes to competing for jobs, each candidate comes with his file, and when I submit someone's name, it's indeed just a name on paper, while others, at least some of them, are known, have circulated, so they have an easier time being nominated."

"There is something else, too. In the Navy, when an officer is invited to compete for a staff job, he usually declines."

[BAMAHANE] Even if it means a promotion?

[Ram] "It is fairly seldom that an officer wants to transfer to the ground forces or to a staff job. We continuously press for positions, but when we already get

one and have to deliver the goods, we sometimes have trouble finding a willing candidate. That may be because of the pride we take in our corps."

[BAMAHANE] If there were another Navy man with the General Staff, would it be easier for you to persuade and to pass on important projects?

[Ram] "I don't doubt it. I don't mean to imply that one hand washes the other and that everything is based on connections and friendship. But if the person in charge of some IDF resource is not familiar with your needs but is well versed in what the ground forces or the Air Force need, then his decisions will go accordingly. I am not complaining, but I do think that the Navy, too, should be permitted to hold some of those positions. We are making efforts, and each time there is an opening we go for it. But the problem is still that on the one hand, Navy officers are not eager to take those jobs, and on the other hand, the IDF is not eager to have them."

[BAMAHANE] Nevertheless, the Navy does enjoy some privileges. You are the only ones not involved with the intifadah [uprising] and you can continue minding your everyday work and training for war without being pelted with stones.

[Ram] "That is true. The Navy has almost nothing to do with the intifadah. We do provide support for activities in the territories, but I cannot say that it is as much of a burden on us as it is on the other IDF corps and branches. From time to time we intensify our naval operations in the Gaza area in support of ground forces, but it would be very difficult for us to maintain a permanent unit there. I cannot cite figures, but those familiar with the subject know how real the problems involved are and how they interfere with training. We responded every time we were asked. In general the Navy contributes and helps everywhere it can, at sea or on land. That, in fact, is the IDF's war today."

[BAMAHANE] Doesn't your limited participation in missions concerning the intifadah cause you to become isolated from current IDF experiences?

[Ram] "Navies are not normally involved in what happens on land. It's a whole different mode of operation and lifestyle, and missions are different. Ground and air forces are usually linked and have more or less the same targets. We are somewhat different, although in the final analysis we all share the same goal. Having said that, it is important to note that whenever we went into action in the territories we won genuine praise. We will of course contribute whatever we can contribute there."

[BAMAHANE] Does the present naval arena still present sufficient opportunities for small-scale naval commando warfare?

[Ram] "Between wars, certainly. All or most of the active war on terrorism is fought by those units, and the same is true in time of war. Naturally, I cannot go into details,

but if Jewish heads continue to think, which they do, then the fleet will be assigned very respectable missions in our next war."

[BAMAHANE] Do other navies also maintain and operate such forces?

[Ram] "Almost every navy worthy of the name has a naval commando. The Italians were the first to come up with the idea; the Americans, French, British, and in fact every major country has some kind of unit of this type trained for commando actions. Some of them work more with intelligence, while others are more involved in the type of operations they had in World War II, but of course, each one's operations must be adapted to their respective naval arena. This is an area to which we are certainly very alert. There are a few specific things that the fleet can carry out better than others can, and that's what we are working on."

KUWAIT

Increase in Revenue, Decrease in Deficit Expected

44040538A *Dubay AL-BAYAN in Arabic* 24 Jul 89 p 3

[Article: "The Kuwaiti Budget for 1989: General State Revenues Expected to Rise. Forecast Deficit to Narrow"]

[Text] Financial experts in Kuwait expect the state's general revenues to rise during the year because of firming oil prices in all recent OPEC agreements, among other reasons.

Accordingly, experts expect the deficit to be less than the 13.337 billion dinars originally forecast for the FY 1988/89 budget.

Kuwait central bank statistics for the first three quarters of 1988 indicate that state revenues suffered a sharp drop of 516 million dinars, or 28 percent, from the corresponding period a year earlier. This was wholly attributed to a 527 million dinar (31.7 percent) drop in oil revenues. Domestic revenues from customs duties on imports, income from government projects, and transaction taxes amounted to 11 million dinars (6 percent) in the same period.

General spending in the first nine months of 1988 grew by 11 percent, or 186 million dinars, from the same period a year earlier.

Expenditures increased despite the sharp drop in revenues because of the government's fiscal policy not to impact public utilities but rather to subsidize such utilities and services. This is evidenced by an increase of 206 million dinars (20.7 percent) in current spending on wages and salaries, the purchase of goods and services, assistance to families, and foreign aid and remittances.

Public ownership spending also increased by 7 million dinars in addition to subsidies for autonomous institutions with separate budgets. Allocations for such institutions increased by 12 million dinars.

Rationalization was evident in the areas of capital and construction outlays where expenditures retreated by some 40 million dinars. There is no doubt that part of the general deficit was financed by domestic borrowing by means of treasury papers that the government began issuing at the end of November of 1987. The domestic public debt is serviced by new issues. It amounted to about 1.395 billion dinars by the end of September of 1988.

Worth noting is that the state's general revenues are expected to increase, therefore narrowing the deficit forecast at 1.337 billion dinars in the FY 1988/89 budget. The expected increase is attributed to firming oil prices in recent OPEC agreements as well as to an increase in the volume of Kuwaiti refined oil exports following the completion of the Mina' 'Abdallah refinery.

Status of Kuwaitization in Key Positions Discussed

44040542a *Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic* 29 Jul 89 pp 1, 17

[Article by Jamal Amin: "Employment Strategy for Next Plan in Two Months; Current Kuwaiti System Achieves Only 40 Percent Employment in 25 Years; Planning Is Drafting New Policy; Breaking Government Employment Down to 14 Categories From Which 280 Subsidiary Specializations Emanate"]

[Text] An informed source has told AL-SIYASAH that the Ministry of Planning is in the process of drafting and implementing a new policy to replace imported labor by national labor in government jobs, especially in the leadership positions. The source noted that the current replacement system does not fulfill the desired long-term objective because it leads to the Kuwaitization of only 40 percent of the government labor in the next 25 years.

The source also said that on 18 July 1989, the Ministry of Planning supplied the ministries and public agencies with forms to register the labor they have and break it down into categories and also to list the specializations needed by the end of the next 5-year plan (1990-91 to 1994-95).

The source further said that the ministry is making arrangements for a meeting which will be held in 2 months and which will include the officials in charge of the government sectors and the officials responsible for drafting the policies and programs of the next development plan to discuss the contents of these forms and to draft a labor and employment strategy for the next 5 years in light of the contents of these forms.

The source pointed out that the forms divide the jobs existing in Kuwait into 14 main categories from which emanate 280 subsidiary specializations and professions. The main categories include:

Physicians, scientists, engineers, economists, legists, teachers, managers and supervisors, men of letters and artists, sociologists, businessmen, skilled engineering workers, skilled medical and scientific workers, clerks and policemen, workers and craftsmen in the production sector, semi-skilled workers, service and agricultural workers and ordinary workers.

In a related development, Dr 'Abd-al-Hadi Muhammad al-'Awadi, the Ministry of Planning undersecretary and general coordinator of the 5-year plan, has sent to the undersecretaries of other ministries and to the officers in charge of labor in the public agencies official letters containing the working plan for the next phase of preparation of the [5-year] plan.

AL-SIYASAH has acquired one of these letters and here is its text:

"On the basis of the future strategy, the next 5-year plan is concerned fundamentally with developing the Kuwaiti citizen so that he may be able to contribute effectively to building and developing the present and future Kuwait and may enter the important strategic areas in which he must shoulder the main responsibility. For this purpose, it is necessary to draw a picture of the work force according to nationality (Kuwaiti, non-Kuwaiti) and profession and of what the future plan should be.

"While in the process of outlining the main features of the future development, beginning with the next 5-year plan (1990-91 to 1994-95), the ministry wishes to familiarize itself with the opinions of the officials in the various agencies on the actual condition of the manpower they have and on their future needs. The ministry especially wishes to learn of the priorities in the area of Kuwaitizing jobs and professions in the various agencies.

"Therefore, we beg you to inform the ministry of the priority you give to the various professions and jobs that you need in the activities that you supervise. In view of the importance of this issue, the ministry proposes the creation of a working team from your esteemed agency in which Kuwaiti officials in charge of the various responsibilities are represented so that a true picture of your future needs may be drawn up. Attached is a form listing the various professions [categories] in the next plan. The ministry wishes to find out your opinion of any proposals that are generally likely to reduce reliance on manpower through automation of the manual activities and computerization of the administrative, mental and other activities in your esteemed agency.

"The ministry will draw up a comprehensive picture of the needs of the various activities in light of the information it receives from the agencies so that this picture may be a basis for the process of Kuwaitization in the various professions and so that the plans needed to

channel the efforts toward this objective may be drawn up according to a set timetable, provided that we receive the attached forms filled with the required data no later than 15 August 1989."

Mediation Between Turkey and Bulgaria Reported

44040538B Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic
24 Jul 89 p 13

[Article by Khalid 'Alawnah: "Kuwait Mediates Between Ankara and Sofia to Solve the Crisis of the Muslim Turkish Minority in Bulgaria"]

[Text] There were indications yesterday that Kuwait has begun active mediation between the Republic of Turkey and the People's Democratic Republic of Bulgaria in order to settle their dispute over the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Discrimination and oppressive laws caused large numbers of that minority to seek refuge on Turkish soil. Ankara, meanwhile, continues to denounce Bulgaria's oppression of Turkish Muslims, describing it as despicable racism.

Kuwait had recently recalled its ambassador in Sofia Talib Al-Naqib—a recognized diplomatic gesture of displeasure towards an action—as an indication of Kuwaiti solidarity with Bulgarian Muslims subjected to oppressive measures that violate their religious beliefs and restrict their freedom of religion.

Turkey applauded the Kuwaiti action in an official foreign ministry statement that called on other Islamic countries to denounce Bulgaria's treatment of its Turkish Muslim minority and to pressure that country into granting Muslims full rights of citizenship.

The Emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al-Sabah received Ambassador Al-Naqib earlier this week and was fully briefed on developments in Bulgaria, on conditions of the Muslim minority there, and on the ambassador's relevant consultations with Bulgarian officials.

The following day, Sunday, the Emir of Kuwait received from Bulgarian chief of state Todor Zhivkov a message on Bulgaria's reaction to the Kuwaiti measure and explaining the Bulgarian position on this issue and on the crisis with Turkey.

Bulgaria says that it rightfully applies its laws to all its citizens and emphasizes that the way it sees it, Muslims there are Bulgarian citizens who converted into Islam during the Turkish occupation of the Balkans and are not so much Turkish Muslims as they are Bulgarian citizens who adopted Islam. Turkey, therefore, has no right to turn the issue into a major national issue as if it involved its own citizens.

But this position is contradicted by fact and by the tens of thousands of Muslim Bulgarian citizens streaming toward the Turkish border to escape a prohibition on

giving Islamic names to the newly born and to flee other oppressive measures meant to wipe out their religious identity.

AL-BAYAN learned that Kuwait wanted to translate its regrets at the treatment of Muslim Bulgarians into more advanced action by exploring what positive assistance it could render to help bring about a Turkish-Bulgarian agreement.

Accordingly, ambassador al-Naqib returned to Sofia as Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad, Kuwaiti deputy premier and foreign minister, began a series of concentrated contacts with the Turkish and Bulgarian sides in order to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.

Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad told newsmen yesterday he had great hopes of reaching a settlement satisfactory to all concerned and pointed out that the issue is of great interest to the Emir of Kuwait who desires a settlement that would protect the rights of the Muslim minority in Bulgaria, guarantee its religious freedoms, and put an end to a cause of friction between two neighboring states, one of which is an important member of the Islamic Congress Organization.

Shaykh Sabah added: We are in contact with both Turkey and Bulgaria in order to bring about an understanding between them that would terminate the conflict and form the basis for good and positive neighborly relations.

Shaykh Sabah emphasized that Kuwaiti actions in this regard are prompted by an interest in this Islamic issue stemming from its chairmanship of the current fifth Islamic Summit and from its good relations with the two concerned parties—Turkey and Bulgaria.

He pointed out that current Kuwaiti contacts are not mediation in the literal sense of the word. Rather, they aim at finding solutions to a problem that will never be resolved across a conference table but as a result of understanding and bilateral contacts between concerned parties.

Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad said that Kuwait is currently awaiting replies from both parties and that he will be closely watching the situation over the next few days.

Therefore, the Kuwaiti initiative, which currently revolves around finding means to resolve the Turkish-Bulgarian conflict, aims at utilizing quiet diplomacy to find a common ground of understanding between the two neighbors.

So far, it looks like Turkey and Bulgaria welcome Kuwait's anticipated good offices. More will be revealed over the next few days.

LEBANON

'Awn Claims He Will Not Hesitate To Use Frog Missiles

44040531 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic
25 Jul 89 pp 1, 22

[Article by Nabih Burji: "Will Missiles Elect 'Awn President?"]

[Text] When General Michel 'Awn talks about Frog missiles, he side steps the fact that he owns a number of them, but he does say, "When the presidential palace here is under threat of force, why shouldn't the presidential palace there be under threat as well?" He feels that the security problems he is experiencing ought to be experienced by others.

In his interview with AL-QABAS, he said: "I am going to set the world afire." Of course, he was thinking of the long-range missiles reportedly installed in Laqluq, a high-altitude area used for skiing. The same reports maintain that the Lebanese army had built "caves" there which have since been rehabilitated to accommodate Frog missiles whose impacts, experts say, is more psychological than military because the conventional charge they carry is not much more effective than a large artillery shell.

Assassination...by Choker

The fact is when Frog missiles get to Lebanon they assume a different and indeed highly menacing nature, especially when they fall into the hands of someone willing to follow a suicidal policy. For Gen Michel 'Awn, who has sent his family to live abroad and spends all his time in a bunker at the presidential palace at Ba'abda, is at a point where he can do anything and will not hesitate to use surface-to-surface missiles with all the serious regional implications that such an action entails.

A correspondent visited the Beirut AL-QABAS bureau to conduct an "anatomical" comparison, and she came out with the conclusion that the head of the military government could, in the end, shoot himself in the head. While he may be right about some of the points he raised, he has crossed every red line without regard to the limits of his power or the intricate regional reality around him. Men who think this way always come to a tragic end.

Obviously, the Syrians will not under any circumstances allow Gen 'Awn to keep his Frog missiles. They have reportedly set a deadline for the withdrawal of these missiles or else they will take the necessary measures to contain this danger because, when confrontation with Israel is a likely possibility at any moment, the Syrians cannot leave themselves open to a missile attack when the opposite is supposed to be true—missiles installed in the Lebanese heights should be Syria's ally, not its enemy.

It may be curious that some West Beirut militias should ask for Frog missiles to maintain a missile balance even though they have artillery that can cover the entire eastern area without exception. Such a request takes on a comic quality unless it is designed to provoke Israel, which, the minute it learns that hostile parties in Lebanon have acquired missiles that can reach the Israeli depth starts pushing for their removal as part of a comprehensive operation for removing all missiles installed in Lebanon. If such is the case, this does not reflect a strong position that can compel Gen 'Awn to give up his missiles but rather a weak position because there is no chance that these missiles can be hit and, therefore, the situation must be made difficult enough to realize the regional demand to remove all missiles from Lebanon.

Missiles Elect President

Those who know Gen Michel 'Awn well believe that, if he does in fact have Frog missiles, he will never give them up because they are his last barricade. Some of his close associates used to say that should Syrian forces try to break through the eastern areas, Syria itself will be subject to penetration across certain borders. And since regional "complications" may ward off an Arab-Arab confrontation, at least for now, missiles are the only alternative. 'Awn asserts that should the Syrians attempt to advance even one meter towards the presidential palace, he will give order to his missile officers to launch them immediately, with all the serious impact that such an action would entail.

This is not easy to do unless the superpowers have taken into account the need to have regional confrontations to create the right circumstances that would help reshape the region according to new strategic exigencies. This by no means is an unlikely prospect, for there are those in Tel Aviv who believe that the Hebrew state has reached the danger point. For besides the failure to deal with the intifadah [uprising], there is deep internal disintegration that has touched every political and partisan establishment. So a different situation in the Middle East has to be instituted to allow the Israelis to catch their breath.

When Israelis take to this kind of thinking, one can be sure that some people in the American administration think the same way, even notwithstanding the contention that the United States is very apprehensive about the introduction of surface-to-surface missiles to Lebanon, for this constitutes a dangerous precedent that could engender other more dangerous steps. The Americans do not neglect to point out that such a situation will give the Syrians all the excuses they need to reinforce their military position in Lebanon with great precision, thus triggering an Israeli reaction that could lead to a military confrontation. For the missiles in Gen 'Awn's possession are not meant for a Lebanese mission or, as he claims, for securing a military balance with Syria, but rather for a regional mission. Hence the contention that "missiles, not deputies, will elect Gen Michel 'Awn president." Gen 'Awn is willing to pull out his missiles if

Damascus agrees to his election as president, even though some high-level political authorities believe that the missile problem has gone far beyond the election process. Gen 'Awn cannot order the withdrawal of Frog missiles which have been sent to Lebanon, not to be pulled out, but to create a particular regional situation.

It is now certain that some influential Arab capitals are moving in several directions to contain the missile question because any mistake will inevitably lead to very serious developments. An Arab-Arab confrontation could break out at any moment, and there are reports of anticipated military preparations along Arab-Arab borders. This is something both America and the Soviet Union may have wanted even though Washington and Moscow have made it known that they have worked hard to prevent the situation from getting out of hand.

LIBYA

Indications of Improving French-Libyan Relations Noted

45040464 *Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 9 Jul 89 p 15*

[Article by Samir Subh]

[Text] Indications that there might be an improvement in French-Libyan relations at this time have grabbed the attention of various political powers and the media alike, and everyone is wondering: Will France soften its policy towards the Jamahiriyyah of Libya, or is it only a passing rapprochement imposed by prior commitments that it had promised to keep?

The first hypothesis seems likely, especially after official French confirmation of reports that Paris had recently agreed to sell spare parts of nonoffensive equipment to West Tripoli. But in spite of that Libya is still subject to the arms embargo that has been in effect since the summer of 1983, since the Chadian insurgents whom Tripoli supports launched attacks against the regime of President Hissein Habre, which prompted France at the time to send its forces to support the threatened Chadian regime. Observers in political circles in Paris report that this new report had surprised the Chadian embassy and prompted it to make a strong protest to the Foreign Ministry.

In any case, what are the reasons for this sudden change in France's position? Is it temporary, or is it the result of lengthy secret negotiations that took place in recent months between the two sides?

The information that AL-BAYAN has obtained from various sources in the French capital confirm that this shift came as a result of long and difficult negotiations in which the secretary of the People's Office in Paris, Hamid al-Hudayri, played a prominent role in removing all the obstacles which used to stand in the way of improved relations. However, these negotiations were associated with goodwill gestures that France requested

with regard to a series of issues that used to comprise intrinsic points of disagreement between the two countries. Some informed sources say that the partial lifting of the embargo is not a recent occurrence, because as far as Paris is concerned, the issue is linked to the process of fulfilling its commitments included in the framework of the agreement on defensive military equipment which Libya bought in 1973.

An official in the French Ministry of Defense said that the decision was made on the fifteenth of last June during a meeting of the ministerial committee on the export of military equipment. According to what this official says, it involves providing upkeep exclusively for defensive military equipment, especially the radars which Libya bought before the embargo was imposed. The ministry justifies this step by saying that it is not going outside of international law, but on the other hand it stressed that this French decision does not include the sale by French manufacturers of new equipment.

Certain sources close to the office of the French prime minister have explained that of the numerous Libyan demands in the military field, French authorities have apparently agreed only to that equipment which it believed was the least vital. Thus France has responded cautiously to the increasing pressure from Libyan authorities and the simultaneous pressure of French manufacturers within the arms sector and the civilian sector.

Public Political Reasons for the Rapprochement

The announcement of the French decision has created a state of confusion within the concerned agencies, for some learned the news through the newspapers. As for Foreign Ministry spokesmen, they were ordered not to make any comments. In any case, even if France does not intend to lift the embargo once and for all, a softening in its policy towards Libya does appear to be almost certain. In this context some accounts which have leaked from the prime minister's office report say that an indepth discussion is going on now within the pertinent French offices and their ministry evaluating Libya's future role and the development of its diplomacy. All of this is going on in light of what the French government noticed recently with great satisfaction—namely the presence of several positive factors that could help to create a state of relaxation at the level of political relations with Libya on the one hand, and to establish an atmosphere of comprehensive openness on the other. At the forefront of these factors are:

- First, the Jamahiriyah of Libya's joining the Maghreb Arab Union [MAU], and the effect of the coordination of policies of the member states in inducing West Tripoli to be more moderate in all areas.
- Second, an end to its old legal dispute with Tunis, especially with respect to the exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf; the lack of support for the Tunisian opposition residing in Libya; as well as the improvement in its relations with Morocco and Algeria, despite the presence of border agreements between the two.
- Third, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's recognition last year of Hisssein Habre's regime, the agreement to exchange ambassadors between the two countries, and his joining the peace process being conducted by the Organization of African Unity, which Paris believes ought to be encouraged.
- Fourth, the reconciliation with Egypt and the reopening of borders with it as a first step towards resuming diplomatic relations soon.
- Fifth, the fact that normalization of relations between Tripoli and Washington is not a remote possibility, especially since goodwill American delegations have been making shuttle trips since last March between Washington and Tripoli with the goal of removing the negative residues of the past, opening new horizons of cooperation, and ending the state of hostility. It ought to be mentioned here that since last January, that is since the crisis of the "al-Rabitah" pharmaceuticals plant, Col al-Qadhdhafi has not let an opportunity pass without mentioning the wisdom and maturity of the new Bush administration.

In any case, one can in no way take away from the importance of the statement which French president Francois Mitterrand made in a radio interview a month after the resumption of Libyan-Chadian relations, in which he said: "Everything that allows the improvement of relations between France and Libya is welcome, on condition the principles of international law are respected," for since that time positive Libyan initiative towards France have doubled.

The Real Background to the Occurring Shift

Although the importance of the announced causes mentioned above must be taken into consideration, there are implicit causes that remain the basis of the process of French-Libyan rapprochement, the signs of which began to take a clear form only a short while ago. After Libya had presented all required indications of moderation which removed most of the political obstacles, it was no longer possible for any French government, socialist or right wing, to refrain from making a gesture to clear the air with Tripoli; that is with respect to the objective aspect of the course of things. As for the real background, that is embodied in a set of material factors and profit and loss reckonings.

France first and foremost wants to compete with European countries, such as the Italy and Federal Germany, in building political relations and special cooperative relations with the states of the MAU. This includes Libya of course, for the MAU is, in the final analysis, the entry visa to the Libyan market, from which French companies profitted very much in the early years following the revolution in 1969, until the end of the seventies.

We must also mention the role which the French industrial networks played for a while in putting pressure on the government to return French relations with the

Jamahiriyah of Libya to what they had been before, with the aim of getting back their share of the Libyan market before it was too late. The pressure climaxed in recent months when the latter called for bids on the implementation of the second stage of the industrial river project, whose cost is close to 6 billion French francs. What Libya wanted happened, for the three largest French companies, Bouygues, Dumez, and Marseilles, competed strongly. But Libya did not stop at this point. Instead, it told the chairmen of their boards of directors that it would not give this project to any French company until Paris reviewed the lukewarm relations in existence up until then.

Concerning this, a French ambassador who had previously served in Tripoli commented, "Libya has understood the rules of the game and has comprehended France's need for new, low risk markets, (as opposed to the markets of francophone black Africa in which it has lost much)."

Libyan Conditions

In any case, this Libyan comprehension was clearly expressed by Ambassador Hamid al-Hudayri during a symposium which he held in the Arab-French Chamber of Commerce last month, inasmuch as he stressed the need to encourage the development of trade relations with France. However, he conveyed the message that after today Libya would buy only what it needed. Moreover, from now on it would not make a distinction between political relations and economic and commercial relations, thus priority would be given to those who have relations of cooperation and friendship with Libya.

Another of the material factors serving to expedite rapprochement is the fact that British and American companies (the oil companies in particular) had continued to operate in Libya throughout the period of the economic boycott and the severing of diplomatic relations. The French saw this as a lesson that cost them dearly, and they decided that in the future any steps towards alliance would not be at France's expense.

Another of the implicit reasons was the position taken by France during the American raid against Libya in 1986. France refused to allow the American airplanes to fly over its territory, and sent the Libyan foreign minister and his accompanying delegation an invitation to a conference held at the beginning of this year on eliminating chemical weapons. Libya saw this as a goodwill gesture by the French government. This was the basis for the secret and semi-open contacts which took place in recent months both in the French capital and in West Tripoli.

Several French Questions

All signs point to a rapprochement and an improvement in relations. But why did the French government want to go to such great lengths to nullify any impact that the announcement of the news of the sale of nonoffensive military spare parts might have?

This news was only disclosed by a leak through the newspapers. And why the confusion between the explanations given by the Ministry of Defense and the refusal of the Foreign Ministry to comment, giving the impression that the Foreign Ministry took a different position?

To these questions there can only be two explanations and no more. Either the government had looked for a way to hide the fact that it is subject not only to diplomatic considerations, but also to the pressure put on it by French manufacturers who are hoping to get their share of the Libyan market and turn the wheels of their factories and reduce their burdens, or the government has opted for this relative secrecy because it has been burned by past experience.

MOROCCO

Political Prisoners Reportedly Go On Strike

45040462a Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 1 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] We received a statement from a group of political prisoners in the prisons of Safi, Aghbilah (Casablanca), and Meknes, in which they proclaimed their solidarity with the political prisoners in Laalou prison in Rabat who were continuing their indefinite hunger strike.

The prisoners who had signed this statement announced that for their part they were embarking on a solidarity strike for 48 hours on Thursday and Friday, 27-28 July 1989. They also demanded that a serious dialogue be opened with them, and they appealed to all powers devoted to human rights in Morocco to double their efforts to avert the threat to the lives of the hunger strikers, which is now worse than ever before, especially since their strike is nearing the end of its sixth week.

Government Approves Construction of Country's Biggest Dam

45040462c London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 8 Aug 89 pp 46, 47

[Article: "Second Largest Dam in Africa To Be Built in Morocco"]

[Text] Morocco has concluded an agreement with several foreign parties to build the largest dam in Morocco—the second largest in Africa after the High Dam in Aswan. Taking part in funding the Majaara Dam on the Moroccan plateau in the middle of Morocco are Spain, Turkey, Italy, and the Soviet Union, in addition to Arab organizations including the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, and the Saudi Development Fund.

The building of the new dam will begin next year, and work on it is expected to end in 1997.

Morocco will cover part of the debt of building the dam with Moroccan textiles.

In addition to the Majaara Dam, 15 medium-sized dams and 300 smaller dams will be built, with a total storage capacity of more than 340 million cubic meters. That will help to protect the Moroccan plateau from the threat of floods that used to sweep through it in the past, and it will also permit the irrigation of 100,000 hectares in the region and produce 390 kilowatts of hydroelectric power annually.

It will divert 800 million cubic meters of treated water to other reservoirs to supply the region stretching between Kenitra and Jdida with potable water.

The Majaara Dam will contribute to improving the agricultural and industrial products which will be used to provide 30 percent of Morocco's requirements for milk. In addition, 15 sugar refineries will be set up with the dam and will participate in the production of 350,000 tons of sugar per year.

Fef Court Sentences University Students

45040462b Rabat ALA-'ALAM in Arabic 30 Jul 89 p 1

[Article: "Harsh Sentences on Students of Sidi Muhammad Ibn-'Abdallah University in Fef"]

[Text] We have learned that the criminal court in Fef has sentenced the students in the colleges of Sidi Muhammad Ibn-'Abdallah University to terms ranging from 5 years and 6 months to 10 years.

A large number of lawyers came forward to defend the accused students. The coordination committee of the Moroccan Human Rights Defense League and the Moroccan Human Rights Defense Association was represented by Professor Abdolhadi Benjloun Andaloussi, head of the league's branch in Fef, Professor Youssef Allawi, and Professor Dinia, while Professor Chawich came from Rabat from the coordination committee for the same purpose. Lawyers from Taza and Oujda also supported the accused.

Labor Union Protests Miners' Working Conditions

45040462d Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic
31 Jul 89 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Statement from the Executive Office of the General Union of Moroccan Workers About the Problems of the Mine Workers in Eastern Morocco"]

[Text] Immediately following its emergency meeting, the executive office of the General Union of Moroccan Workers—which studied in particular the serious deterioration in the circumstances of mine workers in Jerada and Taoussit—it noted with the utmost deep indignation that social problems are nothing but the end product of a government policy which sanctions a lack of attention to the declining situation in which workers in general, and the mine workers in particular, are suffering. This

situation is due to the oppression, injustice and subjugation which this toiling class is experiencing in both their material and social lives because of harsh working conditions. This class lives as if it were in the Middle Ages with respect to the exhausting work it performs and its hideous exploitation, without being paid wages appropriate to this exhausting work, which takes its toll on the health of the worker and causes him to age prematurely. There is also a lack of suitable housing, a lack of adequate protection, poverty in retirement, and other things. Because no just solution has been reached to the problems relating to this sector, especially in eastern Morocco—something we have always demanded—the result is that we are now experiencing social strife of a grave nature, and instead of these problems being met with understanding and study, we now see them being met with violence and suppression.

Following the tragedies of recent months, we see in the present struggle the same disturbances for the same reasons, and even though much time has passed between the latest struggles and this situation, the government has not yet offered a solution. Instead, it decided to meet it the same way—the violence with which it met the last struggles.

The General Union of Moroccan Workers strongly condemns the despotic measures which the administration and also the prefecture of Oujda have ventured to take: the expulsion by the administration of all members of the trade union office of the democratic confederation for work, and the closing down of the confederation's office by the prefecture. Thus it proclaims on this occasion its absolute solidarity with those expelled, and demands that they be quickly reinstated, especially since such measures are nothing but a violation of the laws which protect union activity and guarantee the right to strike.

It also expresses its complete solidarity with the Democratic Confederation of Labor in the face of the operation to close it down, which is contrary to the principle of trade union freedoms and trade union activity, for which the Moroccan working class struggled until it was guaranteed by Moroccan laws, and especially by the highest law, the Constitution. It also demands that the necessary measures be taken against the one who made this decision.

The General Union of Moroccan Workers, in supporting the striking workers under the banner of the three unions, notes with satisfaction the materializing of unity in the trade union struggle, which has been achieved for the first time among the basic unions. It is hoped that this unifying action, which appeared in the Taoussit strikes, will also appear in other sectors so as to force a dialogue with the government to actually reach wholesome solutions ending the despicable expressions of the miserable state under which the workers exist, expressions which are evident in the lack of respect for the law, the continuous decline of purchasing power, the

increasing severity of the housing crisis, the decline in health services, the threat of the specter of retirement, work-related illnesses, etc.

The General Union of Moroccan Workers believes that no real progress can come about without the just treatment of this important class in the country that takes part in the continuous toil and labor to build an advanced Morocco, through actual improvement of its material and social circumstances in application of true democracy. Thus, it believes that unified union activity is necessary as the way to defend the legitimate and just demands of the workers, especially since the idea of unity has begun to bear some fruit in the struggles. It also believes that this unity must take the form of political unity in order to save the country from the bad management of some officials who do not sense the bitterness of the workers' suffering.

SUDAN

Government Agenda for 1989 Published

45040479 Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH in Arabic 30 Jul 89 p 4

[Article: "The 1989 Third Constitutional Decree: Organizing Government Agencies' Actions"]

[Text] Pursuant to the provisions of the First Constitutional Decree, the Revolution Command Council for National Salvation promulgated the Third Constitutional Decree. The text of that decree follows:

Part One: Preliminary Provisions

Name of the Decree and the Effective Date

1. This decree shall be called "The 1989 Third Constitutional Decree" (organizing government). It becomes effective on the day it is signed.

Definitions

2. Unless the context determines otherwise, the following terms, as used in this decree, shall be construed as follows:

- The term "council" shall mean The National Rescue Revolutionary Council which was established in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the First Constitutional Decree.
- The term "council of ministers" shall mean the council of ministers which was established in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the First Constitutional Decree.
- The term "government" shall mean the government of the Republic of Sudan.
- The term "head of state" shall mean the head of state appointed in accordance with the provisions of Article 5.1 of the First Constitutional Decree.

Part Two: The Head of State

The Powers and Authorities of the Head of State

3. The Head of State shall be the highest constitutional authority in The Republic of Sudan, relative to all sovereign acts. The Head of State shall become the commander in chief of the people's armed forces and other regular troops. Without infringing upon the general nature of the foregoing, the Head of State shall have the following powers and authorities:

- To confirm ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries to the government.
- To approve death sentences.
- To grant full pardon, and to commute or reduce unconditionally the sentence of any person charged or convicted of any crime in accordance with controls determined by the law.
- To declare a state of war after the Council's approval.
- To declare a state of emergency in all or part of the country if an immediate and momentous danger threatens national unity, the country's safety, the safety of part of the country, or the country's economy. The Head of State is to take whatever measures are required to confront such a danger, and such measures shall have the power of law. He is to consult with the Council about the state of emergency and the special measures that were taken in that regard within 15 days from the date the state of emergency was declared so the council can make its own determination about the matter.
- To supervise the office of the public comptroller, and to appoint the public comptroller.
- To supervise the judicial authority; to form the Supreme Court; to appoint the chief justice and his deputies; and to appoint the judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of appellate courts, the judges of provincial courts, and the judges of lower courts.
- To supervise the office of the attorney general, and to appoint the attorney general and his deputy.
- To supervise the Public Service Authority, and to consult with the Council of Ministers when appointing the chairman and members of the Public Service Authority.
- To perform any other function or exercise any other power granted to him by virtue of any effective constitutional decree or law.

The Deputy Head of State

4. If the head of state is temporarily unable to perform his functions and exercise his powers, the deputy head of state shall perform said functions and exercise said powers on his behalf.

Part Three: the Legislative Authority

The Council

5. The Council, which is established in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the First Constitutional Decree, shall become the legislative authority in the Republic of the Sudan.

The Powers and Authorities of the Council

6. In addition to promulgating constitutional decrees and draft laws, the Council shall have the following powers and authorities:

- A. To approve the general budget and establish the state's policies.
- To supervise the Council of Ministers, and to hold it accountable for its actions. The Council may remove any minister from office or accept his resignation.
- To ratify international treaties and agreements and foreign loan agreements in accordance with the law.
- To appoint the president of the council, [as published] his deputy, and the ministers.
- To establish ministries, and to determine their areas of authority in accordance with the law.
- To form investigative committees to investigate any problem which is presented to the council.
- To issue rules regulating the council's business and measures and how it exercises its powers.
- To exercise any other powers or authorities granted to it by virtue of any effective constitutional decree or law.

The Executive Authority

The Council of Ministers and Its Responsibility

7.1. The Council of Ministers shall consist of the prime minister and the ministers. Together, they shall make up the executive authority in the Republic of Sudan.

7.2. The Council of Ministers shall be jointly responsible to the Council for the government's executive and administrative actions.

7.3. Each minister shall be responsible to the prime minister for the management of his ministry.

The Powers and Authorities of the Council of Ministers

8. The Council of Ministers shall have the following powers and authorities:

- To conduct all of the government's executive and administrative business.
- To conclude international treaties and agreements and loan agreements.
- To issue rules regulating its activities and procedures and how its powers are to be exercised.
- To perform any other function, and to exercise any other power granted to it by virtue of any effective constitutional decree or law.

Part Five [as published]: Legislation

Legislative Procedures

9. Draft laws are to be approved in accordance with procedures stipulated in the rules which were issued in accordance with Article 6.G.

Draft Laws

10.1. The president of the Council, any council member, or the Council of Ministers may submit to the Council for its consideration any draft law.

10.2. A draft law does not become law unless it is approved by the Council and signed by its president.

10.3. Unless it is explicitly stated that a law becomes effective on the date it is signed or on any other date, a law becomes effective on the date it is published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette].

Fiscal Draft Laws

11.1. At least 1 month before the end of the fiscal year, the Council of Ministers shall submit to the Council a draft general budget for the state, including spending appropriations for development projects. Said draft budget shall be submitted in the form of a financial appropriations bill.

11.2. If the new budget is not approved before the start of the new fiscal year, the old budget remains in effect until the new budget is approved.

11.3. The Council of Ministers may submit to the Council a bill for additional financial appropriations when it becomes evident that the amount approved originally by the Council in the budget is not enough to meet the needs for the present year. The Council of Ministers may submit a bill for additional financial appropriations also when a need emerges during the year to disburse funds for new activities or functions for which no funds had been allocated in that year's budget and when such disbursements have to be approved by the Council.

11.4. When the Council of Ministers wishes to earmark certain funds from the government's reserve revenues, or when it wishes to transfer funds from one reserve account to another, it is to submit to the Council a bill for covering or transferring said funds.

11.5. When the Council of Ministers wishes to disburse funds by deducting said funds from the government's reserve funds, it is to submit to the Council a bill to covering these expenditures.

11.6. Suggestions for instituting new taxes or for amending or repealing existing taxes are to be submitted in the form of a bill for the Council's approval. However, the Council of Ministers may stipulate that on orders from it, any proposed new tax or any change or repeal of an existing tax is to become effective on the day the bill is submitted to the Council for its review, if the Council of Ministers finds that the public interest requires it. If the bill is rejected, however, said rejection or termination of the tax bill shall not be retroactive.

11.7. None of the aforementioned bills referred to in this article shall become law unless it is approved by the Council and then signed by the president of the Council.

Once said bill becomes law, it becomes effective in accordance with the provisions of Article 10.3. above.

Part Six: General Provisions

Prohibition of Private Business

12. No one serving as head of state, council president, council member, prime minister, or minister may, while serving in office, practice any profession or become directly or indirectly involved in any business with the state or with any other body.

Vacancies

13.1. The position of council president, council member, prime minister, or minister becomes vacant in one of the following cases:

- A. Death
- Loss of qualification or suitability to serve
- Conviction in a crime affecting honor or integrity
- A medical decision that the person is mentally unfit
- The Council's acceptance of that person's resignation
- Removal from office by the Council

13.2. In case any one of the positions mentioned in item 1 of this article becomes vacant, the Council shall appoint a successor to fill this position. Said appointee shall take the oath of office in front of the chief justice. The text of said oath is provided in a table appended to this decree.

The Conduct of the Council and the Ministers

14.1. The Council's and the Council of Ministers' proceedings and deliberations shall be confidential. Every council member and every minister shall be bound by this confidentiality, and no council member or minister shall reveal anything that takes place in council meetings or meetings of the Council of Ministers to anyone outside those meetings. However, the Council or the Council of Ministers may, at its discretion, give a council member or a minister its explicit permission to announce any of the decisions made by the Council or the Council of Ministers.

14.2. The conduct of the president of the Council and council members and that of the prime minister and ministers shall be such so as not to create any direct or indirect conflict between their official duties and their personal interests. Specifically, none of these officials may use his official position for his own benefit or for the benefit of those with whom he has a special relationship.

14.3. The president of the Council, any council member, or any minister may be removed from office if he violates these obligations. In addition, other legal measures may be taken against him.

14.4. No criminal measures may be taken against the president of the Council, any council member, the prime minister, or any of the ministers without the Council's written order.

Sovereign Actions May Not Be Challenged

15. The courts may not examine sovereign actions directly or indirectly.

The Sovereign Provisions of this Decree

16. In case the provisions of any law conflict with those of this decree, the provisions of this decree shall prevail inasmuch as necessary to remove such conflict.

By order of the Revolutionary Leadership Council for National Salvation

Issued under my signature on 25 Dhu al-Hijjah 1409 AH, which coincides with 28 July 1989 AD

Lt Gen 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir Chairman of the Revolution Command Council for National Salvation

DUP's Al-'Abidin Disputes Coup Events, Background

45040497 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 9 Aug 89 p 2

[Article: "Position of Sudan's Coup Toward Religious Tendencies"]

[Text] What is the true nature of what is happening in Sudan? This question is asked by the entire world media. AL-AHALI had published a dispatch from Khartoum on the new coup's relationship with the various political forces, led by the Islamists. But it has received the following letter from a Sudanese professor at Khartoum University:

It seems that the writer of the Khartoum dispatch, published in AL-AHALI issue number 407 of Wednesday, 26 July 1989, did not take the trouble of investigating the information contained in his article and that he was content to listen to some amateur political commentators, and there are many of them in Khartoum's circles, with whom he felt comfortable.

It is not true that the Sudanese masses have received the National Salvation Revolution very tepidly, as evidenced by the fact that the al-Jazirah Farmers Union, which is the largest Sudanese farmers' union and which is controlled by the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party], has met with the revolution leader, has declared its support for the revolution, and has canceled the strike it had launched under al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's administration. A delegation representing the Executive Council of the Workers' Union, which is controlled by the three major parties, namely the Ummah, the DUP and the [National] Islamic Front [NIF], has also met with the Revolution Command Council [RCC] and has expressed its acceptance of the new situation. The attempts made by some elements in the Doctors', Engineers' and Bankers' Unions to declare a political strike in protest of the constitutional change that has taken place have not found anybody among their bases to support their call, even though these unions, along with other professional

unions and federations, had pledged to protect democracy and to oppose any military rule.

The country's living and security conditions deteriorated to a degree that has made it very difficult for any neutral person to regret the past conditions. Chaos and laxity prevailed so much that the government lost its authority and the law lost its respect. It suffices to say that the few months which the Unified National Front government survived witnessed 30 strikes, led by the strike of the unions controlled by the government parties, such as the Farmers' Union, the Doctors' Union and the University Professors' Union. Stories of government corruption proliferated to a degree that motivated al-Sadiq al-Mahdi himself to form fact-finding committees to investigate a number of ministers. All this has urged the Sudanese masses to welcome the new regime even though the taste of the bitter experience with the past military regimes is still in their mouth. The masses have watched on television with great admiration the sight of the army and security forces opening warehouses stacked with goods and commodities which the people had found difficult to obtain from the markets. Some of the goods had been hoarded for so long that they became damaged. What is surprising is that the government had a monopoly on the distribution of some of those commodities, such as sugar and flour, which should not have been allowed to be hoarded by merchants. This could have happened only as a result of collusion with high-ranking officials in the executive agency.

As for the evidence cited by the dispatch writer as proof of his statement that the NIF is connected with the RCC, it is inaccurate. The writer said that the most significant evidence is the "serious document circulated by the NIF on Sunday, 25 June 1989," i.e., 5 days before the coup. The fact is that the said "document" is nothing but an editorial published by ALWAN, which is an independent daily, though sympathetic to the Islamic tendency, that was circulated the same way as other papers. Is it reasonable that the NIF would circulate a "document" specifying the day of the coup which it supports? There was abundant talk of a coup in Sudan since the time when the armed forces command presented its famous ultimatum to the government last February. This compelled al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to demand from the armed forces a pledge that this memorandum would be their last intervention in political affairs. But to say that the military rulers of the provinces are members of the NIF or that they have front-oriented tendencies is no more than lies. It is not in the nature of the military to display their political tendencies, especially if they are thinking of seizing power. The armed forces unanimously supported the RCC and the movement did not have to use any external force to seize any military unit. The NIF has been treated the same way as the other parties. Its properties have been confiscated, its newspaper has been suspended and five of its leaders, headed by Dr Hasan al-Turabi, have been arrested. Perhaps the suspicion of a connection with the NIF emanates from the fact that a number of the RCC members are well known for their

religiosity and their upright conduct. Such religiosity and conduct are under no circumstance the monopoly of the NIF members.

As for the southern Sudan problem, the National Salvation Government has abrogated the Garang-Mirghani accord which provoked a major controversy among the members of the previous government. The Ummah Party said that the government had fulfilled all provisions of the accord, whereas the DUP embraced Garang's viewpoint that the Constituent Assembly had to abolish the provisions concerning the Islamic penalties from the law and replace them by the provisions of law No 74. The government feared that if it presented the issue to the Constituent Assembly, more than just its deputies would rebel against it. The deputies had previously supported the Islamic criminal law with an overwhelming majority on the first and second reading of the law. Moreover, abolition of the Islamic penalties would have given the NIF a golden opportunity to tell the people that the Ummah Party and the DUP were not serious in their effort to pass the Islamic Shari'ah laws. This charge would have cost the two major parties heavily in the elections that were to follow. Therefore, it is natural for the new government to abandon the labyrinths of the previous government's policy and to begin establishing a new framework within which to proceed.

I don't know how the writer learned of a secret plan prepared by the NIF and presented to the coup leaders to topple the heads of some of the dissolved parties. It doesn't seem that the idea fits the nature of the Sudanese people. First, it is not in the interest of the new government to do so. Second, the government, while in the utmost need to secure itself, nonetheless arrested no more than 50 people.

The article writer cited some completely faulty information, as in the case when he said that the NIF controls the Islamic banks in Sudan. The most important Islamic banks in Sudan are the Faysal Islamic Bank, the West Sudan Bank and the Sudanese Islamic Bank. The Faysal Bank was founded with Arab capital and the chairman of its board of directors is Prince Muhammad al-Faysal. The bank has only a few department heads who are considered to be pro-NIF. The board of directors of the West Sudan Bank is chaired by Dr Adam Musa Madbo, one of the most prominent ministers from the Ummah Party, who is well known for his hostility to the NIF. It is well known that West Sudan is the Ummah Party's sphere of influence and this province's merchants are the people who founded this bank. As for the Sudanese Islamic Bank, it is controlled by al-Khatmiyah sect. Ahmad al-Mirghani was the chairman of this bank's board of directors until he was selected to become chairman of the Presidential Council.

The Sudanese masses love freedom and refuse but to participate politically in the government. It will be difficult for the new RCC to monopolize political decision-making for a long time. The new situation has been

welcomed as a result of the poor conditions prevailing under Sudan's third democratic administration. We hope that the RCC will fulfill its promise to restore democratic electoral conditions to the government when the existing crooked conditions are corrected and some of the difficult and accumulated problems are solved, especially in the areas of security and difficult living conditions.

Expatriates Voice Concerns, Suggestions at Conference

45040503 Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 10 Aug 89 p 5

[Article by 'Uthman al-Hadi: "New Views on Relationship Between Government and Expatriate Workers; Education, Housing and Investment Are Expatriate Workers' Biggest Problems; Great Interest by Expatriate Workers; Expatriates Allowed to Take Part in Managing Their Affairs; Revolution's Meeting With Expatriates Has Been Frank, Clear and Objective"]

[Excerpts] On Saturday, 5 August 1989, a meeting was held at the Friendship Hall between the National Salvation Revolution, represented by RCC [Revolution Command Council] member naval Colonel Salah-al-Din Karrar and Lieutenant Colonel Dr al-Tayyib Ibrahim Muhammad Khayr, the presidential affairs minister, who chaired the meeting, and the Sudanese expatriates. The meeting was held on the first week of the second month of the revolution's birth to underline its deep faith in the major role the expatriates can play in creating national economic development and social progress and in eliminating all residues of the mistrust that affected the relationship between the previous governments and this important group of Sudanese citizens. The RCC invitation was made to the expatriates themselves. To find out the expatriate workers' reactions and the practical steps accomplished at the meeting to codify the government-expatriate relationship and to create a climate of understanding and trust capable of attracting the expatriates' savings and of utilizing their investments in a well-studied scientific manner that is reassuring to the expatriate workers themselves, we will review here the details of the meeting.

Consistent Policy for Bilateral Cooperation

Salvation RCC member staff Colonel Salah-al-Din Muhammad Ahmad Karrar emphasized the right of expatriate workers to have full rights as citizens who have their influential role in achieving development and economic and political reform. When talking of expatriate workers, Karrar made it clear that the revolution will adhere to a consistent policy vis-a-vis the expatriates and their role in restoring Sudan to its natural position, and that this will be done with effective participation by the expatriates in drafting all the policies that concern them and in adopting the measures necessary to implement the resolutions that will be made immediately.

Six Specialized Committees

The meeting resulted in the formation of six committees to study the expatriate workers' problems in the areas of education, controlled emigration, social security, investment, incentives and privileges for expatriate workers, housing and information. It was decided that each of these committees would be supervised by the concerned minister, would be chaired by the top administrative officer in charge of the committee's area of activity, would include representatives of the expatriate workers, and that the committees' rapporteurs would be expatriate workers. The Expatriate Workers Agency will provide the secretariat of each of these committees.

Committees' Jurisdiction

It will be a part of the jurisdiction of the six committees to present practical and specific recommendations and solutions to the expatriate workers' problems—each committee within its field of specialization—to study all previous documents, research, studies and recommendations submitted by the Agency for Expatriate Workers' Affairs, and to add any documents which the committees deem important to accomplishing their objectives. A committee may make any recommendations it deems necessary to deal with all the problems that concern expatriate workers.

Self-Criticism by Expatriates

In a survey conducted among the expatriates by AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH on their view of the practical steps accomplished by the meeting and on the new law concerning the expatriate workers' incentives and privileges, Muhammad al-Sa'ir Ibrahim, an accountant who works in Saudi Arabia, said that there has to be self-criticism reflecting the government's well-studied view and its deep understanding of the expatriates' problems. The expatriates came to the meeting disorganized, and the dialogue would have lost its meaning and would have strayed into numerous labyrinths if it had not been for the words of some expatriate workers who managed to bring the scattered parties into the dialogue. However, the dialogue did touch on the most significant problems worrying the expatriates, led by the education, housing, and investment problems. We can say with complete honesty that the conference generally achieved unprecedented success, that it has been honest and serious, and that there was no exaggeration in the government's presentation of what resources are available, contrary to the previous governments' policies which exaggerated hopes without realizing any of them. [passage omitted]

Real Representation for Expatriates

At the meeting, it was decided to form the six aforementioned committees, provided that each include the number of members that it deems proper. The expatriate workers in each country are to select 20 members to be assigned according to wish and professional specialization, so as to insure that the tasks are divided fairly and

in a manner enabling committee supervisors to make maximum use of these workers' expertise. In addition to name and profession, the membership applications include the country in which the expatriate works and his address.

Expatriates' Privileges and Duties

The expatriates' privileges and incentives regulations, issued by the Ministry of Finance and Planning on 4 May 1989, abolished the previously applied tax and replaced it by an annual levy that takes into account varying segments and incomes, setting this annual levy at \$100 for workers, at \$200 for employees, at \$300 for university professors and professionals, and at \$400 for businessmen. The regulations also abolished the faith, homeland, and personal income tax for leave-of-absence workers, requiring remittance through the official channels of a minimum annual sum of \$500 by workers, of \$1,000 by employees, of \$2,000 by university professors and professionals, and of \$3,000 by businessmen, provided that the remittances be computed at the free exchange rate. The regulations also linked increased customs fees exemptions to increased remittances made by the expatriate worker.

Import Incentives

The regulations also offer expatriates the right to get a license to import cars, trucks, refrigerators, maintenance workshops, agricultural equipment, and fuel tanker trucks, depending on the expatriate's fulfillment of all his obligations, including payment of the national levy, making the obligatory minimum remittance, paying the arrival and registration fees, acquiring the expatriate worker identification card or remitting a minimum of \$8,000, in case the expatriate wishes to import a car or a truck every 3 years during the expatriation period.

Right to Housing

On terms similar to the abovementioned conditions, the worker is entitled to acquire a plot of land in the capital or in the provinces after repayment of the customary fees. He is also entitled to bid in public land auctions and to acquire finished apartments in the middle and low-cost housing complexes, without allowing this to contradict his right to acquire a plot of land like any other citizen.

Promoting Investment

The regulations also included vast investment promotion incentives for investment firms set up by expatriates. These incentives grant such firms the land they need to set up their projects at incentive prices, totally or partially exempt project requirements from customs fees and from business profit taxes, permit firms to retain part of their free currency to import raw materials and spare parts, and provide for government participation in an investment program to explore investment projects as a service for the expatriates.

In addition to the abovementioned privileges, the regulations also provide privileges in the area of marketing, free zones, and services.

Teaching Expatriates' Children

Educating their children represents a severe and constant headache for expatriate workers. It is for their children's future that most of these expatriate workers have left their country and decided to emigrate. It is unreasonable to let their children confront these educational problems, which begin with the difference of environment that is reflected, naturally, in the difference of curricula. This difference of curricula has resulted in enrollment problems in higher education because our universities' Higher Educational Enrollment Bureau does not recognize Arab educational degrees and does not grant scholarships on their basis.

Independent Enrollment Policy

In this connection, staff captain and RCC member Salah Karrar has asserted that the citizens at home and abroad have equal rights and duties, stressing that the revolution will develop independence in enrollment for higher education, will recognize Arab degrees, and will restore higher and general education to the level from which they have steeply fallen. He said that he was astonished that our universities do not recognize Arab degrees at a time when these degrees are recognized by many high-level international universities. [Passage omitted]

Expatriation Drawbacks

There remains, finally, a word of truth which must be said, namely that expatriation has, by a large degree, continued to represent a phenomenon which has its negative aspects and influences on Sudanese society and economy. Some of these aspects are reflected in the fact that upon their return, expatriates abandon their specializations and engage in the parasitic economy, igniting the black market, contributing to the inflation of dowries, and failing to channel their profits to serve production, good investment, and the ideal utilization of available natural resources. Thus, instead of being a help, expatriate workers have become, to a large degree, a heavy burden to our national economy and society.

Call for Release

But there is great hope that the expatriate workers will awaken and rise to eliminate the negatives of expatriation through information and defining priorities according to the country's real needs. The expatriate will thus turn away from importing videos, and the latest fads in electronics and Atari games will devote serious attention to establishing investment and cooperative firms, each according to his specialization, and will make maximum use of his expertise and contacts on the sound path of development, namely the path of innovative production from the available natural resources far from the peripheral economy.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Japan-UAE Trade Statistics Provided

44040545A *Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic* 22 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by Ahmad Muhsin in Abu Dhabi: "By March, UAE Exports to Japan at 5.1 Billion Dirhams of Which 4.4 Billion in Oil and Gas. Aggregate UAE Exports to Japan In 1988 At 19.6 Billion Dirhams"]

[Text] Aggregate UAE [United Arab Emirates] exports to Japan in the first three months of 1989 were valued at about \$1.392 billion or 5.1 billion dirhams.

Exports of crude oil were valued at \$1.009 billion (3.7 billion dirhams) and of gas at \$184 million for a combined oil and gas value of \$677 million [as published] or 4.4 billion dirhams.

Statistics released by the Japanese embassy in Abu Dhabi, based on figures by the ministry of finance in Japan, put aggregate Japanese imports from the UAE in 1988 at about \$5.329 billion or 19.6 billion dirhams.

[Japanese] imports of crude oil were valued at \$3.774 billion and of gas at \$822 million or the equivalent of 16.9 billion dirhams.

The figures revealed that [1988] imports dropped from \$5.408 billion in 1987 when imports of crude oil accounted for \$3.938 billion and gas accounted for \$809 million. This compares with 1986 when Japanese imports from the Emirates were valued at \$5.947 billion of which \$4.484 billion went for crude oil and \$1.003 billion for gas.

On the other hand, recent government figures put the aggregate value of UAE 1988 imports from Japan at 5.171 billion dirhams or 16.3 percent of total UAE imports of 31.794 billion dirhams. Japan was therefore the UAE's largest supplier last year.

The figures also revealed that machinery and transport equipment accounted for the largest share of Japanese exports to the UAE.

Statistics for Trade With Europe Provided

44040545A *Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic* 27 Jul 89 p 2

[Dispatch from Abu Dhabi: "UAE Imports to Europe Rise from 9.9 to 11 Billion Dirhams."]

[Text] The value of UAE [United Arab Emirates] imports from Europe increased in 1988 to 11.060 billion dirhams from 9.9 billion dirhams in 1987, according to recent government figures. Exports and re-exports dropped to 1.155 billion dirhams from 3.554 billion in 1987.

The figures revealed that imports from Britain, the UAE's largest European supplier, increased last year to 3.056 billion dirhams from 2.695 billion dirhams in

1987. Exports and re-exports were valued at 226 million dirhams, compared with 268 million dirhams [a year earlier].

Imports from Western Germany were put at 2.266 billion dirhams compared with 2.293 million dirhams. Exports and re-exports were valued at 244 million dirhams compared with 611 million dirhams. Imports from Italy were valued at 1.426 billion dirhams compared with 1.095 billion dirhams while exports and re-exports were at 84 million dirhams compared with 512 million dirhams. Sweden accounted for 428 million dirhams compared with 203 million dirhams and exports and re-exports amounted to 16 million dirhams compared with 8 million dirhams. Switzerland accounted for 353 million dirhams compared with 355 million dirhams with exports and re-exports at 194 million dirhams compared with 83 million dirhams.

[Imports from] Belgium amounted to 336 million dirhams compared with 314 million dirhams while exports and re-exports were valued at 91 million dirhams compared with 57 million dirhams. Spain accounted for 318 million dirhams compared with 188 million dirhams while exports and re-exports accounted for 46 million dirhams in comparison with 63 million dirhams. Denmark accounted for 229 million dirhams in comparison with 215 million dirhams while exports and re-exports were valued at six million dirhams compared with 4 million dirhams. Yugoslavia accounted for 117 million dirhams compared with 95 million dirhams; exports and re-exports were valued at three million dirhams compared with three million dirhams. Austria accounted for 113 million dirhams compared with 130 million dirhams; exports and re-exports at 9 million dirhams compared with 15 million dirhams. Greece accounted for 103 million dirhams compared with 115 million dirhams; exports and re-exports at 10 million dirhams compared with 15 million. Norway accounted for 87 million dirhams compared with 62 million dirhams; exports and re-exports at five million dirhams compared with five million. Finland accounted for 78 million dirhams compared with 58 million dirhams; exports and re-exports at one million dirhams compared with two million dirhams. [Imports from] Ireland accounted for 67 million dirhams compared with 59 million dirhams; exports and re-exports were valued at two million dirhams compared with three million dirhams.

East Germany accounted for 53 million dirhams compared with 32 million dirhams; Czechoslovakia for 50 million dirhams compared with 34 million dirhams compared with 23 million dirhams[?] with exports and re-exports at one million dirhams. Hungary accounted for 40 million dirhams compared with 43 million dirhams; exports and re-exports at one million dirhams compared with 43 million dirhams in 1987. Poland accounted for 35 million dirhams compared with 17 million dirhams; exports and re-exports at eight million dirhams compared with one million dirhams. The Soviet Union accounted for 27 million dirhams compared with nine million dirhams; exports and re-exports at one

million dirhams. Bulgaria accounted for 25 million dirhams compared with 22 million dirhams; exports and re-exports at 17 million dirhams compared with one million dirhams. Portugal accounted for one million dirhams in comparison with 13 million dirhams; Luxembourg for one million dirhams compared with 12

million dirhams; Malta for four million dirhams compared with six million; and the Canary Islands accounted for four million dirhams.

The statistics gave no figures for 1988 exports of crude oil, gas, or petrochemical products.

INDIA

Gandhi's Diplomatic Policies Viewed as Failures*46240058 New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 5 Aug 89 p 6*

[Article by Ashutosh Mishra: "The Failure of Diplomacy During the Rajiv Era"]

[Text] During the Rajiv era, India has lost battles on every foreign front. However, Rajiv has been very successful in hiding these failures behind false government honors and bragging about gains that were never there. The people know very little about his failures abroad since there are but a few people who write about foreign policy. The government makes sure that they are all behind it. Foreign policy specialists in various universities are also connected to the government. Despite all of these efforts, the truth does not remain hidden. The fact is that the Rajiv Gandhi government has unconditionally sold Tibet to China. It is ready to give Siachin to Pakistan. All of our neighbors are angry at us, and a change of a mere seven votes would have resulted in the passage of a dangerously condemning resolution against India in the U.S. Senate. At that difficult time, at least one person, Senator Stephen Solarez, took India's side. But, during the Sri Lanka affair, as Bhawani Sengupta's investigations show, not even one country in the whole world supported India.

This is the same United States that Rajiv Gandhi flew to Washington to court as soon as he was enthroned. Since then, each time he goes abroad, announcements are made about new venues of friendships being opened with this or that country. The truth is that despite India's sacrificing its interests to win friends, it only gets threats in return. It does not matter what India's news media says. India has failed to control the aggressive activities of Nepal's and Bhutan's governments. Of course, China and Pakistan have always been against India. Rajiv Gandhi went to China without any invitation, and gave it Tibet, even without their asking for it. He is also bragging about his weak policy toward Pakistan, while Benazir Bhutto is still following Zia's policy toward Kashmir, the Islamic bomb, F-16 planes, and nuclear proliferation. Nepal openly condemned India about the so-called blockade in Brussels, British and Australian parliaments, and even in the United Nations offices. India could not do anything to stop Nepal. Bhutan is supporting Nepal about the rights of countries surrounded by land, Pakistan on the issue of the South Asian proposal for reducing atomic weapons, and China over the issue of Pol Pot. This is a rough sketch of the victories of Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy.

A very real truth about India's foreign policy is that it is a poor country. Any country's foreign policy is restricted by its economic development. Regardless of our claims of being the regional superpower, we will still be in league with Pakistan, and will not compare to China. India has accepted this fact at least in practice. Why else would India be comparing itself to Pakistan in every

area? Why are India's statistics compared to those of Pakistan when weapons are purchased? However, this pitiable condition has been here since Nehru. The only difference is that at least Nehru was respected in the international community because of his eloquence. The sand castle he had built was destroyed by the Chinese attack in one day, and Nehru fell prey to its shock. However, we are still using this same technique of taking trips to various countries and making statements to impress the Indian people. It is being said that personal diplomacy is important in summit meetings these days. Rajiv Gandhi uses this childish excuse to travel abroad leaving parliamentary affairs to other people. They use a plane with the capacity to seat 300 people for the 100 persons who travel with him. When parliamentary members demand audits of these travels, the parliament secretariat does not even bother to return these questions with regrets.

Mr P. Upendra, who was tired of Rajiv's non-stop foreign trips, once welcomed Rajiv to the parliament for his "trip to India!" The truth is that the countries he visits show no interest in India. Those countries never took India seriously during his trips, and China even insulted him openly. During the June 1985 trip to the United States, it was announced that Mr Clean [Rajiv Gandhi] won the hearts of the Americans with help from his European wife. Everyone from the shrewd Kissinger to Reagan's daughter, Maureen, were allegedly impressed with her! However, exactly at that time, Dheeren Bhagat conducted an opinion survey of randomly selected Americans. He found that not one person knew anything about any celebration called the Festival of India. At that time, there was an airplane hijacking incident, and U.S. television stations cancelled interviews with Rajiv Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi could not say anything about the Soviet counterproposal against the U.S. Star War proposal during his press conference. Gandhi visited Mauritius in July 1986, and never mentioned India's opposition to racism while he was there. Everyone tried to ignore the South African airplane parked next to Rajiv's airplane when he was returning. Gandhi's recent trips to France and Pakistan can be included in the same category. He ate with the leaders of 26 other "B" category countries, while his host, Mitterand, ate with his seven rich guests belonging to the "A" category. Gandhi remained silent at this insult to India.

Similarly, Gandhi visited Pakistan recently. The propaganda said that this was the first authorized trip of an Indian prime minister in 10,000 days. He had visited Islamabad in December 1988 for the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] conference. What did India get from these two trips? Pakistan's president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, threatened him openly during the second trip, and the Pakistani newspapers highlighted this insult in large headlines. Later, Gandhi was made to look small by Benazir during the dinner. The summary of Benazir's speech was that India was spreading unrest in South Asia by rejecting Pakistan's proposal. It is true that Pakistan's proposal appears to be

more peaceful. Pakistan wants to keep South Asia without nuclear weapons and wants to sign the treaty on nuclear nonproliferation with India. The Indian government would have thrown out the imaginary units of South Asia if it had dared. The world has shrunk so much that showing South Asia as a separate entity is wrong. It cannot speak out because it is trying to impress the Indian people by calling itself the superpower of South Asia. The Indian government likes to feel good by calling itself a superpower while sitting next to Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal. India becomes helpless in front of Pakistan's logical reasoning because of its efforts to maintain this false glory, and it loses face in front of its "little brother" neighbors.

As the result of Gandhi's two trips to Pakistan, India is ready to give away Siachen. Siachen is strategically situated for guarding Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the Silk route, and the Wakhan corridor. Pakistan had also dropped bombs on it in order to get it. After being beaten by the Indian military, Pakistan is throwing India out of the same Siachen by political strategy, and this is being called another of Gandhi's victories! Pakistan's defense minister has called Siachen the inseparable part of Pakistan. Pakistan will find an excuse to enter Siachen once the Indian military vacates it. The question is what will India get in exchange for leaving Siachen? The United States has approved \$4 billion aid to Pakistan, and it is spending \$1.4 billion of it to purchase 60 L-16 airplanes. Half of Pakistan's budget is spent on defense if interest is added to the one-third of its budget actually being spent on defense. Did Rajiv Gandhi get assurance of even a nominal cut in it? Benazir has raised the Kashmir issue at every international meeting. She even talked about a popular vote in the United Nations. As for the Islamic bomb, she has said a thousand times that she is, after all, the daughter of the father of the Islamic bomb, and is sitting right in the chair vacated by him! Benazir even bragged that the Islamic bomb would have been made a long time ago if Zia had not taken over in 1977. We should not forget that the president and the foreign minister of Pakistan are from Zia's era, and the Pakistan government is still in the control of the military and the mullahs. It does not matter how much land India gives to Pakistan, the latter will never be satisfied.

The newspapers have again brought up the issue of Pakistan's aggressive policy and India's efforts to placate it. However, they have kept quiet about the weakness of Rajiv Gandhi's China policy. The only other example that equals China's insult to India which Gandhi prompted was Atal Bihari Bajpai's visit to China. China had launched an attack on Vietnam when Atal Bihari Bajpai was still there, and he had to pack his bags and leave for India. The journalists travelling with Gandhi had suppressed the news that the Chinese newspapers had given only a third or fourth degree of importance in their coverage of his trip. The Chinese government did not make any secret of the fact that Rajiv Gandhi was there almost uninvited. The Chinese government even blocked out Sonia Gandhi from its newspapers and

television. None of the Indian journalists were granted an interview. Despite all of this, the first thing that Gandhi said in his speech was about giving away Tibet. However, China did not give any importance to this announcement. China knew that Gandhi was there to satisfy the Indian communists. And the leader of the communists, whom Gandhi was trying to pacify, I.M.S. Namboodripad, has clearly written in his article published in the 23 July 1987 issue of the HINDU in which he had advised Rajiv to visit China, that Rajiv Gandhi should show his political courage by admitting that India had attacked China in 1962. Thus, India threw its claim to its territory under Chinese occupation in the waste basket. A joint task force to discuss this issue was established. This was just a meaningless effort. It took 5 months to form this group, and nothing was mentioned about guidelines or any timeframe for discussions in its meetings. Rajiv Gandhi had emphasized these two points in his talks. There still is no change in the Indian government's policy. Not only the Indian government, but also the government media supported the massacre at Tiananmen. Even Gorbachev, who had advised Rajiv Gandhi to visit China, expressed his opposition to the Chinese oppressive policy and had allowed such leaders as Yeltsin and Sakharov to speak on this issue.

Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy is the pickled version of Nehru's dependence on his eloquence and Indira Gandhi's conspiracies and braggings. He has added the new ingredient of inexperience to this formula. This "cocktail" mixture is very evident in our relations with Nepal and Sri Lanka. Rajiv Gandhi was trying to be Indira Gandhi in Sri Lanka, and Nehru in Nepal. However, Gandhi can only try to emulate (unsuccessfully) Indira Gandhi's courage.

Reportage on Indo-Soviet Trade, Economic Relations

Shevchenko Remarks in Madras

46001643 Madras THE HINDU in English
22 Aug 89 p 3

[Article: "Indo-Soviet Trade Set for Increase"]

[Text] Madras, Aug. 21—The Soviet Vice-President, Mrs. V. S. Shevchenko, said here today that the volume of Indo-Soviet trade would be ten billion roubles by the beginning of 1990, signalling a 4.5-fold increase from last year, when it was 2.2 billion roubles.

Addressing a press conference, she said the scope for trade between the two countries had widened, especially after the meeting between the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and the Soviet President, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, in June last. About 150 Indian businessmen had visited the Soviet Union to further trade contacts and there had been an increase in the Soviet Union's purchase of medicines from India.

Mrs. Shevchenko said she met the Governor, Dr. P. C. Alexander, and the Chief Minister, Mr. M. Karunanidhi, who showed interest in "perestroika".

Glasnost was progressing at "cosmic speed," she said. There was no force which could stop the trend of "perestroika" and changes were taking place under the democratisation of Soviet society.

Answering a question on the nationality problems in Armenia, Georgia and Estonia, she said the problem had been discussed in the Soviet Parliament and would be discussed in the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

On whether the Soviet Union would like the Indian Peace-Keeping Force to withdraw from Sri Lanka just as the USSR had withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan, she said the Soviet Union had done so voluntarily. If the USSR said anything it may be construed as interfering in the internal affairs of another country.

'Tree of friendship': Later, at a function to mark the 18th anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship, Mrs. Shevchenko said the Festival of India in the Soviet Union and the Soviet festival in India had helped the people of the two countries understand each other better.

She said the Indo-Soviet relationship was unique and this "tree of friendship" had fructified in economic cooperation, scientific collaboration and cultural exchanges.

The Officiating Chief Justice of Madras High Court, Mr. Justice S. Mohan, said the friendship between the two countries was for the advancement of peace and disarmament.

Mr. N. T. Vanamamalai, general secretary, Indo-Soviet cultural Society (ISCUS), Tamil Nadu State Council who presided, said the friendship was a time-tested one.

Mr. S. Raj Kumar, general secretary, ISCUS, national council, said the USSR was in the forefront of countries which were advocating new forms of democracy.

Mr. F. A. Rozovsky, Consul and head of the cultural department, USSR Consulate-General in Madras, said the Soviet people would never forget the contributions of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi to the friendship between the two countries.

Dr. S. Vijayalakshmi, president, organising committee of Friends of Soviet Union, Tamil Nadu, proposed a vote of thanks.

Cooperation Workshop in Moscow

46001643 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
20 Aug 89 p 13

[Article: "India-USSR To Have New Joint-Ventures"]

[Text] New Delhi, August 19 (PTI): India and the Soviet Union are likely to enter into several new joint-ventures envisaging triangular production and marketing arrangements which would help in meeting each other's requirements and provide for exports to third countries.

This marks a major breakthrough for both sides in the areas of new forms of cooperation which includes primarily joint-ventures and production cooperation.

Under this, arrangement joint-ventures may be set up in India or the Soviet Union on the basis that one-third of the production is sold in the USSR, one-third in India and the balance for exports to third countries with the objective of earning hard currency to meet the requirements of related imports, according to an official press release.

The proposal, mooted by the president of Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO), Mr Ramu S. Deora, at a recent workshop on Indo-USSR business cooperation in Moscow, was agreed to in principle by the Soviet Union.

A delegation of over 100 members of the Indian trade and industry and 250 delegates from various Soviet republics representing Soviet business interests, associations and cooperatives participated in the workshop organised by FIEO in the first ever direct interface of this nature following the introduction of perestroika and changes taking place in the Soviet economy.

In a report to the Union commerce minister, Mr Dinesh Singh, Mr Deora said there was overwhelming response from the Soviet republics to participate directly in the expansion of trade and business relations between the two countries. This will also help to broaden relations by facilitating for the first time entry of new entrepreneurs and exporters into the Soviet market, several of them from medium and small sectors.

The main areas of cooperation identified for economic cooperation are agricultural and food items cement, aluminum, domestic appliances, cosmetics and toiletries, garments, marine products, computers and electronics, drugs and chemicals, automobiles and auto parts, scooters and mopeds and consultancy services. The vast potential of the Soviet market in consumer goods will be explored.

Following this direct interaction between India and Soviet enterprises, a number of contracts for setting up of joint-ventures are likely to be signed.

It was agreed by participants that whereas the existing state agencies in the USSR would continue to be serviced by the Indian counterparts, the emphasis now could be on encouraging new entrepreneurs wanting to do business with the Soviet Union. It recommended that Indian entrepreneurs should take advantage of media opportunities arising now in USSR for advertising their products and services.

In another major development aimed at facilitating rapid progress of Indo-Soviet joint ventures, the workshop has recommended to the Soviet authorities to introduce multi-entry visa and also publish in English the rules and regulations relating to setting up of joint-ventures in the Soviet Union.

Similarly, the Soviet side recommended further simplification and liberalisation of Indian laws on joint ventures. It was further recommended that Indian banks be allowed to set up servicing branches in the Soviet Union and vice-versa.

The consultancy technology interests of both the countries would closely examine possibilities of cooperation in India, USSR and third countries in the spheres of, among other things, construction, infrastructure and technology transfer.

Both the Soviet Union and Indian sides called upon concerned authorities to expedite the establishment of India trade Centre in Moscow and a Soviet Trade Centre in India as this would go a long way in achieving the goal of increasing two-way trade by two and a half times. It was also the unanimous opinion that the FIEO should open an office in Moscow as well as in other Soviet cities and republics.

New Envoy to Moscow

46001643 *New Delhi PATRIOT in English*
11 Aug 89 p 9

[Article: "Indo-Soviet Trade To Rise"]

[Text] Indo-Soviet trade which touched a record Rs 50,000 million in 1988, is targeted at Rs 70,000 million this year, reports UNI.

"We are confident that the objective to increase the trade figure of 1986 by two and a half times by 1992 will be achieved ahead on schedule", Ambassador designate to the Soviet Union Alfred Gonsalves said.

In an interview to the "Soviet Land", a monthly published by the Soviet Embassy Mr Gonsalves underscored the need for exploring new forms of bilateral cooperation environment of our economic action and interaction.

The modernisation—an evolving character of two economies—had opened new avenues of cooperation, he said and welcomed in this context the increasing opportunities for the Indian private sector to do business with Soviet enterprises.

Similarly the Ambassador designate said, there were fresh openings for Indian participation in the development of Soviet enterprises under Perestroika as also that of the Soviet far east and Siberia. Production cooperation, civil aviation, hotel construction, the consumer goods industry, electronics and high technology were some of the new areas being tapped.

The visit of India's Commerce Minister to the USSR and other forthcoming high level exchanges formed an important link in this chain of new forms of economic cooperation.

"Of course, new prospects bring with them new challenges which both sides must meet through innovative methods and approaches. We must not rest on our laurels".

In reply to a question, Mr Gonsalves said India warmly welcomed the new thinking in Soviet foreign policy, seeking solution of problems through cooperation and dialogue.

Welcoming President Mikhail Gorbachev's "boldly innovative" steps to reorient the world order, Mr Gonsalves said, the Soviet Union and India think alike on some of the grave issues before the international community is amply demonstrated by the Delhi Declaration.

Iran Suspects India of Helping Iraqi Recovery

46001648 *Madras THE HINDU in English*
17 Aug 89 p 7

[Article by F. J. Khergamvala: "Iran Feels India Is Helping Iraqi Military Recovery"]

[Text] Teheran, Aug. 16—Iranian officials suspect India of having assisted the Iraqi war effort since the later stages of the Gulf war. Despite unambiguous clarifications to the contrary by Indian officials, one particular incident involving the lack of coordination within the Government of India has disturbed Iranian Foreign Ministry officials, who seem to suspect that while a ban on military supplies is in effect against Iran, India has been helping the Iraqi military recovery effort.

Iran has always been aware that India has a military training team in Iraq that predates the Gulf war. On occasion Iranian officials have voiced their apprehension that some of the Indian team were specifically positioned in Iraq to help maintain combat aircraft of Soviet manufacture. Nevertheless, such fears seldom reached the stage of an official complaint.

Late last year, the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi informed Indian Defence Attache abroad to sound out various Governments that India was now in the business of selling weapons systems and any enquiries would be welcome. The instructions were in the form of general guidelines and seemed to be the culmination of a prolonged discussion within the Government since 1984 when a former Foreign Secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, had initiated the debate.

News to envoy: Armed with this authorisation, an Indian Defence Attache in a Euro-Asian country conveyed Indian intentions to his Iranian counterpart in the same capital. At a time when Iran began shopping around to modernise its armed forces, the latter promptly informed

authorities in Teheran about the Indian offer. The Government of Iran then officially raised the issue with the Indian Ambassador in Teheran, who it turns out was hearing about the offer to Iran—for the first time.

The Ambassador and the two Indian service attaches in Teheran were rightly aware that there was a strict embargo on military supplies to both Iran and Iraq and hence had not acted on the Ministry of Defence guidelines. The Ambassador referred the matter back to the Foreign office seeking a clarification if the embargo had been lifted and saying that Iran had expressed a general desire for weapons systems.

The Ministry of External Affairs promptly clarified that both Gulf war combatants were still on the forbidden list, especially owing to the absence of any progress on settling their dispute. Any such exploratory soundings were to be avoided in Baghdad and Teheran. This was conveyed to the Iranian authorities.

Iranian sources with whom officials in Teheran have discussed this issue indicate that the Iranians are peeved about this Indian attitude. Some do not believe that the embargo is being applied to Iraq as well after the ceasefire.

Commerce Ministry Sets Export Target for 1989-90

46001640 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
25 Aug 89 p 11

[Text] New Delhi, Aug 24—The Commerce Ministry has put the 1989-90 export target at Rs 28,025 crores, making this announcement at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) here on Aug 21 the Minister of State for Commerce, Mr Priya Ranjan Das Munshi, hoped that the target would be exceeded. Last year, against the target of Rs 18,795 crores, the exports touched Rs 20,281 crores.

The Minister said trends in the first quarter (April-June 1989) indicated a 39.8 percent growth in exports, the highest so far. This trend was expected to be sustained in the coming months. Dr Das Munshi, however, spoke of the severe pressures on the international trading environment in the recent years because of increasing protectionism and unilateral actions such as the U.S. move to name countries, including India, under Super 301.

In this environment, the Uruguay round of multilateral negotiations assumed significance as a forum for strengthening the multilateral trading system. The Minister said India had agreed to the inclusion of new areas in the negotiations because it was agreed that in evolving multilateral disciplines in these areas, the development aspect of developing countries would be considered. However, recent developments in the negotiations were causing concern.

In areas of substantial interest to the developing countries only a little progress had been made and the

interests of the developing countries sidelined especially in areas such as textiles, trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS).

Mr Das Munshi said the developing countries had pointed to the unbalanced nature of the negotiations. "Unless the asymmetry in the negotiations is corrected, the developing countries can be affected and the North-South divide will be further accentuated.

Mr Das Munshi said that it would be a pity if organisations such as the UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] were allowed to become ineffective because it was specifically meant to address trade and development issues of the Third World. The UNCTAD had had some initial successes such as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), but in recent years most of the negotiations in the UNCTAD were deadlocked.

Orissa Chief Minister Interviewed

46240055 Calcutta *RAVIVAR* in Hindi
22 Jul 89 pp 26-30

[J. B. Patnaik interviewed by Satyendra Pratap Singh and Rajiv Shukla: "The People Are Happy with Me"]

[Excerpts] The speed with which Orissa has covered the distance from 1980 to 1989, perhaps no other state in India has equaled it. The political stability of the state is also one of the reasons of its fast development. The credit for even this goes to its chief minister Janaki Ballabh Patnaik. In June 1980 Mr. Patnaik was relieved from the position of Minister of State at the Center and was sent to Orissa as its chief minister. He is continuing in this office even today.

The fact is that Mr Patnaik has been aware of the basic needs of Orissa and has emphasized upon its economic development. The rate of development in the state for the last nine years has really been commendable. The government of J. B. Patnaik has tried to provide maximum amount of money to its developmental projects.

As a whole, comparing the Orissa of 1989 with that of 1980, one can conclude that now Orissa is not as backward a state as it used to be nine years ago. After reviewing its situation in 1989, it can definitely be said that a time will come when Orissa will be ranked high in development and progress in comparison to other states.

[RAVIVAR] What is the secret of your continuing as a chief minister for ten years? Have you really been able to do it by manipulative means?

[Patnaik] From 1978 itself when I was the president of the state Congress Committee, I have been working hard to strengthen the base of the state Congress and bring about political stability in the state. When the Congress was passing through difficult times and several senior leaders had parted company with Indira Gandhi to

continue in power, I had written a book entitled "Whither Congress". In this book, on the basis of historical evidence, I proved that without the strong leadership of Indira Gandhi the party had no existence of its own. The party was unimaginable without her. This was in 1977. In 1978, when Congress(I) was constituted, I was entrusted with its reign in the state. With the help of some of my associates, I employed all possible means to put life in the state Congress and make it powerful. We achieved good results. The facts indicate that, even before becoming chief minister, I, along with my associates, had strengthened the roots of the party in the state.

The secret of my continuing as a chief minister for so many years is service to the people and trust of the leadership. The people are happy with the way I have made improvements in Orissa and have served them. Moreover, the leadership has put a great trust in me, and, as long as it is there, I will continue.

[RAVIVAR] Is it not true that you maintain your own group in Delhi and, whatever leader becomes powerful there, you will manage him through your group?

[Patnaik] I do not believe in the politics of groupism. I have no group of my own. I only know Rajiv Gandhi. I do whatever he says. He is my group. Whosoever follows groupism in the Congress, is not able to succeed.

[RAVIVAR] How are your relations with Photedar, Mupnar, Sheela Dixit, and Satish Sharma of Delhi?

[Patnaik] My relations with all of them are good. I remain in contact with all of them.

[RAVIVAR] There is a complaint against you that you do not allow others to come up as your alternative. When a leader tries to come up, you malign him by one means or the other.

[Patnaik] I do not malign anyone, nor do I stop anyone from coming up. Some people were trying to come up by wrong means, which could harm Congress. I stopped those people from harming Congress. Some of them realized their mistakes and slowly returned to the right path. I have not gathered supporters by manipulating, lobbying, or by maneuvering. They saw for themselves that my path was the right one and subsequently became my supporters.

[RAVIVAR] How many are dissatisfied with you at present?

[Patnaik] Not many people have ever been dissatisfied with me. There may be five or six people who do create misunderstandings among the legislators. When the legislators become aware of the actual matter they come and join me. But, some people continue to be active against me.

[RAVIVAR] How many people are there of this type?

[Patnaik] Their number cannot be determined exactly. However, there have not been more than five or six. At

present they are even less in number. And I do not find any dissatisfaction on their part.

[RAVIVAR] Basant Biswal was your supporter and specially close to you. How did a quarrel erupt between the two of you?

[Patnaik] I shall not talk about Basant Biswal. I will not answer personal questions.

[RAVIVAR] Is it true that you have been able to manage the national newspapers and, also, that you do not allow publication of any news from Bhubneswar that is against you?

[Patnaik] This is totally false. I do not manage the media at all. The press is absolutely free. It is working in its own way. As far as the national press is concerned, it has been printing a lot against me. Every now and then it publishes something against me. The national magazines have published all kinds of things against me and are still publishing. But, I go on working in my own way. I never interfere with their work.

[RAVIVAR] All the newspapers in Orissa are owned by politicians. How can the press be free there?

[Patnaik] Where is the press free? All the papers in the country go with one or the other individual or group. No paper is independent. If the politicians are not their direct owners, they are in contact with the owners. These newspapers operate in accordance with them. You are talking about managing the national press. Actually nobody can manage them. Albeit, I have tried to take everyone with me in the state of Orissa. I want to take along the people of the press as well.

[RAVIVAR] What is your reaction to the allegation that you win over the legislators who go against you by making use of money power?

[Patnaik] I have absolutely no belief in money power. My conviction is that whoever plays the politics of money power will not be able to survive in the Congress for long. In Orissa some people had started the politics of money power, but in the end they are all finished.

[RAVIVAR] Who are those people?

[Patnaik] I do not want to mention their names, but everyone knows them. At present the people who are dissatisfied with me in the Congress are using money power. This is why their politics are not succeeding. I do not try to buy any one with money because, if I did, I would not be able to survive very long.

[RAVIVAR] Who are those dissatisfied people?

[Patnaik] Please do not ask for their names. Those who are dissatisfied with me today may become my supporter tomorrow; therefore, it is not proper to mention their names. Also, in my party there is a difference of opinion

(not dissatisfaction) just as we find a difference of opinion in a family. Besides, the Congress constitutes a big family.

[RAVIVAR] Which is the prominent opposition party in Orissa?

[Patnaik] There is only one person in opposition who has some influence. He is Biju Patnaik. Except for him, there is no standing of Janata Dal or any other party there. Nobody even knows such people as V. P. Singh. Biju Patnaik has some influence but only in three districts.

[RAVIVAR] Does it mean that in the next election Janata Dal will not be able to pose a serious challenge to the Congress?

[Patnaik] Not at all. The Congress has no threat from Janata Dal. Earlier, also, all the opposition parties had combined under the umbrella of Janata Party. Rarely ever has there been a multilateral contest. Every time there has been a direct contest. Nothing unusual is going to happen even this time.

[RAVIVAR] What is the situation of Bhartiya Janata Party in your state?

[Patnaik] The state unit of Bhartiya Janata Party does have some locus standi, but, since its big leaders have joined Janata Dal, it has been left with no future. As I have already told you earlier, there will only be a contest between Congress and Janata Dal.

[RAVIVAR] Recently a Kshatriya Khandayat Mahasabha has also been formed on caste basis.

[Patnaik] It is not a new thing for Orissa. There was another party formed here long ago that had fought an election in 1951-52 under its prominent leader and freedom fighter Jadumani Mangraj. After being defeated in the election, it was dissolved. There is no scope for parties formed on caste basis in Orissa.

[RAVIVAR] Don't you have a cordial relation with the state Congress chief Kanhu Charan Lenka?

[Patnaik] There is a good relation, a very good relation. Personal relationships are always higher than political relationships. I am always in favor of maintaining a cordial relation with everybody.

I do not have anything to say about those who are responsible for false and baseless rumors.

[RAVIVAR] But how are your relations with Lenka?

[Patnaik] I have very good relations with him. They have always been so.

[RAVIVAR] Have you not neglected him on several occasions?

[Patnaik] Why? Why should I neglect him? How can a chief minister, after all neglect the party chief?

[RAVIVAR] How is it that no cooperation is sought from the former chief minister Nandini Satpathi in party works?

[Patnaik] Cooperation is to be given. How can someone ask anyone to give cooperation? Still, as far as I know, her cooperation is taken in party works.

[RAVIVAR] It is alleged that, during the nine year period of your administration, social values have gone down and corruption has increased unrestrained.

[Patnaik] The government that existed before ours (that of Janata Party) had become an embodiment of corruption. Even a mass agitation had taken place against the government. Now there is nothing like that. The policy of our government is to keep corruption subdued so that it may not raise its head. We take serious action against any officer against whom we receive any complaint of corruption. However, it is not possible for the government to fight corruption alone, nor can the laws eradicate it totally. In order to root out corruption, it is necessary that people become vigilant. Without the cooperation of people, it is impossible to control all corruption.

[RAVIVAR] During your second term of chief minister-ship, it appears there has been some deficiency in your abilities as compared to your abilities during your first term. Why could you not show any major accomplishment in your second term?

[Patnaik] From the viewpoint of accomplishments, both my terms have been quite significant. When we came to power in 1980, we tried to get an idea of the feelings of the people. For those who were unemployed in the state, a number of projects were drawn. Several schemes were implemented and works were carried out with great speed. We restored will power in the people of Orissa and awakened a dream of prosperity in them.

We set an example before them of how much we could help them realize their dreams. Our officials worked hard day and night in order to make their dreams come true. We took solid steps in the direction of activating inactive people, eliminating economic stagnation, and resolving political conflicts. Since 1985 we have been getting results beyond our expectations. Our ongoing projects were completed. We were, undoubtedly, quite successful in reducing poverty and making developments in the area of agriculture. The list of our successes in the second term is also fairly long. During this period we had some setbacks in several areas. But, despite this, there was no hindrance in the development of the state.

[RAVIVAR] Will there be some adverse affect on Congress because of the reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18?

[Patnaik] No. Congress will, rather, profit from it. Congress has a young, dynamic leader like Rajiv Gandhi, while, on the other hand, the opposition does not have a single comparable leader. Their leaders are all older than

Rajiv Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi has done a lot of work in the interests of the younger generation.

[RAVIVAR] Have you already embarked upon your election campaign?

[Patnaik] What do you mean by election campaign? I have not yet been on an election campaign. As a chief minister, it is my duty to go to the people. With this sense of duty I have visited different areas in the state. It has nothing to do with an election campaign.

[RAVIVAR] Have you thought about your successor?

[Patnaik] Who am I to decide about my successor? Nobody is indispensable in politics. The special authority to determine my successor rests with my leader Rajiv Gandhi.

[RAVIVAR] How much truth is there in the conjecture that your successor is to be Jayanti Patnaik, a member of parliament?

[Patnaik] There is no firm basis for such a conjecture.

[RAVIVAR] Because you and Jayanti Patnaik are active in politics, has there been any problem with your family happiness?

[Patnaik, laughingly]: Not at all. We have no such problem. Nor is any going to arise in the future.

[RAVIVAR] How much time are you able to spare for your family?

[Patnaik] I have practically no time. In spite of my wish, I am not able to give time to my family. In fact, what is left of my family? Besides me and my wife, I have a son who is now an adult. Both my daughters are married. I can say that I have no family.

[RAVIVAR] Will you return to journalism or literature?

[Patnaik] There are several plans. Currently I am working on the Mahabharata. It is not yet complete because there is not enough time for the work. I have a natural interest from my childhood in the Sanskrit language. There are a lot of things to be done. Just wait and see.

[RAVIVAR] Have there been any compromises in the matter of the Illustrated Weekly case?

[Patnaik] Not yet. How can I compromise outside of the court? It is a matter of my prestige. Ten million rupees has no significance for me. I am not aware of an initiative from the other side. I only want prestige and justice for myself.

[RAVIVAR] The last question. Has it occurred to you that you may become chief minister for a third term?

[Patnaik] How can I say this? It would be quite premature to say so. The elections are fast approaching.

Sharad Pawar's Politics, Importance Discussed

46240057 Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi
29 Jul 89 pp 31-34

[Article by Anurag Chaturvedi titled "Why Sharad Pawar is Essential for Congress (I)? He is Capable of Breaking the BJP-Shiv Sena Alliance"]

[Excerpts] Sharad Pawar, Maharashtra's chief minister, may not be indispensable to the state, but he has become very important to Congress (I) in Maharashtra, after the successful bandh [strike] organized by Shiv Sena and the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] on 3 July. Sharad Pawar is viewed with jealousy by his opponents and even by the leaders in his party in Maharashtra because of his uniqueness. Why should this not be? Even big industrialists see his capabilities. Even an important industrialist of J.R.D. Tata's caliber announced, in a public meeting, that Sharad Pawar is so effective that he should become prime minister. An industrialist associated with the Janata Dal said that if the Congress party proposes Sharad Pawar's name as the chief minister of Maharashtra, it can easily destroy the BJP-Shiv Sena coalition. Sambhaji Kakre, the former president of the BJP, who won the election in Sharad Pawar's home town with his approval but is opposed to him personally, has become very careful for this very reason. When he was going to Faridabad to give the Janata Dal's indirect approval for the Shiv Sena-BJP coalition, he stopped in Pune to tell Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh's [RSS] state secretary about Sharad Pawar's "battle strategy." Sambhaji Kakre may not be in Sharad Pawar's league, but he is the prominent opposing leader who understands Sharad Pawar's politics, and can see through his plans before they are implemented.

The quake about the land deals that shook the Maharashtra politics has finally quieted down. The sharp political strategies of the triad—Antulay, Nilangekar, and Tirpude—helped bury it. Now, the first round of the congress fight in Maharashtra is finished to an extent. Every chief minister goes through an "eclipse" since Abdur Rehman Antulay entered the new government house. The list [of those who suffered] is long. This includes popular leaders like Vasant Dada and Sharad Pawar, and leaders like Babasaheb Bhonsle and Shankar Rao Chavhan who were appointed from Delhi. The main reason for the race for Maharashtra's chief ministry is the money making opportunities this office offers.

Until now, being from West Maharashtra or being a Maratha was cause enough for being revered and having stability in Maharashtra's politics. Yashwantrao Chavhan, Vasant Dada Patil, and Sharad Pawar are all from this area. However, being a Maratha could not give the prestige to Shankar Rao Chavhan, Shivaji Patil Nilangekar, and Vilasrao Deshmukh (who is the second most popular leader after Sharad Pawar in Maharashtra) that leaders from Sitara, Sangli, and Baramati get.

The Shiv Sena had grown a lot by the time Sharad Pawar took office in Maharashtra. Shiv Sena's terror did not

increase during his office; however, it did manage to emerge as a more powerful political party. It has made its presence known in areas where Congress (I) used to be the leader. Bal Thakre, Shiv Sena's president, told the RAVIVAR that "Sharad Pawar was able to finish this year because of his good luck."

Recently, the political wheel within Congress (I) has spun very fast in favor of Sharad Pawar. The signs of this change are evident in Delhi and Bombay. After that, Sharad Pawar began to attack opposition leaders and factional coalitions more vocally. In his speech on the occasion of the anniversary of his office, he called the RSS an unprepared party, and mocked it by saying that it will form an inept government. Later, when the news of his resignation was out, Maharashtra Congress president Pratibha Patil (who was appointed leader of Maharashtra along with Sharad Pawar by Rajiv Gandhi at Nagpur) formed the first exercise camp. In this camp, Shiv Sena and BJP formed an alliance, and announcements about the dangers of factionalism were also made. What is Hinduism? Maharashtra Pradesh Congress invited Lakshman Shastri Joshi, the renowned logician, to speak on this subject. In addition to the logician, vice presidents of the Pradesh Congress and known intellectual Rafiq Zakaria and Vithall Gadgil were also present at this camp. Pratibha Patil, the president of Maharashtra Pradesh Congress, told the RAVIVAR that "this whole effort was to test the election machinery of the party before the elections. How will we respond to the propaganda by factional groups during the next elections? We have to think about answers to such questions. This camp was organized for this purpose."

One of Sharad Pawar's qualities is his ability to rule by getting Bombay and the villages to work together. If he is in Bombay for 2 or 3 days, then he will be in Pune and villages west of it on the 4th day. He stays close to the grassroots people through this system. Vasant Dada and Shankar Rao Chavhan lack this kind of common sense. Dada is a rustic type leader. He knows the character of power, but cannot think about several things at the same time. He is not very fond of the city ways either. He is always surrounded by his supporters. On the other hand, Shankar Rao Chavhan is a time-tested and law-abiding leader. He does not have many supporters, but even the bureaucrats praise his administrative abilities. Sharad Pawar keeps followers around him like Vasant Dada and uses them during the elections. At the same time, he is also a skilled administrator.

Last June, Sharad Pawar had announced that he would not have accepted chief ministership were it offered to him in September 1988. He said that it would have given him very little time. Sharad Pawar has done two or three things during the whole year, and any chief minister could have been able to do that, but it would not have strengthened their party. We have to accept the fact that Sharad Pawar has been the center of Maharashtra politics for the last 3 or 4 years. Ratnakar Mahajan, the president of the Janata Dal, told this correspondent that "Sharad Pawar is showing eagerness to fight Shiv Sena

now. Does he know that he is the reason why Shiv Sena has become so strong? When Sharad Pawar changed parties, the people in Maharashtra thought that joining Shiv Sena was the right thing to do. They thought he would be leading it and Shiv Sena began to grow."

Sharad Pawar has given dangerous ground to the factional groups by making the traditional opposition groups in Maharashtra his "B" team. "Sharad Pawar is doing whatever seems to be easy for him in his personal politics. Congress (I) has to accept his chief ministership in the present situation. But the Congress party should teach Sharad Pawar a lesson when it gets the opportunity." This is from a respected Congress party worker, Radhay Shyam. Many veteran congressites from Bombay believe that members of Congress (S) are still given some importance. Ishaq Jamkhandwala, minister of urban development, visits members of Congress (S) every 20-25 days, and invites them for dinner to a three-star hotel. Many congress workers are very alert now because of the talk about prejudice and the crowd of these power brokers. Commented one legislator, "It appears that some industrialist has joined our party."

People who are upset with Sharad Pawar's politics are amazed that a politician of Sharad Pawar's status could make so many mistakes unknowingly during an election year. Perhaps, he did all that on purpose! It is a known fact that Sharad Pawar does not take a step without knowing the results. However, leaving [public] land unprotected in Bombay, displacing non-resident Indians from Konkal, and scheming to help his favorite industrialists under the guise of helping the private sector have caused problems for Sharad Pawar. In addition to these economic actions, the decline of the traditional opposition in the legislature and in the public may have resulted in marginal success for Shiv Sena and BJP in the Lok Sabha elections. It is expected that the Shiv Sena, which has only two seats now, and the BJP, which has 16, will be able to increase their power during the next elections.

The BJP wants to have its candidates run for elections from 35 constituencies. Dharamchand Chaudia, general secretary of the Maharashtra BJP, has his own analysis. "Sharad Pawar is scaring us with Bal Thakre's on purpose. This is Sharad Pawar's game. He has done many favors for the opposition (Janata Dal) leaders. Therefore, they are also playing his game. The BJP has another accounting system which they have borrowed from Haryana. The BJP believes that, just like in Haryana where the voters had rejected the Janata Party and the Ajit Singh group, the Maharashtra voters will also reject Janata Dal and SKP [Shetkari Kamgar Paksha]. This would neutralize any third party in Maharashtra."

During the days when Sharad Pawar's resignation was the big news, Marathi newspapers had continued to support him strongly. The MAHARASHTRA TIMES, the LOK SATTA, and the SAKAL (owned by Sharad Pawar's brother) did not only support Sharad Pawar, but also appealed to Delhi requesting that the leaderships

flourishing in Maharashtra should not be purposely suppressed. Who will be the leader after Sharad Pawar? This question is Sharad Pawar's greatest strength. "So far, the Congress has removed any leader who was involved in any court action to keep Rajiv Gandhi's image clean. Reappointment of leaders such as Abdulrehman Antullay would destroy the moral fabric of the Congress party and its president." So reason Sharad Pawar's supporters.

The way in which Sharad Pawar worked hard, against all odds, to help his 54 supporters win elections shows that he is the only person in Maharashtra who has direct contact with his supporters. He has supporters from Jalgaon to Vidharbha, and he has no peers in formulating election strategy. His supporters have the ability to translate their leader's desires into appropriate and winning actions, and Mr Pawar has the intelligence to make various coalitions and to understand various problems in a given election precinct. Very few of Sharad Pawar's political decisions are non-political. However, during the recent elections, especially in the seven senate election precincts in Bombay, he is thinking about running some candidates who have more popular acceptance. In the Muslim-majority south Bombay, Sharad Pawar wanted to have Nana Chudasma run from there, and appointed him the sheriff of that area. But now, his camp has started to throw around the name of Yusuf Khan, the popular movie star better known as Dilip Kumar, as a possible candidate. He is also aware of the mentality against the shooting that occurred to disperse the demonstration against Salman Rushdie's book. He is also aware of the increasing influence of Haji Masatan, the Muslim leader of this area. Dilip Kumar can be more effective in such a situation. We cannot ignore his efforts to cash on the popularity of such athletes as the cricket player Sunil Manohar Gavaskar. The Maharashtra Congress can form the battle strategy for each seat under the leadership of Sharad Pawar.

A person who knows the Maharashtra Congress of 10 years ago, with its ties to the progressive democratic forces, would be amazed if he looks at the political situation now. Paratibha Patil, who was the president of Congress and opposition leader at that time, may be the president of the party in power. The chief minister is still Sharad Pawar. Shiv Sena's Bal Thakre jokes that if Shiv Sena wins the elections, it will also appoint Sharad Pawar their chief minister!

Sharad Pawar's power had increased significantly after the death of Vasant Dada Patil. However, when Prakash Patil, the son of Dada Patil and the Congress legislator, won the election with the support of his sugar mill, the supporter of Dada Patil gained new confidence. He went to Delhi with a deputation to show his influence. Some supporters of Dada Patil were also included in this deputation. These people are trying to use pressure politics to present their demands to Sharad Pawar.

The inner strife in the Maharashtra Congress is forcing the [Congress (I)] party to change its policy at the

national level. The chief minister of Uttar Pradesh and the president of Bihar Congress have written a letter to the Congress high command suggesting that elections for the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha be held simultaneously. These leaders reasoned that simultaneous elections will help magnify the inner strife of the opposition. Maharashtra would be an exception to this. If Lok Sabha elections are held here earlier, then the interests of Sharad Pawar, Abdulrehman Antullay, Shivaji Patil Nilangekar, Nasikrao Tirpude, and Prakash Patil will not collide. Even if there are some skirmishes, these would not do much harm. The fight among the contending Maharashtra Congress leaders would be worth seeing, if the elections are held simultaneously. They will try to help the opposition candidates if they feel that their own candidates are losing! The elections for the Lok Sabha or Vidhan Sabha will become unimportant for Maharashtra Congress leaders in such a situation. Instead, they will focus on trying to defeat the Congress candidate of another group. [passage omitted]

Dr Rafiq Zakaria, the vice president of Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee, believes that one must consider three very important issues before criticizing Sharad Pawar's politics. First, why did Rajiv Gandhi admit Sharad Pawar and his associates into Congress even though he knew of his past? Second, why did the prime minister take 18 months to nominate Sharad Pawar as the chief minister? Third, why did Rajiv Gandhi stay with his decision to appoint Sharad Pawar the chief minister despite strong opposition from some groups?

Mr Zakaria continues, "Actually when Congress (S) joined Congress in Aurangabad, Rajiv Gandhi had said that Sharad Pawar was a valuable addition to the Congress. It took Rajiv Gandhi 18 months to decide, because he wanted to get to the bottom of the problem. His supporters, including veteran Congress members Umasankar Dikshit and Shankar Rao Chavhan, were opposing this decision. And despite all the opposition during the last 6 months, the prime minister still decided to appoint Sharad Pawar as chief minister." Rafiq Zakaria added, "Rajiv Gandhi's decision is not personal; it is political." He agrees with Mr Gandhi's decision because no other person has the capability to control the Maharashtra politics after the Shiv Sena becomes a political force.

Northeast Parties Rallying Against Congress-I

46001661 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 24 Aug 89 p 7

[Article by Prasun Sonwalkar: "North-East Parties Rally Against Congress"]

[Text] Guwahati, August 23—The possibility of direct contest in the north-east during the general election has brightened with the Mizo National Front [MNF], one of

the two regional parties in Mizoram, applying for affiliation to the National front, a forum expected to have a major say in seat distribution in Assam and other states in the region.

Already, the forum of regional parties of the north-east decided early this month at a meeting here to work towards amalgamating all regional parties in every state into a single party so as to ensure direct contests. Besides indicating a shift towards national parties and forums which were so far described in uncharitable terms by the regional parties, the recent moves also highlight the desperation of the regional parties against the open use of money power by the Congress and its attempts to buy votes during elections in the region.

In Mizoram, the People's Conference of Brig Sailo and the Mizo National Union of Mr Lalduhoma have already merged to form the Democratic Party. However, given the irreconcilable differences between Mr Laldenga and Brig Sailo, a merger of the MNF with the Democratic Party is virtually ruled out, but with the MNF seeking affiliation to the National Front, it is a near certainty that the two regional parties in the state would put up a joint candidate against the Congress, Mizoram has one Lok Sabha seat.

According to a resolution adopted at the forum of regional parties, "the Congress can be fought only through consolidation of regional forces and by having a common programme of action by all regional parties". In Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur a direct contest is clearly on the cards since in each of these states there is one major regional party: People's Party of Arunachal (PPA), Nagaland People's Council and the Manipur People's Party, which was in power in the seventies and which recently attracted many Congressmen to its fold.

However, the toughest test of any move to amalgamate regional parties is in Meghalaya where there are at least three regional parties and their myriad factions, most of whose legislators have crossed over to the Congress-led coalition since February 1988, when the assembly elections saw the Congress failing to win a majority. Securing defections from the opposition by the Congress has led to such a situation that its strength is less than that stipulated for appointment of a leader of the opposition in the house.

While the Congress has announced the candidature of Mr Peter Marbaninag, speaker of the assembly, as its candidate for the Shillong Lok Sabha seat, the three opposition parties, Hill People's Union, Hill State People's Democratic Party and the Public Demands Implementation Committee, have differences over the fielding of the present MP, Mr G. G. Swell, from the constituency.

While the HSPDP-PDIC combine favours Mr Swell for the Shillong seat, they left the Tura constituency for the HPU. This, however, has not gone down well with the HPU given the public resentment in the Garo hills over

the fact that all the elected HPU candidates had crossed over to the Congress-led coalition. If the Shillong seat is not left for the HPU candidate, it is believed that it would be the end of the HPU as a political party.

Sharing of seats between the National Front partners in Assam too would not be a smooth exercise. The Asom Gana Parishad is the dominant constituent in the state and of the 14 Lok Sabha seats, it is expected to contest at least ten, leaving the rest for the Congress (S), the Janata Dal and the Left parties. However, the prospect of a direct contest even in AGP strongholds—there are not many now—is threatened by the possible fielding of candidates by newly formed regional platforms with a strong anti-AGP line. Fielding of candidates would undoubtedly help Congress prospects.

It is being debated in political circles here that Mr Nibaran Bora, president of the Samyukta Lok Parishad, a leader credited with acceptability even among the tribals and others, would contest either from the Guwahati Lok Sabha constituency against Mr Dinesh Goswami or from the Karbi Anglong-north Cachar hills constituency where the autonomous state demands committee is likely to support him. A spokesman of the Jan Chatna Manch, the forum of non-AGP regional forces, said: "This time we will make sure that the all-Assam Students Union does not support the AGP candidate."

Papers Report Parties' Pre-Election Activities

Poll Registration Applications

46001646 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 14 Aug 89 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, Aug 13 (PTI): More than a hundred organisations and associations have sought registration with the Election Commission as political parties as the two-month deadline for it expires tomorrow.

This is besides the applications submitted by most of the 41 rational and state parties recognised by the commission, sources said.

The Congress(I), Congress(S), National Conference, Telugu Desam and the factions of the Akali Dal are expected to file their papers by the last day, enquiries with the parties show.

Under section 29-A of the Representation of the Peoples Act amended last year, political parties and any associations or bodies of individuals are required to make an application for registration with the Commission for recognition as political parties.

The provision was enforced by the Centre from June 15 this year. While existing political parties were given two months time to seek registration, associations or organisations coming into existence after June 15 have been given 30 days for the purpose.

Apart from giving the name of the organisation and other details, the amended law also required the parties

and associations to amend their constitution to swear allegiance to the Constitution of India and the principles of socialism, secularism, and democracy.

They were also required to swear to uphold the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.

The Commission has also sought certain additional particular from the parties like the political principles on which the associations were based, the policies, aims and objects they seek to pursue and some tangible proof of popular support, if any, enjoyed by them.

After considering the applications and offering a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Commission shall decide either to register the association as a political body or not to register it.

Under the election symbols (Reservation and Allotment) (Amendment) Order 1982, the Commission has made a special transitional provision under which every political party which is a national party or state party or registered unrecognised party before June 15 shall continue to be so until their registration applications are disposed of.

'Left ignored stir': The president of the Bihar unit of the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party], Mr Inder Singh Namdhari, today charged Left parties with not actively participating in the August 9 "Bharat bachao" day.

Addressing a press conference on the concluding day of the two-day state executive committee meeting here, Mr Namdhari said, "The move for Opposition unity suffered a jolt due to the indifferent attitude of the communist parties."

New National Front

46001646 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 13 Aug 89 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, Aug 12—Mr Rajinder Puri, who quit the Janata Dal on Thursday, has applied to the Election Commission for registration of an organisation launched by him, the National Front.

This organisation is different from the five-party National Front headed by the Andhra Pradesh chief minister, Mr N. T. Rama Rao.

In a press release, Mr Puri said he had forwarded the application in compliance with the provisions of the new electoral law, making it compulsory for associations and bodies wishing to contest the next general election to apply before August 14. Mr Puri hoped his organisation would be registered as a political party.

Mr Puri said he was not trying to pre-empt the formation of five-party National Front, whose constitution constituents' spoke of united action for the next election but refused to contest under a common symbol. He said legal provisions permitted various political parties to use a common symbol, but the Front members were not doing it because "their private intentions and calculations were different from their public professions."

Muslim Front Formed

46001646 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 12 Aug 89 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, Aug 11 (UNI)—A new national political party—the Muslim United Front—is expected to be formed soon with the aim of consolidating the Muslim votes and forming an alliance with other political parties in the coming general elections.

Representatives of three Muslim parties—the Muslim Majlis, Quami Morcha and the Muslim Youth Convention—recently held a meeting in this regard and decided to form the Front to avoid a split in Muslim votes, said Mr Javid Habib, one of the participants.

The meeting was convened by Naib Imam of Jama Masjid, Ahmed Bukhari, who urged the leaders of the three parties to work unitedly for redressal of the grievances of the Muslim community. A representative of the Uttar Pradesh Muslim League, Mohammed Sulaiman, also attended the meeting.

However Muslim Majlis members objected to the inclusion of the Muslim League in the Front because of its alliance with the Congress(I) in Kerala. The meeting decided that other prominent Muslim leaders should be consulted on the formation of the party.

Mr Javid Habib said support by prominent Muslim leaders was essential to make the Front a powerful one. There was consensus among the participants on the need to form an alliance with any national party, preferably with the Janata Dal, he added.

Mr Habib said it was agreed at the meeting to effect the merger of the Front parties after elections. A convention would be held were the merger resolution would be adopted.

The meeting convened by Ahmed Bukhari was attended among others by Qamar Qazmi (Muslim Majlis) Zafaryab Jilani, Dr Shamim Ahmed and Obeidullah Khan (all Quami Morcha) and Mr Habib of the Muslim Youth Convention.

Hindu Front

46001646 New Delhi PATRIOT
in English 14 Aug 89 p 3

[Text] Three Hindu organisations have decided to form a joint political front called "Hindustan Hindu Mahasangh" and put up candidates in the next general elections, reports PTI.

Disclosing this at a press conference in Delhi on Sunday, president of Hindu Mahasabha Balarao Savarkar, and president of Bharatiya Jana Sangh Balraj Madhok said the decisions were taken at a two-day meeting of the "Hindu Sansad" held in Delhi on August 10 and 11.

The three organisations which have joined the front are Hindu Mahasabha, Bharatiya Jana Sangh and 'Bharat Desam'. Discussions with other such organisations were continuing, they said.

Parties Listed

46001646 New Delhi PATRIOT
in English 15 Aug 89 p 6

[Text] A total of 216 parties and organisations, including 44 national and state parties, have sought recognition with the Election Commission as political parties when the two-month deadline for the purpose closed on Monday, reports PTI.

Among those who have sought recognition were all the seven national parties, 30 of the 34 state parties and 13 of the 18 registered parties. These included the Akali Dal (Barnala) and Muslim League, which were state parties, the Commission sources said.

A total of 166 new organisations and association of individuals, including the Janata Dal led by Mr V. P. Singh, the Akali Dal (Mann), Akali Dal (Baba Joginder Singh), Shaheed Akali Dal (Pheruman), Akali Dal (Master Tara Singh), GNLF, Shiv Sena, Dalit Muslim Suraksha Samiti of Haji Mastan, National front of Rajinder Puri and Telugu Nadu, a splinter group of Telugu Desam, have also submitted their papers for registration.

The registration is being sought under Section 29-A of the Representation of the People Act, amended last year, and enforced by the Central Government from June 15.

The parties and associations have been asked to amend their constitution and to swear allegiance to the constitution and principles of socialism and secularism. They were also required to uphold the unity, integrity and sovereignty of India.

The seen national parties that have sought registration are the Bharatiya Janata Party, CPI [Communist Party of India], CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist], Congress Socialist (S. C. Sinha) Janata Party, Lok Dal (Bahuguna) and the Indian National Congress, which submitted its papers on the last day.

Among the state parties, Telugu Desam, DMK [Dravidian Progressive Foundation], AIADMK [All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam], AGP [Assam People's Council], Sikkim Sangram Parishad and Forward Bloc have met the deadline.

The sources said on a preliminary scrutiny it was found that Kerala Congress(J), the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples' Conference, the Peoples' Conference of Mizoram and the Sikkim Prajatantra Congress have not applied for registration.

Among the registered parties those who have not done so are the Gandhi Kamaraj National Congress, Backward

and Depressed Peoples' Protection Front, Socialist Unity Centre of India (SUCI), Naga National Party and Jagrat of Orissa.

Some other new organisations seeking registration are Federal Party, All India Justice Party, Labour and Job Seekers Party, Jai Jawan Jai Kisan, Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Akhil Bharatiya Ram Rajya Party, Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Maha Sabha, Proutist Bloc of P. R. Sarcar, Amra Bangali of Tripura, Green Party of India, Indian National Congress (O), Tamiyazhaga Munnetra Munnani, Lakshadweep Vikasana Samiti, All India Majlis-I-Ittehadul Muslimeen, Karnataka Gana Parishad, Andhra Pradesh Janata Dal, Labour Party of India and Indiraji National Congress.

The Commission has made it clear that no association or party would be registered unless its memorandum or rules and regulations contained the allegiance provision.

The new provision was enforced by the Central Government from June 15 this year. While the existing political parties were given two months time to seek registration, associations or organisations coming into existence after June 15 have been given 30 days for the purpose.

The Commission had also sought certain additional particulars from the parties and associations like the political principles on which they were based, policies, aims and objects they seek to pursue and some tangible proof of popular support, if any, enjoyed by them.

After considering the applications and offering a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Commission shall decide whether to register the association as a political body or not.

Commentary Questions Janata Dal's Employment Promise

46240059 Bombay NAVABHARAT TIMES
in Hindi 4 Aug 89 p 6

[Article by Sajjan Srivastava: "Can You Really Give the Right To Work?"]

[Text] It seems that, as in love, it is easy to promise impossible or almost impossible things during an election campaign. In the present circumstances, the proclamation by Janata Dal, that it will include "the right to work" in the provisions of the Constitution should it come to power, appears to be such a promise. The leaders of Janata Dal do not even realize how big a promise they have made to the people of India. In comparison, a very simple and yet quite important promise was made by Morarji Desai when he became prime minister, the promise that he would eradicate poverty within 10 years. However, that was not an authorized part of the election manifesto of Janata Dal. Somewhat because of this reason, but mainly because the eradication of poverty or scarcity has never been a focal point of public discussion among the middle class people. Nobody could even consider whether or not it

was possible to do so, and, if so, how it should be done. Today, a similar situation is also evident. The proclamation of providing the "the right to work" is clearly visible like a rainbow in the sky, but down on the earth nobody mentions or discusses this topic. Not even the Congress is asking the question how will it be possible to bring the rainbow down to earth?

Undoubtedly, a slogan such as "the right to work" will have a better chance of clicking in electioneering than anything else. In a country where unemployment or semi-unemployment is rampant, what other political slogan can be more attractive than that of total employment? The proper thing to have happened after this proclamation would have been widespread sensation in the society and for everybody to talk about it. If there is no such sensation, as is the case, then it simply means that this slogan has not in any sense been comprehended or accredited. When the leaders of Janata Dal claim, by means of their newspaper statements or campaign speeches, that after coming to power they will provide work to everyone, no reaction is noted on the faces of the people, because they do not even know what it means. And those who understand its meaning do not believe that this is really possible. It is true that campaign promises are not given much credibility. The Indian people at least have enough political experience to be able to differentiate between true and false promises. However, we should not forget the fact that this is not an imaginary or airy promise. It is clearly stated that the "the right to work" will be included in the provisions of the Constitution. Then, what is the mystery behind the distrust?

The mystery is hidden within the proclamation of Janata Dal itself. The Dal only says that after coming to power it will provide for the right to work, but it does not say whether it will be promulgated immediately after amendment of the Constitution or whether the government will need some time to do so. It should be clear, even to a blind person, that it is impossible to provide for employment for everyone immediately. There is just not enough work, nor can it be produced overnight or even in a few years. Then will Janata Dal provide for unemployment compensation for the unemployed? The Dal is maintaining silence on this question. In Haryana, an unemployment allowance has been introduced since Aug 15, although the amount is meager. In West Bengal, this plan has been in effect in a limited manner. Except for a short interval, this has been in effect for a long period of time. But none of the parties have any plans to make this effective on national level. Janata Dal has been demanding this of Rajiv Gandhi, but it itself does not promise anything like it. Then how can one trust its promise of "the right to work"?

The second reason for not making the promise of "the right to work" trustworthy is the more important one. As a matter of fact, it is not an ordinary matter, it is a revolutionary task. To be sure, in the phrase "the right to work" the meaning of work is not the same as that used by the Congress in the context of Jawahar Employment

Program. It means availability of annual employment for good financial support. In order to provide for such employment, it will be necessary to make a revolutionary change in the economic system of the country, so that large land holdings may be terminated, and more and more people may become landowners. The industry, too, will need a face-lift. The country will have to be industrialized in a big way, and with great speed. In order to do this, only medium and small level technology will have to be adopted. It is a well-known fact that the most modernized and largest industries require more capital and create less employment opportunities. An extensive movement for industrialization can only be promoted by labor-based technology. But even to do this, a large amount of money will have to be invested. From where can we invest so much money? In order to procure a large capital we will have to prevent all kinds of luxury and unproductive expenditures. All centers of luxury entertainment will have to be closed down. Do we get any information on this kind of a program from the speeches and writings of Janata Dal?

Of course, some vague things have been said such as Janata Dal will reduce inequalities and will put a restraint on luxury and unnecessary expenditures, etc. But so far, it does not appear to be truly preparing a solid program to provide employment for everyone. In the 70-point manifesto of the National Front, we do find intent of such a program, but no concrete shape has been given to it. Just recently, Viswanath Pratap Singh, the president of Janata Dal, has started talking about a "line of richness". The fact of the matter is that without drawing a "line of richness," the "line of poverty" does not carry any meaning. Whatever additional amount is needed to lift the people from the line of poverty will have to come from the remainder of drawing the "line of richness". Viswanath Pratap Singh only says that there should also be a "line of richness." He does not say what that line should be, and what idea Janata Dal has to put that idea into effect.

PAKISTAN

Nusrat Bhutto Criticizes the Opposition

46560055 Islamabad HURMAT in Urdu
13-19 Jun 89 pp 11-15

[Interview by HURMAT Correspondent in Chitral]

[Text] [HURMAT] The People's program, started by the federal government, is being severely criticized. The chief ministers of Punjab and Balochistan have opposed implementation of this program in their provinces, whereas some groups are calling it interference in provincial autonomy. What are your views in this connection?

[Nusrat Bhutto] The groups that are opposing the People's Program believe that by implementing this program, the People's Party will become very strong, and our enemies do not want the People's Party to become

strong. The money spent on the People's Program belongs to the people, and, as such, this money should be given to all the provinces without any discrimination, so that this amount may be spent for the development and prosperity of the respective regions. Of course, we will select the officials who will supervise these programs, and who will also be in charge of spending the money allocated for these programs. We would like upright and honest people to come forward. General Zia gave tens of millions of rupees to every MNA [Member National Assembly] and MPA [Member Provincial Assembly], and, today, when we ask what work was accomplished with the national funds, we do not see anything.

Now, we do not give any money to MNA's or MPA's. They will join these programs as members, and they will decide which programs should be started.

People who object that the People's Party workers are being favored with these programs do not know that all the work is being done by the PWD [Public Works Department]. If any province objects to this program, then it is not good because these programs are for all the provinces. The country will be developed, and the rate of development will be accelerated still further.

[HURMAT] What do you think about the confrontation between the center and the Punjab?

[Nusrat Bhutto] The chief minister of Punjab is saying exactly the same things that Shaikh Mujibur-Rahman said in East Pakistan or some people said in the Frontier and Balochistan. What were these people telling them then? These people were saying that they are destroying Pakistan, that they are traitors, and, today, they themselves are saying the same things.

[HURMAT] What will the result of this confrontation be between the center and Punjab?

[Nusrat Bhutto] This confrontation is not in the best interest of the country and the nation. The center tried to put an end to this situation a number of times. God forbid if this confrontation were to continue. Then the other provinces, too, would say the same thing that one individual in the Punjab has been saying about provincialism, and they would start to speak in the same excessive tone. The situation here would be what it was in East Pakistan at that time. I believe that under the present circumstances, the country cannot afford to tolerate the prevailing conditions.

[HURMAT] Soon after coming into power, the People's Party announced it would put an end to drug trafficking in the country, but until now no progress has been made in the matter. Will you please tell us what your government plans to do in this connection?

[Nusrat Bhutto] As far as drug trafficking is concerned, even the educational institutions are not free from this curse. The present government took notice of this serious fact soon after coming into power. A separate department has been established to prevent drug trafficking

and smuggling of illicit drugs. Legal action will be taken against whoever is found to be involved, and no one will be spared.

[HURMAT] The Awami National Party withdrew from the coalition government in the Frontier Province, formed as a result of an agreement reached between it and the People's Party after its candidate for governor was not appointed to the post. In your opinion, what could be the reasons for not fulfilling the conditions of the agreement?

[Nusrat Bhutto] As far as I am concerned, I was not involved in this agreement. It was the leadership of our party in the Frontier province which arranged the agreement. All the same, I believe there was some misunderstanding in interpreting the terms and conditions of the agreement.

[HURMAT] The opposition is demanding the recognition of the interim government of the Afghan Mujahidin which has not been recognized by Pakistan until now. In your opinion, what are the obstacles preventing the recognition of the Afghan interim government?

[Nusrat Bhutto] There are no obstacles whatsoever. Whenever fighting breaks out anywhere in the world, as long as the belligerents do not occupy the land, in accordance with the prevalent traditions no one recognizes their government. In the United Nations, too, to gain recognition the region has to be occupied.

If the Afghan Mujahidin were to control all of Afghanistan, then, not only Pakistan, but the whole world would recognize their government. The current government in Pakistan fully abides by the terms and the conditions of the Geneva agreement, though these agreements were signed by our opponents. I believe this is another attempt on the part of our opponents to discredit our government.

I do not know much about the Geneva agreement, but from what I have read in the newspapers, it says that the Afghan refugees will return to their country after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But, because the conditions there are not favorable, the present government will continue to provide shelter to the refugees until their honorable return.

[HURMAT] When will the interim Afghan government be recognized?

[Nusrat Bhutto] We acknowledge the interim government, and, very soon, the ministers and leaders of this interim government will be accorded full diplomatic privileges. They will be able to fly the flag of their government on their cars. They will be provided with full security arrangements, and accorded full diplomatic facilities enjoyed by other diplomatic missions.

[HURMAT] With the coming into power of the People's Party, the price of consumer goods and food started

rocketing sky-high throughout the country causing suffering to the general public. What measures does your government intend to take against the trend of rising prices?

[Nusrat Bhutto] It is true that prices have risen. The trend in rising prices for the past 11 years created a very serious situation, and every effort is being made to halt this situation. As far as the causes for the rising prices are concerned, for the past 11 years, during Zia's dictatorship, there was no significant industrial development in the country, nor was any attention given to the cultivation of barren land. Today, evidence showing that nothing was done during this period is visible everywhere. Before this period, during the people's regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, innumerable industries were established. Cement, fertilizer, and other factories were set up and industrialists were provided with help for building factories. But later, during the martial law period, not only were no new factories set up, but the factories built in our days were given to thieves who sold the machinery in these factories.

[HURMAT] One other major problem facing the country is unemployment. What measures has your government adopted to solve this problem?

[Nusrat Bhutto] The current People's government, soon after coming into power, started planning to end unemployment. Soon after democracy was reestablished in the country, foreign investors expressed their willingness to invest in Pakistan. With the establishment of industries, many people were provided with employment. These foreign investors are being encouraged to invest their capital in this country. Besides, this foreign aid received will be used to provide employment for more people.

Our ministers have visited many countries with the purpose of providing jobs to our people, to explore opportunities to provide our manpower with jobs in foreign countries. After Mr Bhutto was executed, many countries stopped employing Pakistanis as a protest against the attitude of the Pakistani dictator. Pakistan's rulers gave the impression that the people of Pakistan were not being employed because they demand a lot of money. This suggestion was mischievous, because our hard working people work under all kinds of conditions. Now our labor minister has toured different countries and has had useful talks.

[HURMAT] The opposition leaders seriously criticized the government recently stating that the Pakistan People Party's government has expressed its willingness to allow an international organization to inspect Pakistan's nuclear installations. Is that true?

[Nusrat Bhutto] No never. These ignorant people do not know anything. To tell the truth, we only have two things. One is the nuclear electric plant which generates electricity by means of nuclear energy. The second is the Khota Plant. But I, too, know very little about the Khota installation because Mr Bhutto always kept it a closely guarded secret. Six months after the military government

came into power, the whole world and every child knew about the details of the Khota plant. By revealing the details of the Khota plant, Ziaul Haq committed an unpardonable crime. When Henry Kissinger came to Pakistan earlier, Mr Bhutto told him during a dinner engagement that Pakistan was ready for inspection of nuclear plant because the nuclear energy there was being used for peaceful purposes and which forms a part of our requirements.

[HURMAT] Will the foreign policy of the present government change, or will foreign minister Sahebzada Yaqub Khan continue to pursue the former foreign policy as usual?

[Nusrat Bhutto] During Mr Bhutto's People's government, our charter was that we will have good relations with all countries especially neighboring countries. During Ayub Khan's government, our relations with the Afghan government were not good. But as soon as Mr Bhutto came into power, our relations with that country improved, and our relations with Iran became much better. We had brotherly relations with China, and our relations with the Soviet Union and India changed for the better. In addition to this, Mr Bhutto had the honor of convening a conference of the Islamic heads of state. All member states attended this conference for the first time. As a result of the good relations with India, 7000 miles of Pakistani territory were recovered, and one hundred thousand soldiers were repatriated, otherwise India was bent upon trying each and everyone of the Pakistani soldiers.

All these are the achievements of the People Party's government. Our opponents are trying to undo these achievements, but they cannot undo history, and all of this will be recorded on the pages of history.

The Pakistan People's Party's government too would like to have good relations with all countries based on the principles of equality.

[HURMAT] Your appointment in the government as a senior federal minister is also being criticized. What do you have to say about this criticism?

[Nusrat Bhutto] All of this is being done under a well organized plan. Last week a newspaper in Islamabad published some pictures to say that the senior minister's car is even bigger than that of an emperor. But the fact is that 19 years ago, the Saudi Arabian king gave Mr Bhutto a car as a present. Since Mr Bhutto considered this car was given to him as the head of a state he did not have the right to this car and hence he gave it to the government. Later, he used this car for a number of years on an official basis. When general Zia came into power after martial law, he never used anything that was used by Mr Bhutto and he did not use this car either. This car was standing idle and was very nearly sold and the money appropriated. The drivers who respected Mr Bhutto looked upon this car as a mark of his token and concealed this car for his view. By that time the condition of the car had considerably deteriorated. After the

People's Party came into power, instead of buying a new car, I was given this car which is the smallest rolls royce. Since our opponents would like to take advantage of everything against us, they made a big issue out of this car and tried to start a big uproar about this 19 year old car.

[HURMAT] A little while ago, you said that Ziaul Haq never used personal effects belonging to Mr Bhutto. Can you explain why?

[Nusrat Bhutto] Ziaul Haq came into power by unfair means, and after coming into power, he executed the popular leader of the people and a leader of the third world. He was under constant fear that Mr Bhutto's spirit would devour him. This is why he was afraid of the things used by Mr Bhutto. So much so that he never lived on the second floor of the Government house in Punjab. Instead, he built a big room for himself on the lower level, and got all the telephone connections removed to the room on this floor. Later on Ziaul Haq found that, because of the incoming cars, the lower floor was very noisy. He ordered that all cars coming into the government house should be parked outside. It is quite evident that only a dictator can issue such orders.

[HURMAT] What is the policy of your government with regard to the press?

[Nusrat Bhutto] After coming into power, the People Party's government, in accordance with democratic principles, removed all restrictions imposed by the former government. But this does not mean that lies should be published in the papers, and the people should be misled. Most of the papers may write against us. But according to democratic principles, they should at least find out our point of view so that the people may know the views of both the parties. It has been seen that some newspapers are taking undue advantage of the freedom of the press. I am considering making the punishment for defamation stricter, and I intend to forward a bill in the cabinet meeting. In this connection, we will make good and reliable laws resembling those in the United States and Britain to put an end to abuse of freedom of the press.

[HURMAT] In Pakistan, every incoming government criticizes the preceding government. This is what is happening right now. Would you like to say something about the former government?

[Nusrat Bhutto] Everyone is well aware of what happened to the people and the democratic institutions of this country during Zia's dictatorship. During the same regime, the elected prime minister of the people was dismissed from office and executed. Zia is the assassin of Mr Bhutto and Shahnawaz Bhutto. He even tried to eliminate Benazir Bhutto by a process of slow poisoning. With this purpose in mind, poison was added to Benazir's medicine, and, when her condition took a turn for the worse, she understood the cause and threw away all the medicine. And now even Zia's friends do not want us

to succeed, and they are conspiring against us. But the people will never join their conspiracies.

Government Allegedly Bypassing Standard Hiring Procedures

46560064A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 1 Aug 89 p 3

[Editorial titled "The People's Party and the Civil Services"]

[Text] Another point raised by professor Khurshid Ahmed during a speech in the Senate should not be overlooked. He said that the government is completely ignoring the Public Service Commission [PSC], and is appointing high public servants on the recommendation of a newly invented commission called the Placement Bureau. This has destroyed the very meaning of the civil service. He said this matter concerns thousands of people, and the government should give it due consideration. The PSC cannot be done away with if it happens to have some technical faults. The faults can be corrected. He said he had asked the minister of state for parliamentary affairs to give him the information on this, but had received none. Our rulers know that the Constitution has rules and regulations regarding the appointment of civil servants and the duties they are supposed to perform. Then where is the justification for making the officials obey the Placement Bureau? First, General Baber denied that any such order had been given. Then, this order was given, and the officials concerned were threatened with dire consequence if they disobeyed it. Why is all of this happening when the Constitution says that from grade 17, PSC will select officials on the basis of merit and the quota-system. Nobody would be selected on a political basis. The public servants would have no connection with politics. The Constitution wanted to keep the civil service free from politics. But the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] has made the civil service a part of politics. If civil service jobs can be given on a political basis, then the only people deserving these jobs are the workers of the Pakistan Movement. But the PPP, in order to give civil service appointments to its own workers, has suspended the organization of the civil services until next November. At the moment, neither age, nor education, nor merit is considered in the selection of a civil servant. The government has cleared the way for the selection of the people of a certain political party in the civil service. People educated at the Nai Roshni schools are being turned out of their jobs. Ad hoc appointees are also losing their jobs. Because of the manner in which the PPP is behaving, the civil service organization will soon lose its meaning. That will be a great tragedy for the country and its people. It has been noted that the present government is trying to make the civil servants obey the orders of the ruling party, rather than the laws of the land. The Placement Bureau is only appointing those officials who are likely to follow the policies of the PPP. The civil servants duty has always been to guide the elected government to rule the country according to the laws of the land. If the ruling party does not like a law, it

has to take the matter to the Constitutional or Legislative Assembly and get a new law passed.

We have always given constructive criticism through these columns. We have always called the attention of the government to matters that have great national significance. Ever since this government came into power, the law and order situation in the country, especially in Sind, has deteriorated. In that province, robbery, arson, decoity, and abduction have become everyday occurrences. Why haven't things improved after the elected government came into power? There can be only two reasons for this. Either the government does not realize how serious the situation has become, or the troubled situation of the country somehow serves a purpose for the ruling party. Otherwise, why haven't they been able to control the law and order situation in the land, when they possess all the means and powers to do so. The political problems would have been solved long ago if the rulers had given as much attention to improving law and order in the country as they have been giving to browbeating the opposition. As professor Khurshid Ahmed has said, democracy is another name for criticism. The rulers should not be frightened by it. On the other hand, they should welcome constructive criticism. The higher your political position, the more accountable you will be for your actions. Nobody is above accountability and responsibility. Senator Khurshid Ahmed said that the federal minister of states, Frontier areas, Kashmir, and Northern Areas, laid his hands on a high officer of his own department. This was a shameful occurrence. This is against the rules of democracy as well as the rules of Islam. The government should take note of it. Nobody-be it president, prime minister, minister, or consultant-can be allowed to play with another's honor. Even when a minister does not like a government official, he has no right to come to blows with him. It is against all rules of decency. He should have brought a law suit against him. The action of the said minister is a threat to the whole civil service. The duty of the civil servant is to run the government according to the policies of the ruling party. But these policies have to be based on the constitutional laws of the land. Civil servants are always non-political and non-partisan. They do not take a practical part in politics. No political party has the right to make civil servants its cat's paw, and consider itself to be above the law. The ruling party should not try to establish its own gestapo and rule the country by fascism. Our history tells us that when a newly converted king slapped a common man, the muslim leader Omar bin Khatab allowed the common man to treat the king in the like manner.

Journalist's Arrest Condemned

46560064B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 9 Aug 89 p 3

[Editorial titled "Don't Trample the Freedom of the Press]

[Text] A perfectly innocent journalist has been arrested at the command of a government that claims to be a

protector of freedom of the press. The former government had abolished the press and publications ordinance, and had given the press the freedom to publish what it believed to be true. If the government thinks that the newspapers are overstepping their legal boundaries, it should prove its point, and give newspapers the right to present their defense. Contrary to these rules, the present government has arrested Zahid Malik, the editor of the daily THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER and weekly HURMAT (both published from Islamabad). He is also the joint secretary of APNS [All Pakistan Newspapers Society]. He has been arrested on the grounds that his recently published book, "Dr. Qadeer and the Islamic Bomb", has revealed some sensitive defense secrets. Zahid Malik will have to reveal the names of the government officials who helped him reveal those secrets. He has been kept under arrest in the office of the FIA [Federal Investigation Agency]. Mr. Zahid Malik's only crime is criticizing the policies of the PPP's [Pakistan People's Party] government in THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER, an evening newspaper. A team of FIA police arrested him without a warrant, and confiscated all of the printing plates of the said book, along with six hundred printed copies of the book, some bound and some unbound.

This arrest shows us the falsity of the government's claim of being a protector of freedom of the press. THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER has been criticizing the government's pro-India policy. Recently, on the occasion of Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan, this paper displeased the rulers by revealing some of the government's underhanded dealings with India. The ruling party had already stopped giving this newspaper the publication of government advertisements, but the newspaper had continued its policy of journalistic independence. That is why, contrary to its claims of being a defender of free press, the government has arrested Zahid Malik. Arresting him without a warrant was unlawful and unethical. If he is a criminal in its eyes, why didn't the government indict him in an open court of law? His arrest is a challenge to free journalism. A meeting of the CPNE [Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors] will be called to consider this matter. There is no denying the fact that the publication of the book is just an excuse for arresting him. All of the items in the book had already been published in different newspapers, and two editions of the book were already on the market. How did this book suddenly grow so dangerous to the country's defense? In reality, Zahid Malik has been arrested just for criticizing the policies of the government. Such narrow-mindedness does not suit a government that claims to be a champion of the free press. We would like to ask the government why it has not indicted the officials who dropped papers containing top secret information in a hotel corridor? The government has suppressed the news of the irresponsible government official, and instead, has arrested a perfectly innocent journalist.

There is nothing in Zahid Malik's book that can harm national security. The government has not specified the

law according to which this book can be banned, nor has it pinpointed the parts of the book that are objectionable. The truth is that the accusations are perfectly baseless. The government is revengeful of this senior journalist, because he fearlessly criticizes their policies. An author was arrested after his book had been banned. Such a thing has never happened in any democratic period in the country. Zahid Malik writes for the opposition. The government should remember that harrasing, arresting, and trying to limit the power of the opposition will give the ruling party a bad name. It will strengthen the suspicion that the government cannot answer the opposition's attacks by argument, and is trying to make them silent by using unfair means. Instead of harrasing the author, they should point out the objectionable matter contained in the book. If the rulers sincerely believe in a free press, they should stop bothering the opposition journalists. Do they want to lose popular support? Do they want the people to think there is a contradiction between their words and deeds?

Commentary Alleges U.S. Directs Bhutto's Foreign Policy

46560066 Karachi JANG in Urdu 13 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by Maulana Kausar Niazi: "A Dangerous Plot by the Israeli Lobby"]

[Excerpts] [Passages omitted] When the sun of democracy rose after the long tenure of the martial law regime, the people expected the new government, formed under the Bhutto name, to make some progress in the area of foreign policy, a neglected area during the martial law regime. But a review of the developments during the last 8 or 9 months shows that while our internal affairs are in bad shape, the external affairs are even worse. As a result of our internal policies, the nation is burning with hate and prejudice. The life, property, and honor of our citizens are in constant danger. The demon of inflation is sucking the people's blood. Flour is expensive, and the honor of a poor man cheap. The state and the central government are fighting for supremacy. The ethics of the elected officials are bought and sold openly, and due to the number of ministers, Pakistan is becoming a "Waziristan" [a country of ministers]. Let us forget these ministers as their number is blamed on the 11 years of the martial law regime. Instead, let us look at the external interference in our internal affairs. When we were slaves of the British, we were being ruled by a British viceroy. Now that we are free, we are spending our lives under a U.S. viceroy, known as the U.S. ambassador. This viceroy participates at a high level to help formulate our policies. He openly gives the credit to his country for bringing the Pakistan People's Party to power. He regularly issues statements telling what stand Pakistan should take on the various issues, and he issues instructions to the bureaucracy telling them what attitude to take toward each agency.

The situation has changed dramatically. During the 70's, the term "American agent" was the worst political insult.

These days, one openly shows pride in being an "American agent." No one remembers the oppressed people of the third world or the unity of Islam. Proposals are being presented to make Pakistan a personal property, or to use the words of the late poet Shorash' "a wrist watch and a walking stick," of the United States.

Benazir Bhutto's proposal to form an organization of democratic countries during her trip to the United States is considered part of this scheme. She had proposed establishing an organization of all democratic countries to help each other.

The simpletons in our ruling parties are so proud of the commendation presented by the U.S. Senate over this proposal. They are never tired of calling Benazir a world class intellectual. Our press has generally kept quiet about it, and a few comments only hinted it to be another of "India's interferences." The opposition leaders refused to even mention it. This humble writer, who is disappointed with the political situation in the country, could not remain silent. First, I tried to tell the people about this problem in public meetings in Lahore and Islamabad. Now, through these lines, I am trying to get the attention of the portion of our countrymen who can think and understand it better. I want them to understand this dangerous plan of the Israeli lobby.

It is not necessary to explain how strong the Jewish or the Israeli lobby is in the United States. It controls all the communication media there. It also has supremacy over the Senate, as most of the prominent senators were elected through its help, have received political contributions from it, or are members of this religion. It considers Islamic unity to be the greatest barrier in its path. It has already managed to destroy Arab unity through conspiracies. Now, it is aiming against Pakistan which has been more Arabic than the Arabs on the Palestine issue. Pakistan's importance has increased because of the possibilities of its becoming an atomic power. The United States has always tried to improve relations between Pakistan and Israel. Of course, Pakistan has never accepted such open efforts, therefore, some indirect efforts are being made to achieve this goal. The proposal made by Benazir Bhutto was a part of these efforts. The following could be the results if such a proposal is implemented.

1. The United States will succeed in making the United Nations even more ineffective with the help of Pakistan. The United States is wary of the numerical strength of the Third world countries in the United Nations, and had to use its clout in the Security Council to sabotage various resolutions passed in the United Nations. The establishment of this organization of the democratic nations would help the United States to get rid of the United Nations slowly.

2. Pakistan can also hurt the non-aligned nations group by helping to establish this new organization. The democratic members of the non-aligned organizations will start to ignore its decisions and follow the guidelines

issued by the new association. This new organization, of course, will be led by the United States which does not recognize the word non-aligned.

3. Pakistan will be cut off from the Muslim world also. Because, except for Malaysia and Pakistan, there is no other Islamic country that can be called a democracy according to the Western criteria. It does not matter how democratic Iran is, the United States will call it the number one enemy of democracy, because of the religious government there. And, of course, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. That would be killing two birds with one stone. Pakistan will be cut off from the Islamic world and the OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) will become less effective.

4. By joining (or rather being the founder) of such an organization, Pakistan will not be able to balance its relations with the two superpowers. It will become so close to the United States that its relations with the Soviet Union will become strained. It is not difficult to guess the results of having strained relations with a neighboring superpower.

5. Most of all, Israel and Pakistan will become closer as both will be members of this organization. Israel is not only a democratic country in the eyes of the United States, but also it cannot be denied admission to the organization regardless of what meaning we give to the word democracy. Benazir Bhutto has not mentioned that Israel would not be a member of this organization. Should she ever say anything about it, the reaction in the U.S. Senate will be heard around the world.

It is sad that our prime minister has verified our assumptions by making this proposal. She has clearly shown that our government is fully dependent on the United States. It appears that she has even deserted the route of independent foreign policy that her late father had followed. She does not care for the poor and the oppressed in the Third World or the unity of the Islamic world. She wants to establish a camp that will be led by the United States with India, being the worlds greatest democracy, its life and soul!

I wonder if she has ever though how she will answer a disrespectful question from me. What if I ask her how she hopes to run an organization at an international level when she has failed at running the federation of four states in the country?

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